The term ‘anti-Zionist campaign’ is misleading in two ways, since the campaign which this paper will analyse began as an anti-Israeli policy but quickly turned into an anti-Jewish campaign; this evident anti-Jewish character remained its distinctive feature. The words ‘Zionism’ and ‘Zionist’, repeated in Poland in 1968 in hundreds of propaganda publications and at thousands of meetings, were not used to refer to a particular variety of nationalism but were a substitute for ‘Jew’ and ‘Jewish’. Secondly, ‘Zionist’ meant ‘Jew’ even if the person called a ‘Zionist’ was not Jewish; the anti-Jewish campaign, called ‘anti-Zionist’, was directed against Poles as well.

While the social background – that is, the persistence of anti-Jewish prejudice in Poland many years after the Holocaust – may be well known, a few words about the less known, intra-party aspects of the campaign are in order here. The origins of the tension within the communist establishment which showed up in 1967–1968 could already be seen in the late 1940s, when Władysław Gomułka, the leader of the party until that time, was accused, together with a group of other communist leaders who had likewise spent the war in Poland, of right-wing nationalist deviation, removed from power, and subsequently arrested. The group of communists which emerged triumphant was dominated by those who had spent the war in the Soviet Union, including prominent Jews. In 1956 Gomułka returned and faced a party leadership divided into two factions. The relatively reformist group, called Pulawy, included leading Jewish communists; the other faction, known as Natolin, did not hesitate to exploit the ethnic argument against its rival. Gomułka formed a strategic pact with the first group but after a time he put his own people in key positions and, under the slogan of fighting against revisionism, he was able to weaken the Pulawy faction’s position. In the 1960s a rising new force appeared on the political scene, the Partisans, a rather loose group of party leaders united by a similar political background, unappeased ambitions, and a worldview combining nationalism and communism, under the unquestioned leadership of General Mieczysław Moczar, head of the Ministry of Home Affairs (MSW), including its secret services.

On the eve of the Six-Day War in 1967, there were approximately 25,000–30,000 Jews among Poland’s more than 32 million inhabitants. It was an ageing group and its younger strata were undergoing accelerated acculturation and integration into Polish society, which meant, among other things, the erosion of Yiddish culture and secularisation. This relatively small group possessed impressively developed secular institutions, which – unique in the Soviet Block – were permitted to receive significant support from the West.

FROM ANTI-ISRAELI TO ANTI-ZIONIST CAMPAIGN

When the Israeli–Arab war broke out in June 1967, initially the official media provided rather limited information and news commentary was cautious and measured, thus not particularly aggressive toward Israel. Soon, however, appropriate directives were issued by the party authorities and the columns of the press were filled with thunderous words of condemnation against the Israeli aggressors, along with expressions of solidarity with the Arab nations. Meanwhile, Gomułka and Premier Cyrykiewicz went to Moscow for a summit of communist leaders devoted to the Middle East crisis. There a decision was taken in favour of military and financial support for the Arab countries and the breach of diplomatic relations with Israel, to which Romania refused to agree. The anti-Israeli campaign in Poland developed and its high point was Gomułka’s appearance at the Trade Union Congress on 19 June.

He delivered a long, twenty-page speech, mainly a lecture on the history of Israel and its entry into ‘entente with British–American imperialists against the progressive Arab forces’. Moreover, he gave the Middle East conflict a local, Polish dimension: ‘Israel’s aggression in the Arab countries met with applause in Zionist circles of Jews – Polish citizens’, Gomułka claimed. The authorities treat all citizens equally regardless of their ethnicity ‘but we do not want a fifth column to emerge in our country. We cannot remain indifferent towards people . . . who support the aggressor.’ He also unambiguously urged that ‘those who feel that these words are addressed to them’ should emigrate. A few of the Politburo members present, led by Edward Ochab, protested and under pressure Gomułka agreed to change the text before it was officially published. This was an unprecedented event: the authoritarian First Secretary agreed to the censoring of a speech that he had already delivered and transmitted by radio.

