I. INTRODUCTION

Anglo-American studies on terrorism have largely ignored Carl Schmitt’s *Theorie des Partisanen* since its appearance in 1963. In the massive 1988 bibliography on terrorism by Alex Schmid, Albert Jongman *et al.* Carl Schmitt’s *Theorie der Partisanen* managed to get a listing, but only under the specific bibliography on ‘Terrorism from a military perspective’. In recent books on terrorism Schmitt’s name does not even make the bibliography. In a passionate attack against recent attempts to engage with Carl Schmitt, Jef Huysmans has forcibly argued that the spectre of Nazism and the Holocaust ‘should always haunt any invoking of Schmitt or Schmittean understandings of the political’ and that ‘normative questions about the ethico-political project his concept of the political incorporates ought to be ‘the kernel of any working with or on Schmitt’s ideas’. For Huysmans the history-of-ideas approach is partially to blame for the unwillingness of writers to engage with the possible normative implications of Carl Schmitt’s notion of the political. He writes: ‘[i]ntroducing Schmitt’s work by means of a history of ideas shaped around an epistemological puzzle considerably limits the possibility of incorporating the shadow of the Holocaust and Nazism in the story.’ This paper does not engage with Jef Huysmans’ claim, but suggests that abhorrence of Schmitt’s ideological stance does not justify the neglect in the Anglophone literature of *Theorie des Partisanen*. The paper claims that

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1 The same is not true of European studies; on this, see Muller, J., A dangerous mind- Carl Schmitt in Post-War European Thought, 2003, Yale University Press, Yale.
5 I discuss the significance of *Theorie des Partisanen* within Schmitt’s opus, in ‘The Theory of the Partisan: Carl Schmitt’s Neglected Legacy’, *History of Political Thought*, forthcoming.
Schmitt’s analysis of nationalist and global terrorism enhances our understanding of the bonds between members in terrorists groups and improves our appreciation of the different notions of friendship and enmity endorsed by national terrorism and global terrorism respectively.

II. THE IMPORTANCE OF HAVING A FRIEND.

My first step is to establish the importance of friendship in Carl Schmitt’s construct. We may recall that in his writings Schmitt often points out that the essence of the political is not enmity as such, but the possibility of distinguishing between enemy and friend and that the presupposition of both friend and enemy are essential to politics. He points out that the fact that he had started his examination with the study of the enemy did not imply that that the concept of friend was less crucial than the concept of enemy to his understanding of politics. In my opinion the best way to appreciate what Schmitt meant by this claim is to concentrate on a most illuminating anecdote in *Theorie des Partisanen*: the story of Raoul Salan.

In 1958 General Salan - Schmitt tells us - was made commander-in-chief of French armed forces in Algeria. Although initially a supporter of General de Gaulle, Salan became increasingly hostile to the French President, as he was disillusioned about De Gaulle’s shaky commitment to defend at all costs French sovereignty over Algerian soil. As a reaction, in 1961 Salan founded the OAS (Organisation d’Armee Secret), a secret organization that started to plan terrorist attacks against both the Algerian “enemy” and French nationals on Algerian territory. In 1962 Salan was arrested and tried. In discussing the Salan case Schmitt makes two main points that, I would argue, are of critical importance for a correct understanding of his concept of the political, and of his concept of friend and enemy.

First, Schmitt stresses the fact that Salan had at the same time two enemies: on the one hand he was engaged in an inter-state war against the Algerians and on the other in a civil war against his own government. How is it possible - Schmitt asks - to have more than one real enemy? His reply (that echoes Däuber) is worth recalling:

> The enemy is he who questions our own Gestalt. If our own Gestalt is unambiguous how can this duality of our enemy come about? The enemy is not something that we can do away with for some reason or another or that we can destroy for its complete worthlessness. The enemy places himself on my own level. For this reason, I must engage with him, in order to establish the very measure of myself, of my own boundaries, of my own Gestalt.  

