Hu’s Followers: Provincial Leaders with Backgrounds in the Youth League

Cheng Li

That Hu Jintao is going to succeed Jiang Zemin as the party chief and head of state is beyond doubt; the important question is whether Hu will effectively run the political apparatus of this most populous nation in the world. Crucial to any assessment of Hu’s future, especially at a time when various factions are jockeying for power in the leadership succession, is an understanding of the kinds of political networks he has formed. Although Hu has thus far not been seen as a leader who is obsessed with patron-client ties, he has been well connected with Qinghua University, the Chinese Communist Youth League (CCYL), and the Central Party School (CPS)--the three most important institutions for elite recruitment in present-day China.

The growing presence of top provincial leaders with backgrounds in the CCYL is particularly significant. These provincial leaders can be recognized as Hu’s followers, not only because of their previous political associations with Hu at the provincial and national levels of leadership in the CCYL, but also due to the fact that their career paths have often been identical to Hu’s. To a certain extent, the further advancement of these CCYL cadres who have become provincial leaders and the consolidation of Hu’s power are closely interrelated.

Paramount leaders in the previous three elite generations of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)--Mao, Deng, and Jiang--all established their own political networks with which they were able to exert authority, influence, and power. After he charismatically led the Long March, Mao based his authority largely on the support of his fellow Long Marchers. These revolutionary veterans occupied an overwhelming majority of leadership positions during the first couple decades of the People’s Republic of China (PRC).

From the late 1960s to the 1980s, it was largely their Field Army backgrounds that determined the nature of political loyalty and factional politics among high-ranking leaders. The rise and fall of Lin Biao’s Fourth Field Army faction during the Cultural Revolution was a good example. When Deng Xiaoping resumed power in 1978, he promoted some of his fellow Second Field Army associates to key military posts. In 1988, for example, of the 17 full generals--who had the highest military rank available after the Cultural Revolution--10 (about three-fifths) were from the Second Field Army, especially from the 129th Division (Deng’s own unit). These included then-defense minister Qin Jiwei and then-director of the General Political Department of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Yang Baibing. These military strongmen’s loyalty to Deng was among the most crucial factors that enabled Deng to remain in power after the 1989 Tiananmen crisis.

Jiang Zemin did not have much power and authority in Beijing when Deng appointed him as general secretary of the party after the Tiananmen incident. Because of the lack of a
solid power base, Jiang decided to retain some prominent leaders such as Wen Jiabao, who used to work for Hu Yaobao and Zhao Ziyang, two former party chiefs who had been purged by Deng. Yet, ever since the early 1990s, Jiang has cultivated a web of patron-client ties in the national leadership largely based on two groups of his former associates. The first group consists of officials who were previously affiliated with the First Ministry of the machine building industry, in which Jiang worked for almost two decades. Jia Qinglin (party secretary of Beijing), Luo Gan (state councilor), and Zeng Peiyan (minister of the State Development Planning Commission) all worked in this ministry at about the same time as Jiang did. Jia and Luo are current Politburo members, and Zeng will probably become a Politburo member at the 16th Party Congress. The second and more important group is the so-called “Shanghai Gang”-leaders whose careers have advanced primarily as a result of their political association with Jiang in Shanghai, where he served as mayor and party secretary in the late 1980s. Among 23 current Politburo members, five (22 percent) were promoted from Shanghai.

**Tracking Hu’s Political Networking**

As a fourth generation leader who grew up after the victory of the CCP in 1949, Hu Jintao has neither war-based political associations with events such as the Long March, the Anti-Japanese War, and the War of Liberation, nor charisma, which was exemplified by both Mao and Deng. Furthermore, at least until now, Hu does not have the reputation that Jiang has for being obsessed with promoting protégés to important leadership positions. In fact, no one in the current Politburo is seen as Hu’s protégé. With the exception of the promotion of his longtime personal secretary, Ling Jihua, to the post of deputy director of the general office of the CCP Central Committee in 2000, Hu has rarely directly promoted any leaders at the provincial and ministerial levels.

Make no mistake; Hu has been interested in political networking. As a matter of fact, Hu has not only expedited his own political career through *guanxi* (political connections), but also established remarkably broad political associations throughout his life. Hu is a prominent member of the so-called Qinghua University clique; he headed the Chinese Communist Youth League in the early 1980s; and he has served as president of the Central Party School since 1993. A large number of provincial and ministerial leaders in China today have been associated with at least one of these three powerful institutions.