The speech of 19 June opened an essentially new phase of the campaign. These few sentences by the First Secretary brought onto the scene the word ‘Zionism’, inauspicious for Jews since the 1950s. The anti-Israeli campaign became anti-Zionist and a Cold War crisis acquired a local Polish–Jewish aspect. At the same time, the clash between Gomułka and the outraged Politburo members crystallised or revealed a division in the party leadership which was not limited to that single issue.
The **anti-Zionist** campaign began. Quietly organised activities of the Security Service as well as uncontrolled rumors within the party apparatus and the state administration on expectable political changes started to develop. They marked a stage which may be called a ‘creeping campaign’. Gomulka’s words were the signal for those who had long been awaiting it, above all in General Moczar’s ministry (MSW) and among part of the military leaders. Those who had wished for a long time to ‘settle with the Jews’ felt they had been given the green light, at least to set the ball rolling. The Security Service began to screen people of Jewish origin at various institutions, as well as to identify ‘hidden Zionists’. It might be more than pure coincidence that the two institutions most involved in initiating the campaign in 1967, the civilian and military secret services and the army’s Main Political Authority, were also the institutions most closely supervised and the most infiltrated by the Soviets.

**MARCH 1968**

The major chapter in the **anti-Zionist** campaign began in March 1968. The mainstream of the March events was a student rebellion and its pacification by the authorities. Three days after the riots had begun, the first article appeared in the press attributing the instigation of the disturbances to Zionists and ‘bankrupt politicians’, that is, Jewish ex-Stalinists now side-lined. From that point the quantity and intensity of attacks against Zionism snowballed in the media and in public speeches.

In the course of a week mass meetings were organised throughout the country. Resolutions and letters of an increasingly radical tone were sent to the leadership:

> We swear, in memory of those who died for the power of the people, that we will cleanse Polish soil of all the instigators and leaders of the coup against the working class and the peasant government with our workers’ fists. We will not permit revisionist and Zionist rioters to accuse us of antisemitism, declared the workers from the Półfer factories, while the workers from the Baildon steel works demanded ‘a purge of Zionist elements from party ranks, removal from their positions, and the refusal to permit their children to continue further university studies’.

Simultaneously, an open purge began. Its first target was the most prominent member of the former Pulawy faction Roman Zambrowski. The news of his dismissal carried a clear message: if such a prominent figure was defenceless, anybody could be attacked. Soon several other high-ranking Jewish officials – Jan Grudziński, Jan Górecki, and Fryderyk Topolski – lost their vice ministerial posts. In a few weeks the nationwide purge of Jews from the party and their positions had got under way and was descending from government officials and editors-in-chief through university professors to bookkeepers in cooperatives, foremen, and workers.

Gomulka remained silent until 19 March when he appeared at the meeting with several thousand party activists in the Congress Hall in Warsaw. They bore banners such as ‘Down with the Agents of Imperialism – Reactionary Zionism!’, ‘Long Live Comrade Gomulka’, ‘We Demand the Complete Unmasking and Punishment of the Political Instigators’. Gomulka delivered a speech attacking primarily disobedient writers; next he explained the circumstances of the student protests, maintaining the familiar thesis about the dishonest intentions of the organisers and their cynical manipulation, but he attributed it to reactionary and revisionist instigation, not Zionism. He denied that Zionism was a danger for Poland. There is, however, he claimed, a problem with self-identity among part of the Jews who are attached more to Israel than to Poland. ‘I presume that Jews in this category will sooner or later leave our country’, he said. He distinguished also cosmopolitans ‘who feel neither Poles nor Jews’ and ‘should avoid fields of employment in which national affirmation is an essential thing’ and ‘[good] citizens of Jewish origin’. Gomulka’s voice was thus more balanced than the media campaign, but he did not criticise the hate speech nor stop the campaign.

