Critiquing the SNIJ Hypothesis with Corsica and Hawai'i

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ABSTRACT: This article incorporates an island Indigenous perspective into a discussion of the popular sub-national island jurisdiction (SNIJ) hypothesis that focuses on cultural and political aspects. Corsica and Hawai'i both fit the SNIJ profile; but, in each case, the island Indigenous population is excluded from the benefits that accrue to affiliated islands. An Indigenous perspective on the question of affiliation includes consideration of cultural factors like language and identity in addition to political elements like sovereignty, independence, and affiliation. Any SNIJ or independent small island that bears a colonial history requires accounting for the island Indigenous populations as distinct elements. Corsicans and Hawaiians alike have suffered loss of language, land, and lifeways since their transitions from independence to dependency, demonstrating that measures beyond the economic and socio-demographic need to be taken into account when determining the well-being of an island territory in its particular stage of decolonization.

Keywords: Corsica, decolonization, Hawai'i, independence, indigeneity, islands, subnational island jurisdiction (SNIJ)

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Introduction

Several small island territories historically colonized, or otherwise controlled by external powers, presently find themselves enjoying some degree of political autonomy within the historically dominating state, yet still fall short of sovereign independence. Claims of the various benefits that apparently accrue to this particular political status of sub-national island jurisdiction (SNIJ) have recently gained traction in the island studies literature (e.g. Baldacchino and Hepburn, 2012; Baldacchino and Milne, 2006; Bartmann, 2006), but in our opinion this hypothesis overlooks important aspects of postcolonial island societies. In this article we use an anthropological approach to critique the SNIJ hypothesis based on its neglecting to distinguish between Indigenous inhabitants and other occupants, and its focus on economic factors to the exclusion of social, cultural, and political aspects. These two aspects form a single critique: that the emphasis on economic measures fails to effectively account for what Indigenous peoples have experienced as a result of colonization because the direct impacts of colonization are concentrated in other, important, non-economic social, cultural,
and political aspects. We use Corsica and Hawai‘i as our examples because they fit the criteria of small island SNIJs but are absent from the published meta-analyses. They both appear to fit the pattern predicted by the SNIJ model, until a distinction is made between Indigenous and other inhabitants of the islands; they have similar histories insofar as each was historically independent and since annexation each has been subject to shifting degrees of autonomy and political integration; they both feature contemporary independence movements; and we have conducted ethnographic research in each place (Androus in Corsica, Greymorning in Hawai‘i), which is central to an anthropological approach. The SNIJ meta-analyses collectively address geographically disparate islands on the premise that ‘small island’ is itself a sufficiently meaningful distinction (this includes archipelagic territories like the Cook Islands, Faroe Islands, and Malta); Corsica and Hawai‘i both meet the criteria of small islands and our firsthand experiences there permit us to speak with a degree of confidence that we cannot claim for other small islands. While this article is not an ethnographic analysis, we draw examples from our time in the field to illustrate aspects of our critique, and our discussion throughout is informed by the particular perspective that results from ethnographic participant-observation.

The core shortcoming of the SNIJ hypothesis is its failure to distinguish between Indigenous and other populations in surveying the benefits of affiliation over independence. Distinctions between Indigenous and other occupants remain salient in many of the small island territories in the world, but they are almost entirely overlooked in the SNIJ literature. Baldacchino and Milne (2006), McElroy and Pearce (2006), Oberst and McElroy (2007), and McElroy and Lucas (2014) all identify benefits of remaining affiliated to a larger metropolitan state by comparing SNIJs to their independent counterparts. Yet the broad indicators on which they rely are blind to the political, social, and cultural conditions created by postcolonial island conditions, the negative consequences of which tend to accrue disproportionately to the Indigenous populations of colonized or otherwise occupied territories. No distinction is made between the island’s Indigenous and settler populations in any of these surveys, despite the widespread tendency for colonized populations to suffer social and economic deprivations, both prior to and following decolonization. Finally, the suggestion that islands remain SNIJs by dint of a choice that they are making, as when Baldacchino and Milne (2006) propose that “opting for non-sovereign jurisdictional status may be a highly rational, strategic choice” (p. 490, emphasis ours), overlooks the very real legacies of the historical and contemporary campaigns of domination carried out by annexing and occupying states, to say nothing of the ongoing paternalism evident in the structure of the political relationships between occupied islands and their metropolitan states that frequently precludes Indigenous access to political power and influence. Furthermore, it makes no accounting for the possibility that Indigenous interests may differ from those of other island occupants. We argue for a more nuanced approach to the phenomenon of SNIJs that takes into account the social, cultural, and political aspects of decolonization by acknowledging the existence of Indigenous populations in contemporary small island societies.

By Indigenous, we mean the people generally recognized to be the original inhabitants of the island relative to subsequent arrivals. While including cultural, ethnic, and social elements, this is essentially a political designation by virtue of the sovereignty intrinsic to the acknowledged original inhabitants of a territory (Champagne, 2005, pp. 5-6). In respect to distinguishing one territory from another and marking the historic arrival of outsiders, a small island must be among the most unambiguous of imaginable geographies. Small island
territories currently feature a number of communities present for reasons other than being descended from the historically recognized original inhabitants. The specific circumstances of which groups are present for what reasons vary from island to island; while not the case for small islands universally, the basic distinction between an Indigenous population and other groups can be made for many, if not most, small island territories in the world.