Qinghua University has been recognized as the “Cradle of the Red Engineers”--the most distinguished training ground for technocratic leaders in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) since the mid-1950s. Hu began his political career at Qinghua, where he served as a political counselor--a stepping-stone for students or junior faculty members who later excelled in their professional and political careers. From a total of 682 political counselors at Qinghua from 1953 to 1966, two-thirds later became governors, ministers, managers of large industrial enterprises, or presidents of other universities. For example, Wu Bangguo and Wu Guanzheng, two Qinghua graduates who are current Politburo members, also served as political counselors while they were students at Qinghua. Qinghua University plans to hold a grand
celebration in spring 2003 for the 50th anniversary of the “Qinghua system of political counselors,” lauding all the achievements of this powerful political network. According to Qinghua’s official data, in the history of the PRC more than 300 ministers and vice ministers of the State Council, including one premier, six vice premiers, and state councilors, were graduates of Qinghua.

Hu’s most important mentor was Song Ping, also a Qinghua graduate who later became a Standing Committee member of the Politburo. In 1980, Song Ping, then party secretary of Gansu Province, promoted Hu to deputy director of the provincial economic construction commission and then secretary of the province’s youth league. A couple years later, when Song moved to Beijing, he recommended his protégé to Hu Yaobang, then secretary general of the party, who later appointed Hu secretary of the CCYL. The Qinghua connection played a crucial role in Hu’s arduous journey to a prominent post in the national leadership. Hu has used his school ties effectively and appropriately. When Hu took the post of party secretary of Guizhou in 1985, he often participated in the activities organized by the Qinghua alumni association in the province. Hosting U.S. President Bush to speak at his alma mater last spring, a widely publicized event, clearly demonstrated the coming-of-age of both this “golden boy” of the Qinghua network and this “cradle institution” of Chinese technocrats.

It is often noted that Qinghua University and the CPS have had close ties for many decades. For example, senior administrators of Qinghua, such as Jiang Nanxiang, Xing Jiali, and Wang Jialiu, later became top officials of the CPS. Not surprisingly, Hu Jintao has held the position of president of the CPS since 1993. Under his presidency, the CPS has not only significantly broadened its midcareer training programs, but also turned into a leading think tank for the study of both China’s domestic political reform and international relations. Hu and his like-minded technocrats running the CPS have designed a new curriculum that resembles the master’s programs that U.S. universities sponsor for “midcareer professionals,” as described in a recent Wall Street Journal article.

Prior to Hu’s presidency at the CPS, only a small percentage of high-ranking leaders or promising young officials attended the party school. During the past decade, however, almost all provincial and ministerial leaders have studied there. In Guangxi Province, for example, among the top 15 current leaders (party secretary, governor, and their deputies), 14 attended the CPS. According to the Chinese official source, after the 15th Party Congress in 1997 approximately 150 newly elected members and alternates of the Central Committee, including a few Politburo members, participated in various programs at the CPS. Between 1996 and 2000, more than 1,800 provincial and ministerial leaders studied at either the CPS or its collaborative institutions such as the State Administration School and the National Defense University. Meanwhile, a total of 1,006 bureau- and county-level leaders (or above) attended the one-year-long training program for “young and middle-aged leaders” at the CPS. Earlier this year, Hu Jintao and Zeng Qinghong personally granted diplomas to 836 graduates of the class of 2001 in a highly publicized graduation ceremony at the CPS.
Not all prominent leaders who graduated from Qinghua or the CPS should be seen as Hu’s followers. As a matter of fact, some important figures in the Qinghua clique, for example, Wu Bangguo, Huang Ju, and Zeng Peiyan, are much closer to Jiang Zemin and to the Shanghai Gang than to Hu Jintao. If all high-ranking Chinese leaders are required to study at the CPS, that institution will become too incoherent—and too inclusive—to function as a political faction. Furthermore, Hu cannot claim all the credit for the dynamic role of the CPS in reforming the CCP and its leadership. Jiang Zemin and Zeng Qinghong have been heavily involved in the agenda of the CPS. Some of the top administrators of the CPS, for example, the reform-minded Vice President Li Junru, were transferred from Shanghai. (Li has been a close friend of Zeng Qinghong.)