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We may notice that the quotation from Däuber that ‘Der Feind ist unsre eigne Frage als Gestalt’ can be found also in *Ex Captivitate Salus*, in the section entitled *Wisdom of the Cell* where Schmitt reflected on what enmity meant for him personally.\(^7\)

As in logic there cannot be two distinct negations of a given statement, so Schmitt argues that in politics there cannot be two enemies (negations) of the same entity. The enemy is not just ‘another’, but is the very negation of the self. For Schmitt the enemy does not simply put in question our roles or actions or values or interests, but our very being. The result of any confrontation with the enemy is a verdict on our own identity. This view of enmity that Schmitt sometimes referred to as ‘existential’ is an enmity that comes from the soul and not from abstract ideals or principles, an enmity that has a concrete target, an enmity that is relative and bounded exactly because the enemy is concrete and therefore located on the time-space plane. Instead Salan firstly had one enemy (the Algerians), then two enemies (the Algerians and the French) and finally an universal enemy (the whole anti-colonial world): his enmity became absolute, abstract, and universal, and in turn Salan lost his real identity.

Secondly, Schmitt’s reflections on Salan’s story are interesting for another reason; in addition to the observation that one cannot have more than one real enemy any more than one can have more than one real identity, Schmitt makes the point that one must have a friend. Salan did not. In the *mare magnum* of world politics - Schmitt tells us - Salan was unable to find any agency or third party that supported his cause, and, on the contrary, clashed head on with the compact front of anti-colonialism. Salan had only enemies and thus, says Schmitt, his enterprise was no longer political. Such a remark seems to me all-important to understand Schmitt’s concept of the political

This emphasis on the importance of the friend explains why drawing too close an analogy between the friend/enemy principle and the self/other dichotomy can be seriously misleading. Unlike the self/other duality, there are not two, but three essential elements that make up Schmitt’s concept of the political, namely, the self, the enemy, and the friend.

It is worth pointing out that there are two types of friend that emerge from the pages of *Theorie des Partisanen*: on the one hand there is the friend of, and external to, one’s own group or party and on the other hand there is the comrade belonging to one’s own group or party. The latter is mentioned only once in *Theorie des Partisanen*, but in an important passage, where the key characteristics of the partisan are discussed. The bond between the partisan and his group or party is described by Schmitt as a total bond (die totale Erfassung), altogether different from any type of bond and allegiance that link individuals together under normal circumstances and in a modern liberal

Such a bond, Schmitt explains, is political and distinguishes the partisan from the common criminal. Although at times the two might use similar tactics and methods, their motivation is altogether different, in so far as the former aims at achieving the political goal of a group, or party, whereas the latter aims at private gain. The bond between the partisan and his comrade is intensely political in so far they are both prepared to die and kill for each other and for their shared way of life. The friend as comrade is a defining element of the partisan’s identity: it helps define who the partisan is much more than other associations or characteristics such as his family, or church or class, or even race and gender. While the friend-as-comrade is part of the partisan’s identity, the external friend or ally is the source of recognition of the partisan’s identity. When Schmitt refers to friends in *Theorie des Partisanen*, he does not usually mean one’s comrades, or fellow fighters, with whom one has ‘a total political bond’, but the external and *public* friends of one’s own group and cause. In Schmitt’s account of 20th century partisan guerrillas, ‘friends’ have usually been nation states. This powerful ‘third party’ (der mächtige Dritte) plays a crucial role in Schmitt’s account of the history and theory of the partisan. The function attributed by Schmitt to the third party, or public friend, is twofold: on the one hand, it provides the partisan with arms and supplies; on the other hand it gives political recognition to the partisan - recognition that the partisan does need in order for his activities to be categorised as political and hence non-criminal. As Schmitt points out, an irregular combatant has only two possibilities to legitimise himself and his actions: one is to obtain the recognition from some existing legitimate power, the other is by trying to establish his own legitimacy by revolutionary actions. Self-interest, according to Schmitt, is what motivates the friend or ‘third party’ (der interessierte Dritte) to help the partisan: the influence and power that the third party has on the partisan enhances its own standing on the international stage.