Our study follows others in which the language of colonialism has been applied to cases that are not formal colonies, including Corsica (Reid, 2004) and Hawai‘i (Meller & Feder Lee 1997), as well as southern Italy (Gramsci, 1969; Verdicchio, 1997). By colonialism, we mean any structured enterprise on the part of a national interest to occupy, expropriate, and exploit the natural and human resources of a place in a fundamental breach of the sovereignty of that place’s known inhabitants, whether or not they were formally structured as colonies. Colonialism is further characterized by a simultaneous claim, on the part of the colonizers, to their own modernity and the lack of modernity on the part of the Indigenous (Mignolo, 2001; Quijano & Wallerstein, 1992).

In arguing the need to acknowledge Indigenous populations in both independent and sub-national small island jurisdictions, we take no issue with the premise of investigating small islands as a distinct category of analysis. We accept and support the basic premise that small islands are sufficiently distinctive as to warrant an analysis separate and apart from other political units or arrangements. The very premise of island studies as a distinct field is based on the notion that islands share a set of features that other territories do not. In the case of the SNIJ versus independent question, this includes being a small island and having a historical relationship with a colonizing or otherwise occupying, typically mainland, power. For these reasons, we do not necessarily find the broader literature on state formation, versions of federalism, degrees of autonomy, or other governing arrangements between states and territories in general necessary to develop our critique. We accept that small islands are in and of themselves a meaningful category of analysis, and we agree that a discussion of affiliation versus independence is worthwhile. Our contention, that such a discussion requires an acknowledgment of the difference between Indigenous and other occupants of small island territories, should not be taken as a position that the SNIJ in itself is not a meaningful unit of analysis relative to independent small islands. Instead, we contend that evaluating the benefits of affiliation versus independence needs to take into account the differences between Indigenous and other island occupants.

The anthropological approach on which our critique is based seeks to account for the particular historical circumstances by which societies find themselves in their present circumstances. This does not preclude collective classifications like SNIJs, but it does require attention to the complexity inherent in each individual case. The legacy of occupation common to small islands suggests that some kind of acknowledgment of island Indigenous populations could be incorporated into the SNIJ meta-analysis, but doing so would require going beyond the information available in the CIA World Factbook. Such a meta-analysis is beyond the scope of this article, in which we aim to illustrate the importance of including social and cultural aspects together with political and economic elements. Our perspective is informed by anthropology’s various critiques of the postcolonial political-economic system (e.g. Gardner and Lewis, 1996, 2015; Marcus and Fischer, 1999; Wolf, 1982) and by the perspective of critical ethnography (see Law, 2004; Thomas, 1993). Specifically, we aim to deliver a “close analysis of local situations with the aim of re-envisioning flawed models of macrosystems” (Marcus and Fischer, 1999, p. 81). We challenge the premise of “value-free
facts” (Thomas, 1993, p. 21) by highlighting the context of the colonial legacy and the interests served by the kinds of development that the SNIJ model addresses. Ours is one of those studies that seek to “present the equivalent of ethnographic perspectives on their subjects at critical junctures of their analyses” (Marcus and Fischer, 1999, p. 81). And because “to an ethnographer, sorting through the machinery of distant ideas, the shapes of knowledge are always ineluctably local” (Geertz, 2000, p. 4), we find it paramount to draw on our direct experiences of participant-observation for examples supporting our critique. We first present a brief historical overview of the political and cultural situations on each island, followed by an assessment of their profiles based on the widely used measures of SNIJ prosperity, before considering Indigenous perspectives on decolonization in Corsica and Hawai’i.

Historical backgrounds

In an early formulation of the premise that remaining affiliated brings greater benefits, Royle claims that the “universal commonality about all islands” is that “each of them has been subject to extra-territorial political control” (1989, p. 107). While universal may be an overstatement, this is certainly true for both Corsica, annexed by France in 1769, and Hawai’i, annexed by the United States in 1898 (following a United States backed coup d’etat in 1893). In each of these cases, the establishment of the extra-territorial control was resisted both by the local governments in place at the times and by the local populations of each of these island nations. Royle’s (1989) treatment of these two islands is instructive: he includes neither Corsica nor Hawai’i in his survey of “islands not fully independent” (p. 108), but he mentions each in passing. Hawai’i is cited as a “typical case of the vulnerability of small islands” (1989, p.110), but only insofar as it was the site of a Japanese attack against the United States, an ironic comment given Hawai’i’s forceful takeover by the United States. (A point of fact is, Hawaiians argue that no attack would have occurred had Hawai’i not been in U.S. hands, since the target was specifically the United States’ naval base, rather than anything Hawaiian.) Royle (1989) mentions Corsica to demonstrate the various ways in which island territories have been transferred between greater powers, noting that Corsica was “purchased” (p. 107) from the Republic of Genoa by France; but fails to mention the wars fought by Genoa and France against Corsica to effect this arrangement. Understanding the particular history of how any given island became subject to extra-territorial political control is essential to deciphering the complex situations vis-à-vis their present political, cultural, and social circumstances.