While the early stages of the campaign are not clear – for instance, we do not know who made the decision to publish the first anti-Zionist article on 11 March – the First Secretary undoubtedly had to at least approve such steps and he did not oppose the development of the campaign. If Gomulka had wanted to stop the campaign or give it a different flavour he could have done so in its initial stages, but he did nothing. Why did he unleash the campaign? First, the campaign was a reaction to the student protests and dissent among intellectuals. It was a handy instrument with which to fight the rebellion by compromising its leaders and goals as alien and perverse. It combined well with police operations and various forms of repression against contesting students and writers. Secondly, it was an instrument with which to prevent the spread of the rebellion outside universities to broader groups, in particular workers, which the party leaders feared deeply. At least since the autumn of 1967, when a series of strikes and other workers’ protests had followed a rise in food prices, the leaders had been seriously concerned with the possible eruption of popular unrest. This objective seems the most important motive behind allowing and maintaining an aggressive campaign which aimed at alienating the dissident students and intellectuals from the masses by portraying them as ‘the Alien’: as Poland-hating Jews, Stalinists attempting to return to power, allies of German expansionists (who still evoked widespread fear and hatred), arrogant and egoistic members of the Establishment, and so on. The campaign not only separated the masses from potential leaders but channelled a part of popular frustration against ‘Zionist-revisionist’ scapegoats.
The third main objective, which the decision makers never revealed explicitly, was to change the political balance in the party leadership. The attack on Zionists in March restimulated the conflict which had emerged or crystallised in the Politburo around Gomulka’s ‘fifth column’ speech in June 1967. The new attack gave its proponents strategic advantage over their adversaries who were forced onto the defensive and deprived of support from the party aktiv [activists]. The main opponent of Gomulka, Edward Ochab, resigned from the Politburo and state positions. Another Politburo member, Rapacki, the foreign affairs minister, simply ceased going to work and went on extended vacation. Marshal Spychalski, Gomulka’s former friend, was also practically neutralised and soon left the Ministry of Defence. The key motive for Gomulka in accepting the anti-Jewish initiative coming from Gen. Moczar’s secret services seemed to be the desire to reconsolidate the leadership on his terms. Gomulka’s objectives acquire greater significance in the context of developments in Czechoslovakia. The brutal repression of students, the propaganda campaign, and the mobilisation of the party served as a preventive strike against potential followers of the Czech path, as well as the consolidation not only of the party leadership but also of the entire party. The motive of General Moczar was similar, though not identical: he wanted to weaken his opponents and to become Number Two and the principal candidate to succeed the ageing Gomulka. Furthermore, the general attack on Zionists and the dismissals of several high-ranking Jewish officials finally eliminated a group of once-powerful individuals and began a wider wave of changes among the cadres which satisfied the ambitions of many so far frustrated medium- and lower-level apparatchiks, especially those of the generation that had joined the party in the early 1950s.

Paradoxically, what links the goals discussed above is the lack of any essential link between them and Zionism (whatever it might have meant), and the incommensurably large scale and intensity of aggression of the anti-Zionist campaign. However, while not being necessary, anti-Zionism was a useful tool because it served to attain all the above objectives. Playing the Jewish card was ‘multifunctional’.

For each of the above purposes, anti-Zionism was an instrument, which was used in a more or less cynical way. It should be stressed, however, that for some people the attack on the Jews was the chief goal and their anti-Jewish prejudice and resentment were sufficient motive for action. The Ministry of Home Affairs or CC (Central Committee of the Communist Party) archival documents do not present such motives explicitly but their implicit obsession with a Jewish conspiracy and the ‘Jewish threat’ leaves no doubt as to what kind of sentiments and opinions about Jews some of their authors had – the significance of their deeds is equally transparent. Thus, both the pursuit of rationally defined interests and irrational impulses can be found at the origin of the campaign.

Between the extreme ideal types – cold cynicism in the manipulation of the antisemitic prejudices of others in order to promote one’s interests, and antisemitic paranoia which is too sincere to be cynical – there is a spectrum of attitudes combining cynicism and prejudice in various proportions.

THE WITCH-HUNT

The campaign was much more a return of Stalinist ghosts than of right-wing antisemitism. It was a verbal, symbolic pogrom made along recognisable patterns of hate campaigns against various real and imaginary enemies that each communist country had experienced several times. From chauvinist antisemitism it borrowed certain clichés and slogans – the keys to the Polish historical legacy of anti-Jewish prejudices. From the arsenal of previous communist purges and hate campaigns it took certain slogans and stereotypes of the enemy, ready-made patterns for individual and institutional behaviour, organisations well-trained in their use and the appropriate Orwellian Newspeak.