While Hu’s influence on both the Qinghua network and the CPS is strong, his association with up-and-coming leaders with backgrounds in the CCYL leadership is perhaps even stronger. This is partly because of their previous political associations with Hu at the provincial and national levels of leadership in the CCYL, but mainly because their career paths have often been identical to Hu’s.

**Rising Stars in the Provincial Leadership with CCYL Backgrounds**

Officials of the CCYL have long been a major recruitment source for the party and government leadership in the PRC. The mission of the CCYL states explicitly that this political institution is the “reserve army” (houbeijun) for the CCP. Its purpose is to “add new blood” to the party and to produce successors for all levels of political leadership. The CCYL is one of the largest political institutions in the PRC. In 2002, the CCYL has a total of over 68 million members, including 181,000 full-time CCYL cadres. In the history of the PRC, several prominent leaders originated from the CCYL. Hu Yaobang, Hu Qili, and Li Ruihuan, three former or current Standing Committee members of the Politburo, advanced their political careers largely because of their leadership experience in the CCYL.

But Hu Yaobang, Hu Qili, and Li Ruihuan were all involved in the CCYL leadership prior to the reform era. Their life experiences differed profoundly from those of Hu Jintao’s generation of CCYL cadres. When Deng Xiaoping came to power in 1978, he promoted some young CCYL cadres to the national level of leadership. Deng met Wang Zhaoguo in 1981 when Deng visited the Number Two Motor Vehicle Plant, where Wang was serving as secretary of the CCYL and deputy director. Deng appointed him chairman of the national committee of the CCYL almost immediately. Wang was the fastest rising star in the Chinese leadership in the early 1980s. But this helicopter-style promotion did not work well, because CCYL cadres like Wang Zhaoguo lacked administrative skills and decision-making experience at either municipal or provincial levels of leadership. Wang, therefore, was later appointed governor of Fujian and now is director of the United Front Work Department of the CCP.

Not many leaders with backgrounds in the CCYL entered the 14th and 15th Central Committees of the CCP. Backgrounds and experiences as mishu (personal assistants), taizi
Li, China Leadership Monitor No.3

(princelings), tongxue (schoolmates), and tongxiang (fellow natives) constituted the main channels of elite recruitment during the 1980s and 1990s. Some princelings also pursued their careers through the CCYL, such as Chen Haosu, son of the late Marshal Chen Yi, and He Guangwei, son of revolutionary veteran He Changgong, who served as members of the CCYL secretariat in the early 1980s. But the helicopter-style promotion in the CCYL did not advance their political careers much further. Chen is currently president of Chinese People’s Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries, and He is director of the National Tourism Administration under the State Council.

However, a majority of current provincial leaders with backgrounds in the CCYL do not come from high-ranking official families. Their experience in the CCYL might help them expedite their political careers, yet they have usually been promoted in a step-by-step manner. Many worked in the grass roots (e.g., factories, rural areas, and research institutes) for a long time.

Table 1 lists 30 current provincial leaders (full or deputy party secretaries and full or vice governors) with previous backgrounds in the provincial level of leadership, or above, in the CCYL. This is certainly not a complete list of current provincial leaders with CCYL backgrounds. Of a total of 31 province-level administrations, only 15 have released the biographical backgrounds of their top provincial leaders. The real number of provincial leaders with CCYL backgrounds must be much larger.

The most recent edition of the most important source of biographical information on PRC leaders, Who’s Who in China Current Leaders, was published in 1994. Although it provides biographical information on all provincial party secretaries, governors, and their deputies, many of these officials have been replaced or promoted in recent years. This study uses various sources, e.g., recently released biographical data from the Chinese authorities, information available in newspapers published in Hong Kong and elsewhere, and official and nonofficial online sources.

Table 1 does not include leaders below the provincial level despite the fact that some distinguished party secretaries and mayors in major cities have made their careers in the CCYL—and they are often seen as rising stars. For example, Li Ke (party secretary of Nanning and former CCYL secretary in the city) and Qin Guangrong (party secretary of Changsha and former CCYL deputy secretary of Hunan), both alternates of the 15th Central Committee, are not qualified for this list due to their lower-level administrative status.