Corsica

Corsica’s geography has determined much of its historical relationship with mainland powers in the vicinity in two main ways: first, its strategic location adjacent to both the Italian peninsula and the continental mainland made control of its ports desirable to maritime republics and mainland powers alike. Second, its overwhelmingly mountainous character made control of the interior not worth the trouble for those same interests. More than once in Corsica an author has been offered the explanation that the Corsicans of old simply relinquished control of the coasts to foreign powers and were more or less left to themselves in the vast rugged interior. As with hostile colonial zones throughout the world, it was the Church that spearheaded the first presence of the European political establishment of the day, with its claims of territory and administrative control. With the backing of the Pope, the
Bishop of Pisa established a system of parishes in the interior towards the end of the eleventh century. By the middle of the twelfth century Genoa was contesting Pisa’s claim; Rome’s attempt to divide the island between the two republics ended with Genoa taking over the territories allotted to Pisa; the ensuing years saw Genoa struggling to hold the island in the face of attempted invasions by the Crown of Aragon and ongoing rebellions from the interior. By the middle of the sixteenth century Genoa had settled into a period of relatively stable rule that lasted until the brief interlude of independence preceding French rule (Carrington, 1971, p. 290-291). The sale of Corsica to France to which Royle (1989, p. 107) refers had happened in 1768 (although he erroneously gives the date as 1760), almost forty years after the original revolt against the failing Genoese state and thirteen years after the constitution which established a republican government on the island. Thirty thousand French troops took a year to put down an army of mostly untrained volunteers less than one third their number (Carrington, 1973, pp. 485-491), a detail perhaps more salient to Royle’s purpose of illustrating the ways in which the possession of islands is transferred between states.

By the end of the nineteenth century the French state had begun to gradually develop roads and introduce public schools. Schooling in French had several consequences, more or less consistent with the cultural consequences of colonization found elsewhere in the world: among these, the Corsican language shifted from a first language to a second one characterized by concentration among older speakers and disappearance from traditional domains. French schooling naturally served as a means to encourage labor emigration through its combined promulgation of the official language to the exclusion of Corsican, and encouragement of the idea that education is a pathway to qualifications that allow one to work in a ‘modern’ occupation on the continent or elsewhere in the world as part of a French colonial administration. Over the course of the twentieth century this trend created a consistent pattern of labor emigration out of Corsica (Hossay, 2004, pp. 407-408). While a development plan based on an extensive survey of the island’s conditions was written in 1795, it was never acted upon. The first actual development programs for Corsica were not put into place by France until 1957 (Willis, 1980, p. 346), by which point the mainland had been modernizing for generations (Aminzade, 1984; Brown 1969). Over the next decade those programs ended up benefitting resettled French colonials from North Africa, continental French enterprises, and seasonal employees from the mainland in the burgeoning tourist sector, all at the expense of the local productive economy (Hossay, 2004, pp. 408-409). By the 1970s local sentiments had coalesced into collective action framed in increasingly nationalist terms, with the first deadly confrontation between nationalists and French police occurring in 1975. Nationalist violence continued until a 2014 voluntary cease-fire was announced in the hopes of generating support for a campaign of amnesty for jailed Corsican nationalists. An alliance formed by a pro-autonomy nationalist party and a separatist nationalist party won a clear majority of votes in the December 2015 election, giving them 24 of 51 seats in the local assembly, on a platform of increased legislative powers for the island (“Electoral success in Corsica,” 2015).

**Hawai’i**

Sustained contact between Europeans and the Hawaiian islands began at the end of the eighteenth century with disastrous consequences for the Native population of the islands. Within a few generations, the population had been dramatically reduced (the pre-contact population is a matter of politically charged debate; estimates of the degree of population loss
range from 50% to 90%; see Meller and Feder Lee, 1997, p. 169), and as early as 1838, the islands’ government was pressured to draw into the world political system via the emergence of a government compatible with the European designed system of sovereign states, be they republican or monarchical. One example is a letter by U.S. politician and educational missionary William Richards, who writes “I endeavored as much as possible to draw their minds to the defects of the [Indigenous] Hawaiian government…and often contrasted them with the government and practices of enlightened nations” (quoted in Kameʻeleihiwa 1992, p. 174). The obvious intent of such discourse was to impress upon Hawaiians that to acquire the wealth of enlightened nations land must be bought and sold. Richards was instrumental in the land reform introduced by the 1839 Declaration of Rights, which restricted traditional authority over land in the interest of the colonizing settler class, and represented those same interests in his advocacy for the 1840 Constitution (Kameʻeleihiwa, 1992, p. 174-177). The Kingdom of Hawai‘i that emerged from these radical transformations faced increasing pressure from foreign elements to facilitate international economic and military interests, leading to the breakdown of traditional land management structures and the introduction of private land ownership (Trask, 1993, pp.7-10). U.S. settler colonial landowners organised the overthrow of the Hawaiian government in 1893 (Trask, 1993, p. 16). The U.S. media immediately deployed the spectre of Hawai‘i falling into British hands as inimical to U.S. interests, but in fact Britain showed little interest in interfering with U.S. annexation (Tate, 1967). Instead, President Grover Cleveland’s official position was that the overthrow of the Hawaiian monarch had been unlawful,

the source of the revolt against the constitutional Government of Hawai‘i … a detachment of marines from the United States Steamer Boston, [that had] landed upon the soil of Honolulu was itself an act of war.