Paradoxically, probably the most powerful slogan of the communist propaganda in March was the accusation that the Jews were zealous communists. They were blamed for a major part, if not all, of the crimes and horrors of the Stalinist period. The myth of Judeo-bolchevism had been well known in Poland since the Russian revolution and the Polish-Bolshevik war of 1920, yet its 1968 model deserves interest as a tool of communist propaganda. This accusation exploited and developed the popular stereotype of Jewish communism to purify communism: the Jews were the dark side of communism; what was wrong in communism was due to them. This both compromised the Jews and absolved other communists and the regime itself from the crimes and other misdeeds of its most shameful period. The stereotype of Jewish communism was in turn rooted in an incomparably older myth, known in Europe since the Middle Ages, that of Jews spreading disease.

The stereotype of the treacherous Jew was similarly transformed. The conviction that Jews were inclined to treason and co-operation with the enemies of Poland, together with the myth of Judeo-communism and similar stereotypes elsewhere (for example, the Dreyfus affair in France), had been popular at least since the war of 1920. In 1968 it was reinterpreted: the Jews are wont to betray People’s Poland - the party, and socialism. ‘Poland has never been their fatherland. . . . Their fatherland is the American dollar . . .’, reads a March article. But although the spies had no fatherland, they did have an ethnicity – their Jewish origin was unmasked immediately. We can trace much older roots of the cliché of the Jewish traitor to the party: colonel Jozef Swiatlo, who had defected to the West and became the icon of the Jewish traitor of communist Poland, had the features of Judas Iscariot. He also had some of the characteristics of Emanuel Goldstein, the archetypal traitor to the Party and Big Brother in Orwell’s 1984.
Another theme of the journalism initiated in March was the battle against ‘the campaign of mean invective against the Polish nation, intending to render it obnoxious in the eyes of world opinion’. Poles learned from it that Israel and international Zionism, in exchange for damages in the amount of 3 billion marks, agreed to the rehabilitation of Nazi criminals. On this basis . . . Zionists, seeking to absolve the Germans for the crimes committed against Jews, attempt to convince both Jews and the entire world that the real culprits of those crimes were . . . Poles.

As proof of this campaign the press gathered citations from various publications in the West about Polish antisemitism, especially articles and public speeches by Jewish politicians. These charges were in fact sometimes unjustified or exaggerated, and in any case incompatible with the self-perceptions and images of the war in the Polish collective memory, thus they struck an extremely sensitive nerve in Polish identity. In this way the March propaganda fed on its own fruit: the pursuit of Jews in Poland caused a wave of protests abroad, including unbalanced generalisations about Polish antisemitism, which were then exploited to spread the campaign further and allowed the communist authorities to present themselves as defenders of the national honour and to call for unity under their leadership.

Yet, even the most creative combinations of old and new antisemitic slogans could not have created the required effect without the power of the party propaganda machine. Besides the monopolised radio and TV there were such instruments as the workplace radio broadcasts, wall newspapers, posters, banners and signs placed on buildings, newsreels shown prior to movie screenings, books, brochures, leaflets, and so on, even deliberately spread rumours. For many weeks that enormous propaganda machine was a war machine, producing a formidable noise, which even when not entirely successful in infusing people with antisemitic messages, at least blocked the possibility of independent communication contradicting the official line.

While using the power of modern media the rulers did not forget the traditional ones. The scale and reach of public meetings was immense. Some meetings were huge undertakings organised with the participation of crowds numbering more than a hundred thousand, but altogether more people participated in tens of thousands of meetings on a smaller scale, organised virtually everywhere. There were factory and department meetings, in low-level party organisations (POP), provincial, county and district party organisations, conferences of the aktiv, sessions of party committees and executive committees at various levels, meetings of the party-controlled trade unions, youth and women’s organisations, Veterans’ Union, and so on. The Warsaw party committee alone — and in only the first two weeks of the campaign — organised more than 1,900 POP meetings, nearly 400 rallies, approximately 700 meetings of the aktiv, and 600 meetings of party groups. The number of various types of gatherings throughout the country in the course of three months of the campaign is difficult to specify, but a hundred thousand is a very conservative estimate. The army alone directed 25,125 officers and cadets to lead ‘explanatory sessions’, and they took part in 42,000 meetings (including 27,000 in the country, 4,000 at workplaces, and 10,500 in schools), which reportedly gathered 3.7 million people.