To conclude this section, friendship is crucial to Schmitt’s concept of the political. Schmitt’s interpretation of the Salan story supports his own claim that the friend was as relevant to his concept of politics as the enemy. I would argue that politics in Schmitt’s sense is about the interaction of *three* agencies: one’s friends, one’s enemies and one’s political unit (which can take the form – depending on historical circumstances - of state, party, or group). For Schmitt one’s identity cannot be defined without the active interplay with *both* friends and enemies; it follows that in a world without friends as much as

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8 Schmitt, *Theorie des Partisanen*, p. 21. According to Schmitt, the debate on the so-called total state had failed to notice that in the 20th century not the state as such, but the revolutionary party is the true fundamental totalitarian organization.

in a world without enemies there is no chance of establishing who we are. As politics is a search for identity\(^\text{10}\), it follows that in a world without friends, as much as in a world without enemies, there is no real politics. In a world with no friends but only enemies (or, to use Schmitt’s terminology, a ‘universal enemy’) politics becomes simply a façade, just a cover-up of an never-ending state of hostility culminating with the victory of one over the other, thereby bringing about the end of both politics and of the pretence of politics. The Cold War, with its attending division of the world in two opposing camps, for Schmitt was an example of futile politics.

### III. SCHMITT’S TYPOLOGY OF ENEMIES AND FRIENDS.

For Schmitt the category of the ‘political’ does not coincide with any particular historical form (such as the state), but acquires its concrete meaning only when it does so. Likewise, the categories of friend and enemy do not coincide with the historical forms that enmity and friendship may take in different ages, but they nevertheless gain their concrete content only when they do so. In *Theorie des Partisanen* Schmitt discusses the changing meaning of enmity, which had been previously only been hinted at in *The Concept of the Political*.\(^\text{11}\) Nowhere in his works though does Schmitt define the meaning of friendship in any detail. This may seem to support the claim that Schmitt gave primacy to the concept of enmity over the concept of friendship. In his Foreword to the 1963 German edition of *The Concept of the Political* Schmitt defended himself by protesting that the construction of a juridical concept proceeds always from its negation and that this method does not imply the primacy of the negated concept. He refers to criminal law and observes that it would be absurd to contend that criminal law gives special value and primacy to crimes. Similarly - he claims- it is absurd to consider the concept of enemy as more important to his theory than the concept of friend. In this section I have a double purpose: on the one hand, my aim is to offer an account of Schmitt’s typology of enmity that although very brief is as accurate and as close to the texts as possible; on the other hand I will venture to speculate what a Schmittean typology of friendship may look like.

To begin with, we may recall that in Schmitt’s works one can find reference to three different types of enmity: conventional, real, and absolute.

One type of enmity that Schmitt takes for granted and never defines in any great detail is **conventional enmity**; conventional enmity is limited and

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\(^{10}\) I will return to this point in the final section of the paper.

\(^{11}\) In his Foreword to the 1963 German edition of *The Concept of the Political* Carl Schmitt states that ‘the main lacuna [of *The Concept of the Political*, 1932] lies in the fact that the different types of enemy – conventional, real and absolute – are not separated and distinguished with sufficient clarity and precision’ p. 17. I discuss this in some detail in *The Theory of the Partisan: Carl Schmitt’s Neglected Legacy*, *op. cit.*
regulated. The circumstances in which conventional enmity materialises are inter-state wars. The protagonist of this type of enmity is the sovereign state. Its limitations and regulations come from *jus publicum europaeum*, namely the system of law which regulated European inter-state relations from the Westphalia Treaty to the First World War. This system of law enforced distinctions between war and peace, between criminal and enemy, between civilian and combatant.

Another type of enmity that appears repeatedly in Schmitt’s writings is ‘real enmity’; Schmitt links this form of enmity to the birth of the partisan during the Spanish Wars against Napoleon. Real enmity is subversive of - and unbounded by - the distinctions and regulations of *jus publicum europaeum*. Schmitt explains that this type of enmity appeared first in civil and colonial wars and was essentially defensive. The enemy is seen by the partisan as an oppressor, an invader to be fought with all available means. In his words:

> the partisan turns away from the conventional enmity of a controlled and circumscribed war and projects himself in a new sphere: the sphere of ‘real enmity’ which by means of terror and counter terror keeps growing until annihilation’.\(^\text{12}\)

Schmitt is at pains to point out that real enmity is unbound by legislation and yet not completely unbridled in so far as the ‘telluric’ characteristic of the partisan (his bond to a particular land) imposes spatial and temporal limits upon his hostility and prevents him from making claims of absolute justice. Real enmity is, Schmitt insists, relative and not absolute, defensive and not aggressive.\(^\text{13}\)

The third type of enmity that one can find in Schmitt’s writings is absolute enmity. Schmitt ascribes this type of enmity to the global revolutionary, or terrorist. What sets the revolutionary apart from the autochthonous or telluric partisan is the lack of a special bond with a particular land. Whereas for the autochthonous partisan the enemy is located in time and space and hence relative to - and bounded by - specific historical conditions, for the revolutionary the enemy can be a universal enemy, a class or a racial enemy. Schmitt points out that the enmity of the revolutionary is totally unbridled: ‘the war of total and absolute enmity knows no limitations’, neither the limitations of *jus publicum europaeum* (that constrains conventional enmity), nor the limitations of time and space (that relativise real enmity).