Furthermore, table 1 does not include ministerial leaders with backgrounds in the CCYL. In fact, among the 29 current ministers of the State Council, six (21 percent) previously served as CCYL leaders at the provincial and/or national levels. They are Du Qinglin (minister of agriculture), Jia Chunwang (minister of public security), Zhang Fusen (minister of justice), Li Dezhu (minister of minority affairs), Sun Jiazhen (minister of culture), and Zhang Weiqing (minister of family planning). Hu’s associates at the CCYL also occupy some of the most
important positions in the four departments under the CCP Central Committee. They include Wang Zhaoguo (director of the United Front Work Department), Liu Yandong (executive deputy director of the United Front Work Department), and Liu Yunshan (executive deputy director of the Central Publicity Department). It is important to note that leaders with CCYL backgrounds have already become an important force at both the provincial and ministerial levels of leadership.

Table 1 shows that all these leaders’ tenures as provincial CCYL officials occurred—at least partially—about the same time as when Hu Jintao was serving on the CCYL secretariat (between 1982 and 1985). Although it is difficult to trace each leader’s association with Hu Jintao during that period, one can reasonably assume that Hu and most of these leaders have known each other, through CCYL work, for a couple decades. Many of these provincial leaders used to serve as members of the CCYL central committee that Hu once headed. Some, for example, Song Defu (party secretary of Fujian) and Li Keqiang (governor of Henan), are presumably Hu’s close friends or allies. More than half of these provincial leaders are currently members or alternates of the CCP Central Committee.

Most of them are also relatively young considering the fact that they already hold high-level leadership positions. A majority of them (57 percent) were born in the 1950s. Because they are young, it is likely that they will be the up-and-coming leaders in the next decade and beyond. Five (17 percent) included in table 1 are female.

In contrast to the dominance of technocrats (engineers turned politicians) among the third and fourth generations of Chinese leaders, table 1 presents a more diversified distribution in terms of academic training and institutions attended. Five majored in economics, five in engineering and agronomy, five in mathematics and physics, four in politics and party affairs, three in history and philosophy, and one in law. Moreover, no school is overrepresented, and none of these leaders studied abroad. Eight hold graduate degrees, including two with doctoral degrees (one in economics and the other in law).

The demographic distribution of these leaders is similar to the pattern found in many other studies of PRC elites—many were born in eastern provinces such as Jiangsu and Shandong. Most of these provincial heads (63 percent) were CCYL leaders in the same province. But the regions in which they currently serve as provincial leaders are widely spread: six in the north, four in the northeast, eight in the east, two in the central region, five in the south, two in the southwest, and three in the northwest.

Those officials who were recently transferred to another province are usually seen as particularly suitable for further promotion. These leaders can gain more administrative experience by confronting challenges in a new environment. This observation holds especially true for those who were transferred from the central government or economically rich provinces to poor and remote areas. For example, Liu Qibao, a member of the CCYL secretariat in the late 1980s and deputy chief of staff of the State Council, was recently transferred to Guangxi.
where he served as deputy party secretary. Luo Baoming, former CCYL secretary of Tianjin and head of the publicity department of Tianjin, was recently appointed deputy party secretary of Hainan. Wang Lequan, current party secretary of Xinjiang, was transferred from Shandong, where he had served as deputy secretary of the CCYL and also as vice governor. These leaders seem to follow their role model, Hu Jintao, who was often “ready to take on difficult posts” such as the ones in Guizhou and Tibet.  

Another good example is Shen Yueyue. She was born in 1957 in Ningbo, Zhejiang, where she began her career as a shop assistant. She later enrolled at Ningbo Normal College to study mathematics. After graduating from college in 1980, she taught in a middle school in the city. Meanwhile, she served as a part-time CCYL official at the school. She joined the CCP in 1981 and served as deputy secretary and secretary of the CCYL in Ningbo for a few years. From 1986 to 1993 she as served deputy secretary and secretary of the CCYL in Zhejiang before becoming deputy party secretary of Hangzhou. She studied at the CPS in 1996 and was elected an alternate of the 15th Central Committee a year later. Between 1997 and 2001 she was party secretary of Shaoxing, Zhejiang. In 2001, at age 44, she was appointed deputy party secretary of Anhui, becoming one of the youngest high-ranking provincial leaders in the country. 