President Cleveland’s position had the effect of stalling formal annexation by the United States until his successor William McKinley took power and moved forward with the acquisition of Hawai‘i (Trask, 1993, p. 20). Meller and Feder Lee attribute the origins of the contemporary Hawaiian sovereignty movement to the social pressures created by political and economic changes forced by outside interests that Hawaiians faced prior to the overthrow of the monarchy in 1893 (1997, p. 169). They locate the emergence of the contemporary activist structures in the 1970s, following various cultural revival movements of the 1960s (1997, p. 171). At the time of this writing in February 2016, an ‘Aha, or a political gathering, is currently underway “to establish a path to Hawaiian self-determination” (Na‘i Aupuni 2016), the latest in an ongoing series of efforts by Hawaiians to have their sovereign rights acknowledged by the United States.

Corsica and Hawai‘i as SNIJs

The island studies literature shows broad support for the position that remaining politically affiliated with a former colonial power creates a set of economic and social benefits for small islands, offsetting the limits to economic and social development that they typically face. McElroy and Pearce’s (2006) appraisal of dependency’s benefits compared 25 different economic, social, and demographic measures for 55 islands with under a million inhabitants. Oberst and McElroy (2007) included 58 islands with populations up to three million in their
comparison of outcomes for two different types of small island economy. McElroy & Parry’s (2012) assessment of independent versus SNIJ over a thirty year period addressed 55 islands of less than one million in population. McElroy and Lucas (2014) introduced a measure of geographic distance to their similar set of economic and social indicators for 35 islands with populations under 3 million. While neither Corsica nor Hawai‘i appear in any of these analyses, with populations of approximately 322,000 and 1.4 million respectively, they can fairly be considered small islands. All of the aforementioned studies rely on the CIA World Factbook as a source for economic, social, and demographic data. Neither Corsica nor Hawai‘i appear in the Factbook, which likely explains their absence from these comparative surveys, which Oberst and McElroy (2007, p. 167) give as the reason for Hawai‘i’s omission, and presumably the same applies to Corsica. Similar data for certain key measures are available from the European Union and the U.S. Census Department; based on these, both Corsica and Hawai‘i appear to more or less fit the pattern of SNIJ superiority. A more critical assessment, however, reveals the limitations of this perspective. The following comparison is based on the undated Data Appendix to McElroy and Parry’s (2012) study, whose most recent data is from 2010; data for Corsica comes from Eurostat and Kołodzieski’s (2013) note, while information for Hawai‘i comes from its government’s website.

Consistent with the general definition of an SNIJ, Corsica and Hawai‘i each appear to enjoy a degree of autonomy within the structures of their metropolitan states. Baldacchino (2004) includes them both in his early formulation of island sub-nationalism: Corsica with French Polynesia, New Caledonia, and Wallis and Futuna as “an island autonomy within a mainland state--France” and Hawai‘i with Rhode Island because the US is an example of a “federation encompassing islands as fully-fledged constituent units” (p. 87). (Placing Hawai‘i together with Rhode Island shows an unusual lack of historical perspective; Rhode Island, as one of the thirteen colonies and a faction of the colonizing power that became the United States of America, was never recognized as an independent nation, as was Hawai‘i.) Beyond these basic criteria, they do match some of the broad trends. For example, McElroy and Pearce (2006, p. 533) concluded that “with respect to basic resource availability, the independents are between two and three times larger on average in both area and population”. At 8,680 km² Corsica is closer to 7,024 km² average size of independent islands than it is the 1,398 km² average size of the SNIJs, while the Hawaiian archipelago dwarfs both figures at 28,000 km². In terms of population, Corsica falls quite near the average of 349,500 for independent islands, while Hawai‘i is at the high end of the range for small islands generally, well above the average for dependents and independents alike. With respect to per capita GDP for 2010, at $19,389 Corsica fell short of the $23,109 average for dependents, but still well above the $11,993 average for independents. Hawai‘i, on the other hand, had a per capita GDP of $49,673 in 2010, higher than both averages and third overall after Bermuda and Jersey.

The SNIJ hypothesis, that the economic benefits of affiliation offset the challenges posed by insularity, appears to bear out for Corsica and Hawai‘i as well. We argue, however, that the key shortcoming of such an approach is its failure to account for the differences between Indigenous island inhabitants and colonial or immigrant settler populations. Differences between these groups exist in any island that has been colonized, annexed, occupied or otherwise politically dominated by an outside state, and they persist in those sovereign island states that are products of decolonization. One of the starkest examples of this is how the native Hawaiian population falls behind the rest of the island’s population in both income (Office of Hawaiian Affairs, 2014) and public health (Office of Hawaiian Affairs,
In Corsica, the economic benefits of the tourist industry, down to the level of the seasonal jobs themselves, have been primarily enjoyed by people from the mainland (Hossay, 2004, p. 408). In Hawai‘i, the tourist economy has gone the way of massive corporate development, the direct and indirect consequences of which have been to drive native Hawaiian families into poverty and off the island in search of work (Trask, 1993, p.180-184). In both cases, the touristic development hailed by the SNIJ hypothesis has driven the price of land out of the reach of the island’s Indigenous population.