This is not the place to examine in greater depth Schmitt’s typology of enmity and in particular his acute observations on the differences between the real enmity of the nationalist terrorist and the absolute enmity of the global terrorist. However, even if sketched in broad outline, the typology of enmity can be used to formulate a typology of friendship.


It can be argued that to conventional enmity (namely an enmity which is controlled, limited, regulated and – in Schmitt’s own words - game-like) there corresponds a type of friendship that is also contained, restrained and game-like. This friendship is neither dramatic nor intense, but more akin to the relationship found between players. Such form of game-like friendship is the lukewarm bond that – in Schmitt’s view - individuals form in liberal democracies.

In a similar vein, it can be argued that the friendship corresponding to real enmity is much deeper, much truer, and much more dramatic than its conventional counterpart. For a telluric partisan or for nationalist terrorist the commitment to the group is total; he is willing to endure imprisonment, torture, and even death to defend his fellow fighters. He is willing to kill civilians and even children to protect his group. He would risk everything for them: his safety, his liberty, his reputation, his honour, and even his own family. In Schmitt’s philosophy the ultimate source of this kind of existential or true friendship between people is the common bond to a land (Heimat): it is located in time and space; it has a history.

Finally, the third type of enmity – absolute enmity- is related to a more abstract form of friendship. Although the global revolutionary or global terrorist may have physical contacts with some comrades, he is equally committed to friends that he may have never physically met or seen. This type of terrorist is willing to kill and die for abstractions (be they ideals, or people). As we will see in the next section, ideologies such as Leninism or even just-war theory have contributed to some extent to the development of absolute enmity and, arguably, of abstract friendship, too.

To conclude, although there is no typology of friendship in Schmitt’s works, yet a distinction between three types of friendship (game-like, existential, and abstract) can be constructed as a mirror image of Schmitt’s own typology of conventional, real, and absolute enmity. I will discuss the implications of these distinctions in the final section of this essay.

IV. IDEOLOGIES, TECHNOLOGIES AND FRIENDS.

Schmitt puts across the view that the meaning of ‘enemy’ and ‘friend’ is not fixed and eternal, but emerges from the interaction of a large number of factors in each epoch. These include the structure of the international political system, the ideology of the political agent, the level of technological advancement in weaponry and communications, the stage of economic development, changes in jurisprudence, and, of course, the prevailing
Not only can these factors not be isolated from each other, but the relation of cause and effect between each of them and the prevailing notion of enmity (and friendship) is also far from clear-cut. Schmitt associates the origin of the notions of conventional, real, and absolute enmity with three different historical conditions (inter-state wars, civil and colonial wars, and revolutionary wars, respectively) and with three different agents (the state, the telluric partisan, and the global revolutionary). The notions of real and absolute enmity, however, are no longer confined to the situation and agency with which they were originally linked when they enter the international sphere. Textual evidence to support this claim can be found for example in Schmitt’s remark in Theorie des Partisanen that European states entered the First World War as conventional enemies and left it as real enemies. This implies, for example, that a strengthening of the state system in itself does not guarantee a return to the conventional notion of enmity associated with *jus publicum europaeum*. The reason why this is so has to be found in Schmitt’s idea that political agency, although the essential carrier of a particular notion of enmity, is just one source of its meaning in different historical periods.

Of all the factors influencing the meaning of enmity (and friendship) in a given age Schmitt seems to pay particular attention to two: ideology and technology.

As a first step, let us consider briefly the role given by Schmitt to ideology in the definition of enmity.

In *Theorie des Partisanen* Schmitt does not discuss the ideology that inspires conventional enmity, but devotes a large section to the elucidation of the ideological sources of real and absolute enmity. Three names stand out: Clausewitz, Lenin, and Mao Tse-Tung.