Meetings, and in particular party meetings, were more than a propaganda channel. They served to educate and transmit vocabulary and patterns of behaviour that were currently desired and approved, and warn against those which were inappropriate and condemned. They required participation in rituals such as applauding the speakers, raising hands to vote, holding banners, participating in discussions, using correct words and phrases, responding with the appropriate shouts, and so on. Attending meetings lasting several hours and listening to extended speeches required patience and self-denial. One should not underestimate the psychological effects of repeated participation in such meetings, even if it became a routine. The meetings were also a tool of supervision and evaluation of those convened — a test of the correct performance of rituals, which permitted evaluation of individual and group obedience.

THE HUNT AS A SOCIAL PHENOMENON

The March mobilisation of both the party and broader groups under the campaign slogans was more than just the disciplined implementation of orders from above. The behaviour of crowds participating in the campaign’s rituals was a social phenomenon, the result of interaction between the apparatus of the party, propaganda, and the Ministry of Home Affairs implementing their acquired procedures, and the society. Also, the operations of this apparatus consisted of the actions of thousands of individuals. As the campaign descended to increasingly lower levels of party, county, district, and factory committee meetings, there was undoubtably a heavy input of independent initiatives, sometimes excitement and enthusiasm. The sources repeatedly emphasise that many of these meetings were something out of the ordinary, as opposed to the previous stagnation of party organisations.

The Jewish theme inspired many of the most lively discussions, eliciting great interest and emotion, described sometimes as simply ‘anti-Zionist psychosis’. The documents of this period speak about ‘breaking through the barrier of silence’ and the March wave of antisemitism had indeed a dynamic of taboo-breaking. For many years before March the communists had blocked not only public displays of antisemitism but also any unritualised expression concerning Jews and Polish–Jewish relations. Prior to 1968, the topic could be publicly aired only within the framework of the hypocritical lines of official propaganda; otherwise it remained under a heavy lid of
silence. Beneath that lid, however, a hallucinogenic mixture was fermenting, composed of very old anti-Jewish prejudice, modern antisemitic slogans that the pre-war right-wing had spread, conspiracy theories, still inconceivable psychological consequences of war-time horrors, and by-products of the post-war ‘Poles–Jews–communism’ syndrome. In March not only was the lid suddenly removed from the kettle, but it was also heated with the help of hate propaganda: becoming infused with its vapours became a party and a civic duty.

The social dynamics of the campaign cannot, however, be reduced to the stimulation and release of antisemitic resentment and prejudice. Several forces fuelled the campaign. One of the key features of the campaign was the channelling of general social frustrations with living and work conditions and focusing the aggression thus generated towards designated enemies. Poles were permitted to express loudly their dissatisfaction and demands for change – an extraordinary possibility under the communist regime - on condition that they fitted into permissible forms, that is, into the rhetoric condemning Zionists, revisionists, and so on. In 1968, after years of fearful silence, Poles were able to criticise officials: not all of them, only the Jewish ones, nevertheless they could finally speak publicly about the corruption and arrogance of the ruling bureaucracy at least to some extent. They could openly say that certain – Jewish – officers of the pre-1956 Security had tortured their victims. They could even throw off submission to their – Jewish – superiors. After the ‘go ahead’ had been given to attack Zambrowski and other high Jewish officials and their alleged ‘protectors’ – even top public figures (Ochab) – it became possible to publicly criticise members of the ruling group – not all of them, of course, but even that was a significant departure from their previous untouchability. The egalitarian charges made against their arrogance, abuse, unjustified privileges, and so on, were basically accusations made against the communist establishment as a whole.

The particular tension and frustration which fuelled the dynamics of the campaign were the cadre and generational pressures resulting from poor career prospects in petrified bureaucracies. The pressures were powerful because since the post-1956 restabilisation of the regime no major purge or expansion of the apparatuses had occurred, while a new generation crowded into lower- and medium-level posts. Advancing one’s career by using anti-Zionist slogans was an instance of the broader phenomenon of exploiting the state-run ‘hunt’ in order to promote one’s private interests. The March campaign created conditions particularly encouraging for intrigues, defamation and informing. In this atmosphere people without scruples could settle old scores, make a strike at rivals for their jobs, or just have power over someone else’s fate for a while; it was enough simply to join the campaign and, using its slogans, attack the chosen individual, displaying at the same time one’s political vigilance and engagement. The person attacked did not have to be a Zionist (or a revisionist, reactionary, and so on) for the attack to be successful. More importantly, the attacker did not have to be a convinced antisemite or orthodox communist. It was enough to know the proper form of attack and not to have moral qualms. These (im)moral prerequisites and the perverse symbiosis of the state and its citizens’ dark instincts are worth stressing. Under conditions created by the regime, the pursuit of private interests served the public evil.