This is the story told by Martin (a pseudonym, as are all names of informants), a Corsican nationalist from a village close to the coast in the northern part of the island. According to Martin, all but a few Corsicans now find it impossible to acquire land if they have not inherited it. Around forty years old in 2015, Martin explained that this was already the case for his father’s generation, and that had his grandfather not left them land, it would be impossible for him to live in his own family’s village. He also reported widespread discrimination against Corsican families and landowners, recounting several instances of which he is aware in which loans or building permits have been denied to Corsicans in favor of foreigners (by which he means off-islanders) willing to pay over-market prices to banks and exaggerated or invented fees to corrupt officials. Martin is fond of pointing out that the population of the island, currently 320,000, would be over 500,000 if population growth had matched the pace of development on the island; he blames the glut of seasonally occupied vacation homes, beach apartments, and hotels that sit empty for most of the year for inflating the price of land artificially and moving it further from the reach of ordinary Corsicans. Regardless of the extent to which such discrimination occurs, the end result is the same: the development of the island unfolds in such a way that supports a tourist economy whose economic benefits appear to bypass the locals.

Language

Language is a salient aspect of postcolonial island societies, whether independent or affiliated; but language issues are not directly addressed in the SNIJ literature, despite appearing elsewhere: see for example Counceller, 2012; Edwards, 2016; Gegeo and Watson-Gegeo, 1999; Johnson 2012; Otsuka, 2007; Makihara, 2004; Sallabank, 2010. Each of these makes an important contribution individually, including explicit critiques of colonialism, but none of them attempt to situate their case studies within the broader category of small islands. Yet each one presents a variation on the same theme: an island Indigenous language whose survival is threatened as a consequence of some form of colonialism.

The vitality of the island Indigenous language should be incorporated into the discussion by which the benefits of remaining a SNIJ are calculated because the condition of the Indigenous languages of an island is an important measure of the island’s overall social and cultural well-being. Suppression of local language, culture, and social structures were universal features of the colonial enterprise. Indigenous languages are important to the ways in which communities maintain their identities, maintain their connections to places and ancestors, and to the vitality of traditional and cultural knowledge (Tsunoda, 2005, pp. 135-139). The condition of a colonized people’s language is also an important aspect of a community’s social psychological well-being (Tsunoda, 2005, pp. 141, 147). From a political perspective, the significance of stable, healthy Indigenous languages should not be taken lightly given the role that language has played historically as a marker of national identity, a
recognizable factor in how one nation was distinguished from another. Colonizing powers used this in campaigns of assimilation, merging people, land, and language to create the claim, for example, that French people live in French territory and speak French. Understanding this, the provisional government that illegally took power following the 1893 coup d'état in Hawai'i went to work in an effort to strip Hawaiians of their language by establishing English as the exclusive language of instruction in schools. Similarly, compulsory schooling in French, which reflected the strong role of language in French state nationalism, played a major role in interrupting the intergenerational transmission of the Corsican language (Jaffe, 1999, pp. 77-84). Both France and the United States are highly nationalistic states predicated on the assimilation of all citizens to a single national identity synonymous with that of the state itself, making the suppression of Corsican and Hawaiian language and identity an intrinsic aspect of the people’s experience of the ruling state.

The UNESCO Atlas of the World’s Languages in Danger recognizes Hawaiian and Corsican as individual languages. A standardized written form of Hawaiian was developed during the Kingdom, but several dialects persist across the islands, albeit with a degree of mutual intelligibility. No standardized form of Corsican has achieved widespread usage, and several local variants are still common across the island (Romani 2010, p. 12), but speakers report that these variations are always mutually intelligible. The UNESCO Atlas lists Hawaiian as a “critically endangered” language (Mosely, 2010, Map 27), defined as a situation in which,

the youngest speakers are in the great-grandparental generation, and the language is not used for everyday interactions. These older people often remember only part of the language but do not use it on a regular basis, since there are few people left to speak with (Moseley, 2010, p. 12).

This is deceptively wrong as this statistic ignores that Hawaiian immersion schools have been producing fluent speakers as young as three years old since the 1980s. However, other sources and direct observation paint a more hopeful picture that reflects the particular circumstances of the Hawaiian case, in which the language is undergoing a process of revitalization. Since the 1980s, the Hawaiian language revitalization movement rapidly spread to other islands around a small core of L2 speakers of Hawaiian raising their children as L1 speakers of Hawaiian at home (Wilson and Kamanā, 2001). Hawaiian language immersion schools have been operating at all levels, with university degrees now being earned in Hawaiian language (Tsunoda, 2005, p. 203). The younger generations of bilingual speakers coming up through the system of immersion schools have been observed using Hawaiian exclusively amongst one another, even in situations where they must switch to English to speak to adults or other non-speakers. So to the oldest speakers we must add the youngest speakers, with generations of non-speakers between them decreasing. Sources from within the Hawaiian language revitalization movement estimate they have reached 10,000 speakers. From 2008-2009 Hawaiian immersion schools showed the percentage of Hawaiian students enrolled in total immersion models was 100% in preschool through grade 5, 64% in grades 6-12, and 88.3% overall (Hale Kuamo‘o, 2008). By any measure, this represents extraordinary success for a language revitalization movement, and while foreign language immersion programs in the US have ‘auxiliary’ language goals, the success of Hawaiian revitalization efforts can be seen as working into a primary goal toward reclaiming their Hawaiian National order.
With respect to Corsican, the UNESCO Atlas lists the language as “definitely endangered” (Moseley, 2010, Map 10), which they define as a situation in which,

the language is no longer being learned as the mother tongue by children in the home. The youngest speakers are thus of the parental generation. At this stage, parents may still speak their language to their children, but their children do not typically respond in the language (Mosely, 2010, p. 12).