Li Yuanchao is another rising star who has had broad work experience. A native of Jiangsu, Li was born in 1950 and grew up in Shanghai during the Cultural Revolution. Like Shen, Li began his career as a middle school teacher. He joined the CCP in 1978 and graduated from the mathematics department of Fudan University in 1982. While studying at Fudan, he also served as deputy secretary of the CCYL at the university. After graduation, he worked as secretary of the CCYL in Shanghai for a few years. He continued his graduate education at Beijing University, where he received a master’s degree in economics in 1988. He later took many different leadership posts, such as secretary of the CCYL, deputy director of the foreign publicity office of the CCP Central Committee, deputy director of the information office of the State Council, and vice minister of culture. 

In 1998 Li completed his doctoral degree in law at the Central Party School. Since 2000, Li has served as deputy party secretary of Jiangsu. Last year he was also appointed party secretary of Nanjing. Within a year, he has initiated some new programs, including taking institutional measures to control official corruption, making the policy-making process of the city government more transparent, and altering the selection process of the CCYL secretary in the city by instituting elections. Under his leadership, Nanjing has quickly become an experimental base for political reforms in China. Since Li has been close to both the Shanghai Gang and the CCYL, he is a leader who is likely to receive endorsement from both Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao. 

Among the provincial leaders listed in table 1, Song Defu and Li Keqiang are the most likely candidates for the next Politburo. Song Defu served in the CCYL secretariat between 1982 and 1993. He has had leadership experience in various sectors: the military (as deputy
director of the organization department under the PLA General Political Department), the party (as deputy director of the CCP Central Organization Department), the State Council (as minister of personnel), and the provincial leadership (currently as party secretary in Fujian). In 1982, at the age of 36, Song joined the Central Committee of the 12th Party Congress. In addition to his relatively young age, his long tenure as a Central Committee member and his broad leadership experience will help him further advance his political career.

Li Keqiang has been in the spotlight in the PRC for many years. He was born in Anhui, where he also worked as a “sent-down youth” in rural areas during the Cultural Revolution. In 1978, Li passed the national examination for college entrance and enrolled in the law department at Beijing University. He later obtained a doctorate in economics at the same school. His political career has been spent largely in the CCYL, where he held various leadership positions for about 15 years. In 1998, at the age of 43, Li became the governor of Henan, China’s most populous province. However, Li’s political future has been clouded by two fires that caused about 400 deaths during his tenure in Henan. These two fires, though politically damaging to him, may not jeopardize Li’s chance for promotion because many other regions, including Shanghai, have experienced major accidents in recent years.

Li Keqiang, Li Yuanchao, Shen Yueyue, and a few other rising stars in China’s provincial leadership—e.g., Liu Qibao (deputy party secretary of Guangxi), Jiang Daming (deputy party secretary of Shandong), and Song Xiuyan (deputy party secretary of Qinghai)—are all in their 40s. In many ways, their career paths are identical to Hu’s. Their experience in provincial CCYL leadership will speed up their promotion; their current jobs as top provincial leaders add new administrative credentials to their résumés; and their relatively young ages “give them a career edge over colleagues of the same rank.”

Although these provincial leaders and Hu may not deliberately build up a CCYL-based faction in the national leadership, they will naturally establish a mutually beneficial relationship. These provincial leaders like to see themselves as Hu’s followers, and Hu, in turn, needs their support as he prepares for his own administration.

Characterizing Hu’s Power

What does this discussion of the rise of provincial leaders with CCYL backgrounds tell us about the characteristics of Hu’s leadership and the nature of his power base? How does Hu’s style of political networking differ from Jiang’s and other power contenders’ in the fourth generation? How can one reconcile the contradictory perceptions that Hu does not have his own faction on the one hand, but that he is well connected with some of the most powerful networks in the country on the other hand? The following three general observations may shed valuable light on Hu, a “man famous for being unknown,” as a British journalist described him.