Among the forces contributing to the campaign, opportunism and conformism played a prominent role. Although these are human phenomena present in every society, in this monocentric regime the party concentrated various kinds of power in its hands (as the unrestricted political ruler, the real chief of the army and police, the owner of the national economy and the main employer, the director of the mass media, the exclusive patron of the arts, and so on), and in consequence it also almost monopolised the powers of opportunism. Conformism dictated that one should not stick out one’s neck. As one of the jokes circulating at the time put it, ‘What is the difference between antisemitism today and before the war? Before the war it wasn’t obligatory.’

Conformism was fortified with a strong dose of intimidation. Its main agents were aggressive activists called *huweibins* in reference to their counterparts in the Chinese Cultural Revolution. Many feared to express in public sympathy with the victims of the hunt, or even to maintain contacts with them. In this respect March once again displayed its affinity with the purges of the Stalinist era, whose victims were condemned to the status of contamination.

Yet despite intimidation and repression there were people, Poles and Jews, who expressed their solidarity, raised their voices in defence or offered help. Victims’ accounts testify to such attitudes. Expressions of disgust, sometimes almost physical repulsion, or shame, which the campaign and its methods evoked among independent-minded witnesses are also worth noting. Władysław Bartoszewski wrote to his friend in Israel to express his deepest shame for what the communists ruling Poland are doing. Fortunately, I do not feel co-responsible for their actions because this rule is alien, police-based and imposed on Poland. . . . But I greatly regret that all this happens on behalf of Poles and Poland, and is organised by people who speak Polish.

THE END OF THE CAMPAIGN

By late April the main objectives of the campaign had been largely achieved. At the same time, party reports increasingly confirmed the warnings that popular demands, excitement among the *aktiv*, and the political ambitions of some groups in the establishment were weakening respect for the party leadership and might get or had already got out of control. Complaints from the campaign’s victims, their families and friends, including respected old party comrades, were reaching Gomulka, as well as letters from other people outraged by the open manifestations
of antisemitism and the crudeness of the methods being applied. The First Secretary decided to end the campaign, but he was surprised how difficult it was. Clearly, the dynamics unleashed proved more resistant to control than he had expected. Only after several weeks, after repeated warnings and the quiet punishing of some of the most aggressive campaigners, was discipline fully restored.

The fifth congress of the party in the autumn of 1968 took place smoothly, led energetically by Gomulka. The analysis of March was reformulated, focusing now on the dangerous role of revisionism and the need to combat it. The congress confirmed personnel changes at the top, including the entry of new members to the Politburo, although General Moczar had to be satisfied with the position of vice-member and had to leave the Ministry of Home Affairs that had been his power-base. The changes should be seen as the beginning of the upward movement of the younger generation. At the same time, the old comrades of Jewish origin finally left the stage. Their places were filled by the ‘phalanx of younger Aryan arrivists’, as one observer noted.

**EMIGRATION**

Emigration was the most widespread response on the part of Jews to the events of 1968 and the most obvious result of the anti-Jewish campaign. On April 8 the Politburo recommended that ‘instructions be prepared with regard to the departure from Poland of citizens of Jewish origin’. Three days later, from the tribune of the Sejm, premier Cyranikiewicz spoke on behalf of the government:

> Among Polish citizens of Jewish ethnicity there is a certain number of individuals with nationalistic convictions, Zionist, and thus pro-Israeli. . . . Loyalty to socialist Poland and imperialist Israel is not possible simultaneously. A choice has to be made and the conclusions drawn. Whoever wants to face these consequences in the form of emigration will not encounter any obstacle.

The border was opened for those who indicated Israel as their destination and specified their ethnicity as Jewish. Another essential requirement for emigration was to relinquish Polish citizenship. As a result the departing were no longer considered Polish citizens and were not given a passport, but a so-called travel document. The travel document was peculiar, since it stated who its bearer was not: ‘the possessor of this travel document is not a citizen of the Polish People’s Republic’. It was a one-way ticket.