While this naturally depends on the ages involved, since two to three generations of parents are living at any one time, this seems a fair assessment based on the situation reported from Corsicans involved in language revitalization, who generally estimate about that about a third of Corsicans speak the language. This varies by age, but also by gender, with men more likely to be speakers than women (Jaffe, 1999, pp. 103-106). The aforementioned Martin is a Corsican speaker, but instead of learning the language at home from his parents he learned it from the older men with whom he hunted in his youth, an activity conducted exclusively in Corsican. He is quick to express his regret at not speaking Corsican with his daughter (displaying the pattern of gendered Corsican reported above), but simultaneously indicates the fact as an example of how the language is being lost as a consequence of the French possession of the island. Like many other Corsicans, Martin is in support of expanding the language in schools, where it is currently taught as an optional subject at a relatively superficial level (Blackwood, 2007, pp. 30-31). Being taught as a subject is not the same as being the language of instruction, as it is in Hawai‘i; several Corsicans have explained that such a thing is impossible because it would be incompatible with the fundamental French values enshrined in the Constitution: Equality and Fraternity, by which all are equally French and thus must share a French identity; and the French language, named explicitly as the language of the Republic. This popular image of French linguistic nationalism enforcing a standardized national language through the public school system is qualified somewhat by Candea’s (2010, p.121-123) citation of the regional differences historically evident in French schooling; nevertheless, a massive language shift to French took place in Corsica over the course of the twentieth century. The loss of Corsican language provides an irresistible allegory of French oppression in all its forms because language is one of most salient symbols of identity. (Androus has heard stories from Corsicans who attended elementary school in the 1960s of corporal punishment from teachers for using the language.) During a formal interview with a militant nationalist I was told that the most important issue driving the Corsican independence movement is the language, because it is the basis for sovereignty and the recognition of the Corsican people as existing in their own right. Like Jaffe’s (1999, pp. 162-163) report of her 1989 survey data, in which she found support for expanded Corsican language instruction in schools, Androus’s own participant-observation is naturally biased towards supporters of the language. But neither Jaffe nor we make any claim to representative sampling, in part because of the scale involved and in part because it is impossible to remove a researcher from the social context in which he or she operates. This is not a deficiency because our goal is to illuminate the depth of meaning in people’s lived experience through direct
encounters rather than to reduce their heterogeneous complexity to statistical exercises. The island’s Indigenous language is a matter of great political, cultural, and social import in both Hawai‘i and Corsica. From policy level debates about signage and schooling to individual language choices in daily life, the question of language goes right to the heart of the inescapable heritage of the colonial legacy. Because the SNIJ is fundamentally a political classification, we turn now to the political dimension of the SNIJ hypothesis.

**Decolonizing development: critiquing the SNIJ reliance on economic indicators**

At a minimum, some acknowledgment of the Indigenous population in respect to the economic and demographic development of a small island should be a part of any discussion of decolonization’s benefits and drawbacks. A further critique calls into question the notion, implicit in the premise of benefits accruing to SNIJs, that higher economic indicators represent both the realization of a universal aspiration and a net benefit for the people of the island. Economic development is not universally beneficial to people in the development zone, some of whom are subject to “inequality, marginalisation, and disempowerment” (Gardner & Lewis, 2015, p. 45) resulting in their being “denied access to the material, social and emotional necessities of life” (Gardner & Lewis, 2015, p. 44). It is important to note that these are “culturally determined” (Gardner and Lewis, 2015, p. 44), which is to say that Indigenous communities may defy the logic of economic rationality by preferring to manage landscapes in such a way that undeveloped seafronts are prioritised over high-density vacation units, or that low-intensity transhumance agriculture is prioritised over extractive industries. The preservation of island landscapes is frequently connected to tourism as a sustainable economic alternative, but this relies on accepting the premise that economic development is acceptable at any other cost, which cannot be presumed automatically to be true for Indigenous island occupants. Setting aside for a moment the possibility that economic benefits accrue disproportionately to non-Indigenous sectors of small island societies, economic indicators like GDP cannot measure the non-economic value inherent in a healthy language or in a landscape managed for long-term floral and faunal diversity or to preserve the possibility of carrying out culturally and socially important activities. We cannot speak to other small island contexts, but in both Corsica and Hawai‘i, certain elements are opposed to touristic development and see it as a threat rather than a benefit, consistent with Gardner & Lewis’ claim cited above.

Indigenous groups in both Corsica and Hawai‘i have resisted tourism related development, violently in the case of Corsica. Indirect signs of support for various factions of the Corsican National Liberation Front (FLNC) are evident throughout the island in the form of graffiti, posters, and people sporting t-shirts or accessories that display symbols of the nationalist paramilitary. Jean-Guy Talamoni, current president of the Corsican Assembly, delivered his first address in Corsican, during which he stated his alliance with the FLNC, whom he mentioned in the same phrase as the fallen soldiers of the original war against French annexation in the 18th century (France 3 Corse ViaStella, 2015). In a subsequent profile, Talamoni was not only quoted as declining to denounce nationalist violence, but also as crediting the FLNC with the preservation of the coastline from construction (Henry, 2016). This is a popular claim among nationalists and while no society displays homogeneity of public opinion, it is fair to interpret Talamoni’s electoral success as evidence that a significant
number of Corsicans are opposed to the touristic development of the coastland to which Talamoni refers. Haunani-Kay Trask of Hawai‘i is even more explicit. She wrote,

[I]f you are thinking of visiting my homeland, please don’t. We don’t want or need any more tourists, and we certainly don’t like them. If you want to help our cause, pass this message on to your friends (1993, pp. 195-196).