First, some Western media outlets, for example, the New York Times, identified Hu as the “presumed successor” and the “most promising leader” of the fourth generation chosen by Deng Xiaoping in 1992. But this description is problematic, to say the least. While Deng
indeed promoted Hu to the Standing Committee of the Politburo, it was Jiang (not Deng) who appointed Hu as his “successor.” Hu’s appointments as vice president of the PRC in 1998 and vice chair of the Central Military Commission (CMC) in 1999 made it clear that there is an unambiguous pecking order in the political succession. The fact is that Deng died in 1997, a couple years before these two most important appointments.

Meanwhile, Hu has not been seen as a protégé of Jiang because Hu does not belong to Jiang’s network. Jiang’s confidant in Zhongnanhai is not Hu, but Zeng Qinghong, a prominent figure in the Shanghai Gang. But the fact that Hu was promoted by Deng and was later appointed by Jiang as the successor places Hu in a very advantageous position; he has Jiang’s endorsement, but his rise to the top leadership will not be seen as a result of Jiang’s favoritism. By contrast, the political future of Zeng Qinghong has been compromised by Jiang’s favoritism. Unless something drastic develops, Jiang has neither the incentive nor the political might to change his successor.

Second, Hu’s power base is currently much broader and less exclusive than Jiang’s was when the latter became general secretary of the party in 1989. Hu has been associated with the three most important institutions for elite recruitment in present-day China, but neither the Qinghu network nor the CPS is controlled by Hu exclusively. Other political forces, especially Jiang’s Shanghai Gang, have also exerted influence on these institutions; many prominent members of the Shanghai Gang also belong to the Qinghua clique. These informal networks often have overlapping memberships, creating a complex interdependence among various factions.

The analysis in this study, if valid, may indicate that, instead of acting as exclusive political factions, the Qinghua network and the Central Party School have often functioned as places for political negotiations, factional compromises, and consensus-building among various forces. Hu’s low-profile personality and his previous record as a leader who has been able to receive support from both the liberal and conservative wings of the CCP establishment are in line with this analysis.

Third, Hu can be seen without doubt as a “spiritual leader” of the officials with CCYL backgrounds. The ties between Hu and his CCYL associates have more to do with shared identity than political loyalty. The growing presence of provincial leaders with CCYL backgrounds is an important political trend in elite recruitment in China. Yet, Hu has cautiously avoided establishing a CCYL-based network as Jiang and Zeng did with their regionally based Shanghai Gang. To a certain extent, Hu does not need to establish his own faction. As the time when he will succeed Jiang approaches, a large number of leaders who were previously tied to Jiang or other factions may jump on the bandwagon, shifting their loyalty to Hu—the new boss in Zhongnanhai.

In addition, Hu’s broad leadership experience in China’s hinterland provinces (Gansu, Guizhou, and Tibet) may garner broad support for him in the western and central regions,
especially considering the fact that a great number of leaders in the hinterland provinces have been concerned about Jiang’s Shanghai-based nepotism and favoritism. If a factional fight breaks out between Jiang-Zeng and Hu, a majority of provincial and ministerial leaders will presumably side with Hu rather than Jiang-Zeng because of their resentment of the power manipulation of the Shanghai Gang.28 This factional fight, of course, is by no means inevitable. But if it does happen, Hu’s followers in the provincial leadership will probably become his most invaluable political allies.

May 2002

Notes


2 From 1966-71, an overwhelming majority of top officers in the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) originated from the Fourth Field Army, but after Lin Biao fell, many of them were purged. For many years, even lower-ranking officers from the Fourth Field Army (lacking any direct association with Lin) could not be promoted. See Li and White, “The Army,” 771.


4 For a detailed discussion of the Shanghai Gang, see Cheng Li, “The Shanghai Gang: Force for Stability or Cause for Conflict?” China Leadership Monitor 2 (spring 2002).

5 For a discussion of the system of political counselors, see Cheng Li, China’s Leaders: The New Generation (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2001), 87-126.


8 In addition, Qinghua graduates also accounted for 54 members and alternates of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, including four Politburo Standing Committee members and 11 Politburo members and alternates. Shijie ribao, February 23, 2002, sec. A, p. 5.


10 Before the Cultural Revolution, these two schools were headed by Jiang Nanxiang and Lin Feng, two close friends who had been comrades-in-arms of the December 9 Movement. Jiang and Lin promoted faculty and cadre exchanges between Qinghua and the CPS during their presidencies.