According to Schmitt, Lenin learned from Clausewitz, whom he much admired and studied, that war and politics cannot be disentangled as concepts, in the sense that politics contains enmity and hence potentially war. In Schmitt’s view, however, there is a crucial difference betweenClausewitz and Lenin in this respect, in so far as the enmity implicit in politics for the former is of the ‘real’ variety, an enemy located in time and space, whereas for

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14 In 1963 Schmitt wrote that the notion of conventional enmity was the result of European rationalism and wondered on the effects of the increasing contacts with non-European cultures.

15 In Schmitt’s opinion Germany was criminalized for having waged war and this criminalisation marked the abandonment of *jus publicum europaeum* and the endorsement of real enmity even in inter-state wars.


the latter it is ‘absolute’, directed against an abstract enemy, the class enemy and the class system everywhere in the world.  

Schmitt detects a strong Clausewitzian influence also on Mao Tse Tung (who he refers to as ‘the new Clausewitz’), in so far as he, too, like Lenin, interprets Clausewitz’s formula of war as the continuation of politics as meaning that politics must contain at least potentially an element of enmity. Schmitt claims that although in the theories and practices of both Lenin and Mao one can detect the presence of both types of enmity, Lenin favoured the global revolutionary and the notion of abstract enmity, whereas Mao never abandoned the Clausewitzian notion of real enmity and never played down the role of the autochthonous partisan, either in theory or in practice. Schmitt indeed goes as far as saying that the seed of the ideological differences between Chinese and Russian Communism has its origin in the different weight assigned to the ‘telluric’ element. 

For Schmitt Leninism is just an example (admittedly, in his opinion a crucial example at the time of writing Theorie des Partisanen) of an ideology promoting absolute enmity. In Theorie des Partisanen Schmitt mentions other ideological views undermining the classical notion of enmity – views that are touched upon also in The Concept of the Political, namely, the notion of the ‘last war of humanity’ coined after the First World War and the ‘just war’ tradition. By rejecting the minimal ethical stand that Schmitt attributes to *jus publicum europaeum*, namely, that ‘waging war is legitimate as long as the enemy is respected’, and by trying to find a highly moral justification for war and killing, the ‘just war’ tradition according to Schmitt is compelled to portray the enemy as an evil to be eliminated, thereby embracing the notions of absolute enmity.

There is no doubt that in today’s world Schmitt would see not only religious fundamentalism and global terrorism, but also the ‘war on terror’ as unambiguous examples of ideologies endorsing absolute enmity. For Schmitt, the notion of enmity in the twentieth century has been affected not only by ideologies, but also by other factors, such as technological developments and global interdependence. Schmitt argues that there is a

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18 *Prima facie* the association of Lenin with ‘absolute enmity’ made by Schmitt in Theorie des Partisanen seems to contradict the association of Lenin with ‘real enmity’ suggested by Schmitt in The Concept of the Political. The balance of evidence seems to me to suggest that when writing Theorie des Partisanen Schmitt thought that Lenin had made practical use of autochthonous partisans (whose enemy is real), while theorising the notion of global revolutionary and hence the notion of absolute enmity.

19 In Theorie des Partisanen, Schmitt attempts to reconstruct ‘das Bild der Kriegslehre dieses neuen Clausewitz’, p. 60. Earlier Mao is defined by Schmitt as ‘the greatest practitioner (Praktiker) and the most famous theorist (Theoretiker) of revolutionary war’, p. 59.


21 C. Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, p. 36.
relationship between technical advance in weaponry and the underlying notion of enemy. He offers the powerful example of the nuclear bomb and claims that in order to justify not simply the use, but also the production and the possession of nuclear weapons, one must convince oneself that the enemy is a monster. Weapons of mass destruction for Schmitt presume the notion of absolute, limitless enmity.

Although Schmitt points out that even the most pre-industrial partisan with the most unsophisticated of weapons can create problems to the most technologically advanced modern army, he believes that the partisan, or the terrorist, takes part, as any other agent, in the technological age and is affected by advancements not just in weaponry but also in communications. According to Schmitt, it is the traditional, ‘telluric’ element of the partisan that is especially affected by technological change. Technological developments are singled out by Schmitt as the forces that bring about the loss of the ‘telluric’ element and turn the partisan into a small cog in a gigantic machine that operates politically on a global scale. The partisan becomes an instrument of an external agency by which, according to Schmitt, he is manipulated. For Schmitt globalisation, political interdependence, and technological advancement have affected and may affect further the nature of the partisan.