From an island Indigenous perspective, touristic development is not necessarily automatically welcome. This fact is centrally important to the political dimension of our critique because it goes to the essence of self-determination for Indigenous island inhabitants.

A particularly problematic aspect of the SNIJ hypothesis is Baldacchino & Milne’s proposal that “opting for non-sovereign jurisdictional status may be a highly rational, strategic choice” (2006, p. 490). The very nature of a colonial, or even postcolonial, relationship precludes the possibility of choice on the part of the colonized people: they were forced into these relationships. For many Indigenous inhabitants of colonized territories, successive waves of political decolonization have done little to erase the consequences of the sustained exploitation that defines a colonial relationship. The paternalism inherent in the colonial administration of Indigenous societies is reproduced when the dominant state sets the terms by which occupied island territories are currently allowed to manage certain, select aspects of their own affairs. This is a coercive form of governance that does not constitute voluntary participation, but is characteristic of Indigenous peoples’ experience throughout the world (Champagne, 2005, pp. 18-19), which is itself characteristic of colonialism. Corsica and Hawai‘i are distinctive insofar as each was administratively joined to the mainland territories of their annexing states, rather than administrated as overseas territories, protectorates, or any of the other forms of unincorporated territory that each state has used to administrate island territories that are not adjacent to their mainland. Subsequent autonomy arrangements, as in the case of Corsica’s administrative status as a “territorial community” (Daftary, 2008) or Hawai‘i current process to create a Native Hawaiian governing body, are thus granted within a larger context of political domination by external forces. In the case of Corsica, the expansion of local authority in governance introduced in the 1990s was quickly extended constitutionally to the entirety of the French state in what Daftary (2008, p. 299) calls a “wave of decentralization.” Consequently, Corsica currently enjoys little more practical autonomy than any other part of France. Referenda addressing modification of its organization as a territorial community can be held, but the French state reserves the right to render them non-binding (Daftary, 2008, p. 300).

With the passage of over one hundred years since the overthrow, Hawaiians find themselves once again at the crossroads. Available data suggests appreciable support for Native Hawaiian self-determination, with a 1995 telephone survey finding 52% of respondents in support of a “Hawaiian sovereign nation” (Meller & Feder Lee, 1997, p. 178). The U.S. Department of Interior’s Office of Native Hawaiian Relations recently signaled the U.S. government’s willingness to recognize a Native Hawaiian governing body. The “Procedures for Reestablishing a Formal Government-to-Government Relationship with the Native Hawaiian Community” published in the Federal Register allow for any form of governing body to be developed entirely at the discretion of the Native Hawaiian community. While the form of governance is at the discretion of the Native Hawaiian population, the Procedures are clear that the governing body will be subject to the plenary authority of the U.S. legislature.
The Procedures repeatedly invoke the “special trust relationship” between the U.S. government and Native Hawaiians, likening it to the relationship between the U.S. government and North American Indigenous groups (Procedures for Reestablishing, 2015, pp. 59115-59116). In U.S. jurisprudence the trust relationship between the U.S. and Indigenous groups can refer to two distinct but related things: Indigenous lands held in trust by the U.S. government or notion that the relationship between Indigenous groups and the U.S. is that of a ward to its guardian (Debo, 1970, pp. 349-350). The lands held in trust represent what remains from a series of systematic and deliberate legislative maneuvers designed to dispossess Indigenous peoples of what little land remained in their possession at the end of the nineteenth century; the U.S. government took control of Indigenous lands for the supposed benefit of the Indigenous people, who were claimed to be incapable of managing it themselves (Lazarus, 1991, p. 109). Even the most optimistic interpretation of the special trust relationship must acknowledge that its very premise is the inability of Native Hawaiians to manage their affairs without the guardianship of the United States. Furthermore, the Procedures clearly state that whatever governing body is established will be subject to the plenary power of the U.S. Congress (2015, p. 59132). This in itself is nothing more than a country continuing to flex its might as a colonizing potent. Interestingly, such arguments for a special trust relationship are not made for any of the European enclave states, such as Monaco or San Marino, despite their various forms of dependency on their surrounding states. The issue of whether this sort of situation, modelled on the legal relationship between the U.S. government and North American Indigenous groups, is in the interest of Hawaiians has been divisive. Historically Indigenous North Americans have suffered at the hands of this legal relationship; on the other hand, there is currently nothing in place by which Native Hawaiians have any sort of dedicated political representation. Whatever the outcome, one thing is clear: any such arrangement falls far short of sovereignty, and arguably even self-determination, if the entire enterprise falls under the authority of the U.S. legislature.

Sovereignty is more than just the “siren call” warned against by Baldacchino and Milne (2006, p. 491), it is the measure by which nations are acknowledged to possess a right to self-determination. Their point that “upholding and distinguishing strict ‘sovereign’ from ‘non-sovereign’ entities in international practice was never consistently followed in the past” is well taken, but we disagree that it “is even less tenable today” (Baldacchino and Milne, 2006, p. 490). The international state system of sovereignty into which the world has been drawn is strategically and unequally deployed as a means by which to justify the continuing occupation and control of colonized territories. Indigenous claims to land and sovereignty that historically precede the establishment of the current nation-state destabilize that state’s claim to legitimacy, creating a political need for the state to dominate Indigenous peoples and abrogate their claims (Champagne, 2005, pp. 16-17). This is why the Procedures describe the Native Hawaiians as “the Indigenous people of a once sovereign nation” (Procedures for Reestablishing, 2015, p. 59116). But the United States does not have the power to negate Hawai‘i’s sovereignty, even if they cease to acknowledge it. In the historical context of Hawai‘i’s illegal overthrow, the current reconfiguration offered by the United States must be seen for what it is: as an act of colonialist paternalism continuing to inform the United States’ approach to the Hawaiian people.