14 Ibid., 6.


17 Li, China’s Leaders, 87-174.
Some officials may concurrently hold the top positions in both the party and government leadership. Governors usually also serve as deputy party secretaries. Each province usually has five or six deputy party secretaries and eight or nine vice governors. One or two deputy party secretaries also usually serve as vice governors.


Shen Xueming et al., comp., *Zhonggong di shiwujie zhongyang weiyuanhui zhongyang jilü jiancha weiyuanhui weiyuan minglu* (Who’s who among the members of the 15th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and the 15th Central Commission for Discipline Inspection) (Beijing: Zhonggong wenxian chubanshe, 1999); Ho Szu-yin, comp., *Zhonggong renmin lu* (Who’s who in Communist China) (Taipei: Institute of International Relations, National Chengchi University, 1999); and *China Directory* (Tokyo: Radiopress, annually). The author frequently uses verified information from newspapers such as *Renmin ribao* and *Shijie ribao* and online sources such as http://www.chinesenews.com.


Earlier this year, the Nanjing CCYL announced openings in the posts of secretary and four deputy secretaries. A total of 143 people applied for these posts. The organization department did some background checks on these candidates. Eighteen were selected as candidates for these five posts. An electoral college with approximately 200 lower-level CCYL officials was formed to elect these top five CCYL leaders in the city. *Pingguo ribao*, May 25, 2002.


For a discussion of the crucial role of Zeng Qinghong in the formation of the Shanghai Gang, see Li, “The Shanghai Gang.”

Li, “The Shanghai Gang.”
Table 1
Hu Jintao’s CCYL Associates in Provincial Leadership
(as of May 31, 2002)

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<tr>
<td>Song Defu</td>
<td>party secretary of Fujian</td>
<td>member</td>
<td>1946</td>
<td>Hebei</td>
<td>two-year college</td>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>member of secretariat, 1983-88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Li Keqiang</td>
<td>governor of Henan</td>
<td>member</td>
<td>1955</td>
<td>Anhui</td>
<td>Beijing University</td>
<td>B.A., Law; Ph.D., Economics</td>
<td>member of secretariat, 1983-98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qian Yunlu</td>
<td>party secretary of Guizhou</td>
<td>member</td>
<td>1944</td>
<td>Hebei</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Wang Lequan
1. party secretary of Xinjiang
2. member
3. 1944
4. Shandong
5. Central Party School
6. Party Affairs
7. deputy secretary of Shandong, 1982-86

Ji Yunshi
1. governor of Jiangsu
2. alternate
3. 1945
4. Jiangsu
5. Shandong University
6. Physics
7. deputy secretary, secretary of Jiangsu, 1982-84

Ma Qizhi
1. governor of Ningxia
2. alternate
3. 1943
4. Ningxia
5. Central University of Nationalities
6. History
7. deputy secretary of Ningxia, 1981-83

Shen Yueyue (f)
1. deputy party secretary of Anhui
2. alternate
3. 1957
4. Zhejiang
5. Ningbo Normal College
6. Mathematics
Sun Shuyi
1. deputy party secretary of Shandong, secretary of Jinan
2. alternate
3. 1945
4. Shandong
5. two-year college
6. unknown
7. deputy secretary of Shandong, 1978-85

Luo Baoming
1. deputy party secretary of Hainan
2. alternate
3. 1952
4. Tianjin
5. Nankai University
6. M.A., Economics
7. deputy secretary, secretary of Tianjin, 1983-92

Wu Aiying (f)
1. deputy party secretary of Shandong
2. alternate
3. 1951
4. Shandong
5. Shandong University
6. Politics
7. deputy secretary of Shandong, 1982-89

Song Xiuyan (f)
1. deputy party secretary of Qinghai
2. alternate
3. 1955
4. Tianjin
5. China’s Youth Political College
6. Politics
7. deputy secretary, secretary of Qinghai, 1983-85
Huang Huahua
1. deputy party secretary of Guangdong
2. alternate
3. 1946
4. Guangdong
5. Zhongshan University
6. Mathematics
7. deputy secretary, secretary of Guangdong, 1982-87

Ba Ter
1. secretary of discipline inspection of Neimenggu
2. alternate
3. 1955
4. Liaoning
5. unknown
6. unknown
7. deputy secretary, secretary of Neimenggu, 1984-91