In Schmitt’s account the two factors that undermine the conventional notion of enmity – ideology and technology – were at work not only in the partisan wars of the twentieth century, but also in another phenomenon that followed the Second World War, namely, the Cold War. Writing in 1963 Schmitt states:

[A]lso in the other type of today’s wars, the so-called Cold War, the whole conceptual framework that has so far supported the traditional system of defining and regulating war breaks down. The cold war mocks all the classical distinctions between war, peace and neutrality, between politics and economics, between the military and the civilian, between combatant and non-combatant, and maintains only the distinction between friend and enemy, on which it grounds its very origin and essence.²²

In Theorie des Partisanen Schmitt does not commit himself to suggesting that either factor – ideology or technology - is more important in defining the notion of enmity of an age. In other parts of his opus, though, there is the suggestion that the technological factor takes precedence over all other factors, including ideology. For example, in Ex Captivitate Salus²³ Schmitt argues that in the Middle Ages ‘theologians’ held an ‘absolute’ concept of enmity; yet he stresses that these early modern wars, although bloody, were essentially different from the partisan wars of the twentieth century, last but not least because of the differences in weapons technology. If the crisis of

conventional or limited enmity is a direct result of advances in weapon technology, then this process is as unlikely to be halted or reversed as technological development.

As globalisation has affected the notion of enmity of the age and has fostered absolute enmity, so it has affected the destiny of the concept of friendship. It can be argued that globalisation takes away the telluric element of friendship and promotes ‘abstract’ friendship.

**V. FRIENDSHIP AND THE POLITICS OF IDENTITY**

In section I of this paper I have argued that Carl Schmitt’s reflections on the partisan are unduly neglected by Anglo-American students of terrorism. Schmitt was captivated by the total bond that the partisan has with his group and saw in that bond the foundation of a truly political unit. Schmitt was fascinated by the telluric partisan’s commitment to his group, by his complete dedication to his political cause and by his unshakeable willingness to die and kill to defend and protect the members of his group and their political purpose. It is my contention that Schmitt tried to capture the partisan’s notions of ‘real enmity’ and ‘true friendship’ in his own notion of the political. Indeed when Schmitt wrote in *Ex Captivitate Salus* that he was the last supporter of *jus publicum europaeum* to which he had given ‘a new existential basis’, he knew that his ambiguous qualification was all-important. Although Schmitt favoured the state as political agent and he dreaded civil and revolutionary wars, his claim that politics contains enmity and potentially war was a blow against both classical political theory and against *jus publicum europaeum*, which was predicated on the stark separation of peace and war. As Hobbes had used natural law theory subversively, so Schmitt sabotaged classical European jurisprudence. By claiming consistently throughout his life that politics contains enmity and virtually war, Schmitt provided both recognition and theoretical underpinning to the claim by all partisan fighters of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries who felt that their irregular fighting and their engagement in colonial and civil wars was not criminal but political, not legal but legitimate.

In this paper I have stressed that Schmitt, while sympathetic with the telluric partisan and the nationalist terrorist, had made no concessions to the global revolutionary or global terrorist and had spoken of absolute enmity only in a very derogatory way. He never failed to point out disapprovingly that absolute enmity dehumanises the enemy; it depicts him as a monster; it urges us to fight aggressive and punitive wars against him; it convinces us that we have the right not simply to contain, but also to annihilate the enemy on the ground of some supposedly objective criteria decided *in abstracto*. Interpreters have responded differently to Schmitt’s open condemnations of absolute enmity. Sympathetic readers have highlighted such open
condemnations to support their claim of the ideological distance between Schmitt and Nazism. More cynical readers have remained unconvinced by Schmitt’s condemnation of absolute enmity and have argued that it is inconsistent with other claims made by Schmitt. 24 According to Derrida, Schmitt conveys the thought that the closer a grouping comes to the extremity and purity of the friend/enemy antithesis, the more political it is; it follows – argues Derrida – that absolute enmity is the most political form of enmity and the most consistent with Schmitt’s philosophy.