France and the United States treat Corsica and Hawai‘i as respective internal issues. Whether couched in the language of autonomy, territorial community, trust relationship or any other, the two island nations are denied the sovereign status that historically had been theirs.
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Krasner (p. 7) makes the point that decisions about sovereignty are made by rulers who, as a general rule, seek to retain power. The decisions in question do not assign sovereignty, they either do or do not recognize a sovereignty that issues from other sources. The right to self-determination possessed by original island inhabitants is a function of their long-term occupation of the territory prior to annexation or colonization by external states (Champaign pp. 5-6), which means that the sovereignty of Hawaiians and Corsicans does not depend on, nor is it granted by, any other state. Recognizing what another has is not equivalent to granting that to the other, and the same is true of sovereignty in the international world political system. The reason for this is acknowledged in the 1755 Constitution of the independent Corsican Republic: sovereignty is vested in the people. As long as the people exist, they are sovereign, underscoring the importance of assimilation campaigns to colonial states. The key shortcoming of the SNIJ hypothesis is its failure to account for the ways in which Indigenous sovereignty has been abrogated by a colonial legacy that continues to inform present political arrangements. As the authors of the SNIJ hypothesis rightly point out, sovereignty does not necessarily lead to independence. But an arrangement short of independence does not necessarily represent a legitimate case of self-determination on the part of the sovereign groups involved. Hawai‘i and Corsica both meet the criteria of a SNIJ, but in each case qualifications emerge based on differences between the island’s Indigenous population and the settler population connected to the dominating state. Discussions of small island political and economic development would do well to address such differences.

Conclusion: further testing of the SNIJ hypothesis

There is no question that small islands categorically face a set of unique challenges, and seeking patterns that could provide helpful solutions is a worthwhile endeavor. In our opinion, the hypothesis that remaining affiliated as a SNIJ generally benefits small islands remains unproven. To effectively evaluate the relative benefits of affiliation versus independence, a distinction between Indigenous and other occupants of the island is paramount. Acknowledging this difference in turn requires investigating the island’s particular political history, and the present expressions of that legacy, to determine the relative benefits of current arrangements. In postcolonial cases, the impact of historic colonialism on Indigenous communities must be taken into account; because of its multiple degrees of significance, the condition of the Indigenous language provides an important indicator as to the overall well-being of the community. Acknowledging this difference also requires investigating the extent to which economic and demographic indicators vary between Indigenous and other occupants of the island. Corsica and Hawai‘i illustrate this point: in both cases the islands meet the criteria for SNIJs and both support the hypothesis based on its criteria. But in both cases, the benefits appear to not only bypass the Indigenous communities, but to bring social and cultural costs by limiting access to land and housing, and consuming resources on a scale well beyond that of the island’s own population. Both Corsica and Hawai‘i include profound resistance to touristic development among significant portions of the Indigenous population, an important feature of those small islands that remains hidden by the format of the SNIJ hypothesis as currently formulated. For this reason, and all of the others outlined above, we maintain that the question of the SNIJ’s advantage over independence remains unresolved. The meta-analyses and attendant discussions that we critique are important contributions that have opened a worthwhile dialogue, but much remains to be discussed before a conclusion can be reached.
References


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Critiquing the SNIJ Hypothesis with Corsica and Hawai’i


Hawaiian Creole speakers have mixed feelings about the creole. Hawaiian Creole has often been denigrated as a sub-standard form of English. But with the efforts of local linguists and writers, people are now beginning to realize that the creole is a language separate from, but similar in appearance to, English. Hawaiian Creole can be heard on the playgrounds and in neighborhood conversations. However, English and Hawaiian are the official languages of the legislature and standardized English is the official medium of instruction in the school system. See the position paper “Pidgin and Education” written by “Da Pidgin Coup”, a group of interested faculty members and students at the University of Hawai‘i. Back to top sounds grammar. Vocabulary. Two competing hypotheses are advanced in Dying to Live: The Afterlife Hypothesis and The Dying Brain Hypothesis. The Afterlife Hypothesis states spirit survives body death. The NDE is the result of spirit separating from the body. “If the Afterlife Hypothesis can answer them best then I shall accept that and work with that as well as I can. If the dying brain hypothesis does better than I shall work with that.” As we have already seen, however, she has no intention of considering the Afterlife Hypothesis. Even in Dying to Live, the Afterlife Hypothesis is a best fit with the evidence, however, when evidence points to the Afterlife Hypothesis, it is blatantly ignored. Corsica is an island in the Mediterranean Sea and politically one of the 18 regions of France. It lies southeast of the French mainland, west of the Italian Peninsula, and immediately north of the Italian island of Sardinia, the land mass nearest to it. A single chain of mountains makes up two-thirds of the island. The island is a territorial collectivity of France. The regional capital is Ajaccio. Although the region is divided into two administrative departments, Haute-Corse and Corse-du-Sud, their