Jin Yinhuan (f)
1. secretary of discipline inspection of Shanxi
2. alternate
3. 1952
4. Shanxi
5. Shanxi Agronomic University
6. Agronomy
7. deputy secretary, secretary of Shanxi, 1984-90

Shi Yuzhen (f)
1. deputy party secretary of Hunan
2. alternate
3. 1947
4. Hunan
5. unknown
6. unknown
7. secretary of Hunan, 1978-82

Quan Zhezhu
1. vice governor of Jilin
2. alternate
3. 1952
4. Jilin
5. Yanbian University
6. Mathematics
7. deputy secretary, secretary of Jilin, 1982-86

Wang Lulin
1. vice governor of Jilin
2. n/a
3. 1953
4. Henan
5. Jilin University
6. M.A., Economics
7. deputy secretary, secretary of Jilin

Li Yuanchao
1. deputy party secretary of Jiangsu, party secretary of Nanjing
2. n/a
3. 1950
4. Jiangsu
5. Fudan University, Beijing University, Central Party School
6. Mathematics; M.A., Economics; Ph.D., Law
7. secretary of Shanghai, 1983; member of secretariat, 1983-88

Liu Qibao
1. deputy party secretary of Guangxi
2. n/a
3. 1953
4. Anhui
5. Anhui Normal University
6. History
7. deputy secretary, secretary of Anhui, 1982-84; member of secretariat, 1985-88

Lin Yanzhi
1. deputy party secretary of Jilin
2. n/a
3. 1948  
4. Heilongjiang  
5. Qinghua University  
6. Engineering, Physics  
7. chair, All China Students Association, 1981-82; standing member, 1985

**Jiang Daming**  
1. deputy party secretary of Shandong  
2. n/a  
3. 1953  
4. Shandong  
5. Heilongjiang University  
6. Philosophy  
7. deputy head of organization department, 1983-88 (?)  

**Qiang Wei**  
1. deputy party secretary of Beijing  
2. n/a  
3. 1953  
4. Jiangsu  
5. unknown  
6. M.A., Engineering  
7. secretary of Beijing  

**Xu Lide**  
1. vice governor of Guangdong  
2. n/a  
3. 1945  
4. Guangdong  
5. South China Normal University  
6. unknown  
7. deputy secretary of Guangdong, 1982-86  

**Liu Peng**  
1. deputy party secretary of Sichuan  
2. n/a  
3. 1951  
4. Sichuan
Meng Xuenong
1. vice mayor of Beijing
2. n/a
3. 1949
4. unknown
5. Shandong People’s University
6. M.A., Marxism
7. deputy secretary of Beijing, 1982-87

Liu Jingmin
1. vice mayor of Beijing
2. n/a
3. 1952
4. Hebei
5. university education
6. unknown
7. deputy secretary of Beijing

Sun Hailin
1. vice mayor of Tianjin
2. n/a
3. 1946
4. Tianjin
5. unknown
6. M.A., unknown
7. deputy secretary of Tianjin, 1983-85

Han Zheng
1. vice mayor of Shanghai
2. n/a
3. 1954
4. Zhejiang
5. East China Normal University
6. M.A., Economics
7. deputy secretary, secretary of Shanghai

**Wang Houhong**
1. vice governor of Hainan
2. n/a
3. 1943
4. Anhui
5. Anhui University
6. Mathematics
7. deputy secretary, secretary of Anhui, 1982-83

**Wang Donghua**
1. vice governor of Heilongjiang
2. n/a
3. 1950
4. Jiangsu
5. Harbin Engineering Institute
6. M.A., Engineering
7. deputy secretary, secretary of Harbin, 1982-85

**Notes:** f = female

**Sources:** Shen Xueming et al., comp., *Zhonggong di shiwujie zhongyang weiyuanhui zhongyang jilü jiancha weiyuanhui weiyuan minglu* (Who’s who among the members of the 15th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and the 15th Central Commission for Discipline Inspection) (Beijing: Zhonggong wenxian chubanshe, 1999); Ho Szu-yin, comp., *Zhonggong renmin lu* (Who’s who in Communist China) (Taipei: Institute of International Relations, National Chengchi University, 1999); *China Directory* (Tokyo: Radiopress, annually); and http://www.chinesenews.com.