Although Derrida’s argument is forceful, my contention is that the rejection of absolute enmity is implied by – and consistent with – a very specific claim that Schmitt made about the political and that I introduced in Section II. There I discussed R. Salan’s story and Schmitt’s view that when one has, like Salan, only enemies and no friends politics becomes a cover-up of a never ending state of hostility. From The Concept of the Political to the Theorie des Partisanen, Schmitt maintained consistently that for real politics to take place there need be multiple players. We may wonder why. The answer, I believe, lies in Schmitt’s notion of political identity. Comrades, allies, and enemies are important for establishing our identities: we measure ourselves against our enemies; our comrades are an integral part of our identity; our allies are our witnesses and our helpers. But allies and enemies serve a further function: present allies can become our future enemies as much as our present enemies can become our future friends.

Schmitt’s own concept of the political and his insistence that we need allies as much as enemies is predicated on the assumption that our identity is not given a priori or fixed. Politics for Schmitt is not about an identity that already exists but about an identity as a never-ending process. Comrades and allies as well as enemies are all equally important for this process to take place.

To say the same thing in different words, Schmitt rejected absolute enmity because it was incompatible with his understanding of identity as a process.

In Section III I elucidated Schmitt’s typology of enmity and attempted to derive a typology of friendship: I suggested that ‘conventional enmity’ is mirrored by ‘game-like friendship’, that ‘real enmity’ corresponds to ‘true or existential friendship’ and that ‘absolute enmity’ is the counterpart of ‘abstract friendship’.

The first type of friendship assumes or is inspired by an individualistic ideology in so far as friendship is a game only for someone who can claim to have an identity independent from his association to a group or party. The partisan described by Schmitt acquires his identity from belonging to a group and so the bond of friendship between himself and the group can never be just a game.

The third type of friendship – or abstract friendship – is inspired by ‘dogmatic’ ideologies. The global terrorist or fundamentalist does not need to find his identity through a process of interaction; his own identity, or rather the identity of his group, is already known to him; all he needs to do is to protect and safeguard it against the enemy.

In my opinion, what I defined as ‘existential friendship’ would be endorsed by Schmitt for a number of reasons. First, because it assumes a non-individualistic definition of a person. It assumes that identity is above all about ‘belonging’ to a group or another; a friend is part of our identity.

Second, it assumes that identity is not given *a priori* but is a process, identity is about ‘becoming’; it is a search whose outcome cannot be known in advance: as the future friend is unknown, so is our identity.

Finally, we may recall that in *The Concept of the Political* we find the following remarks:

> All political concepts, images and terms have a polemical meaning. They are focused on a specific conflict and are bound to a concrete situation whose ultimate consequence is a friend-enemy grouping [...] Words such as state, republic, society, class, as well as sovereignty, constitutional state, absolutism, dictatorship, economic planning, neutral or total state, and so on, are incomprehensible if one does not know exactly who is to be affected, combated, refuted or negated by such a term. (pp. 30-1)

Schmitt’s legacy on friendship is that its definition is more than a terminological issue: it refers to historical ‘antitheses’, to ‘concrete antagonisms’ and to ‘competitions’ and ‘struggles’; in other words, for Schmitt any definition of friendship is, above all, a political definition. Even a game-like definition of friendship is political in so far as it assumes that one does not need an existential bond with others in order to be ‘one’ and have an identity.

From a Schmittean perspective the history of political thought is a battle of definitions of friendship and enmity. Schmitt would have said that the problem for the political theorist does not lie in finding the ‘true’ content of friendship but rather in discovering the factors that in a particular historical age determine its dominant meaning.

In Section IV, I mentioned that for Schmitt many factors affect the meaning of enmity of an age. These include the structure of the international political system, the ideology of the political agent, the level of technological advancement in weaponry and communications, the stage of economic development, changes in jurisprudence, and, of course, the prevailing culture. Of all these factors Schmitt gave special status to technology and suggested that advancements in communications and weaponry were crucial for the advent of global terrorism and the gradual but unstoppable crisis of both conventional and real enmity.
This may support the claim that for Schmitt technology even more than ideology is the culprit for the crisis also of existential friendship and its replacement with abstract friendship.