The number of individuals submitting applications for emigration grew gradually. In 1968 a total of 3,437 persons left, while only 26 were refused their passports. The following year the number rose to 7,674. Between 1968 and 1971 the total number of (declared) emigrants to Israel was 12,927. Israel registered 1,349 immigrants from Poland in 1968 and 1,735 in 1969. Thus, only about a quarter of the ‘Zionists’ went to Israel; others chose Sweden, USA, France, or other countries where they had relatives or friends.

The post-March emigration wave had a peculiar social structure. The percentage of university students and persons with a university degree was almost eight times higher than among the population of Poland in general. Most numerous were engineers and doctors. Among the emigrants there were nearly five hundred academics, including outstanding figures in the arts and sciences. Two hundred journalists and editors, more than sixty employees of radio and television, nearly a hundred musicians, actors and artists, as well as twenty-six filmmakers, submitted requests for passports. One can hardly overestimate the losses Poland suffered as a result of such a significant outflow of human capital, for which the term ‘brain drain’ seems most adequate. Another significant feature of the post-March emigration was the departure of more than 520 former officials of the central state administration, including 176 former employees of the Ministry of Home Affairs and the Ministry of Public Security. Out of 998 emigrating pensioners there were as many as 204 emigrants who had received special pensions for outstanding service to the Polish People’s Republic.

The fluctuating monthly numbers of applicants for the exit permit (see Figure 1) reflected the complexities of the emigrants’ motivations.

> What causes led us to decide to emigrate?, asked one of the emigrants. I think there were as many reasons as there were emigrants. And even more, since everyone had several. . . . Besides, the decision was not a one-step action. It was instead the sum of reactions to events mainly of the previous [1968] year.
1968 was not just the year of the campaign but also of the intervention of the Warsaw pact forces in Czechoslovakia. As a close observer summarised:

The motives for emigration were predominantly the feeling of danger and the fear of increasing antisemitism, fear concerning the fate of one’s children – in such cases this is the strongest motive. At the same time it was sometimes an emigration in the hope of improving one’s standard of living, an emigration reminiscent of traditional emigration for economic reasons.

In a survey on a sample of emigrants who settled in Sweden, the respondents gave the following answers to the question concerning the main reasons for leaving: an attack against the respondent or someone in their family (40 percent); the dismissal from work or expulsion from university of someone in the family (31 percent); fear for one’s professional future (34 percent); announcement of the deadline for submitting applications for emigration (25 percent); fear for one’s physical safety (25 percent); and ‘all the others were leaving’ (24 percent). The last factor listed was the social dynamics of the exodus, the feedback mechanisms that operate in any major migration through personal networks.

The final chord of emigration was the farewells at the train stations. Friends and relatives of those emigrating came to the station, sometimes large groups of friends from school or university. And that was the final picture of Poland for the emigrants, a moment that stuck in their memory: ‘Many friends and acquaintances said goodbye to us at Gdansk Station, both Poles and Jews. I remember only grey faces with sad smiles. We had a lovely funeral in Warsaw…’. In March 1998 at Gdansk Station in Warsaw, where the train for Vienna used to depart, a memorial tablet was mounted on the thirtieth anniversary of the March events.
Notes

For an extensive description of the campaign, which this paper summarises, see Dariusz Stola, *Kampania antyżydowska w Polsce 1967–1968* (Warsaw: ISP PAN, 2000). I am grateful to the American Jewish Committee for a research grant that made possible the archival researches for this study.
In March 1968, the anti-Zionist campaign of the Polish government moved into a new phase. The communist regime exploited the protests of students and intellectuals against censorship as a pretext for intensified attacks against the Jewish community. For the Jews in Israel in the 1960s the choice made by the Jews who stayed in the communist countries was unacceptable.

1. Eugeniusz Mironowicz, Polityka narodowosciowa PRL [Politics toward National Minorities in the People's Republic of Poland] (Bialystok: Bialoruskie Towarzystwo Historyczne, 2000). Recommend this journal. Email your librarian or administrator to recommend adding this journal to your organisation's collection.