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NATO's Enlargement and Russian Perceptions of Eurasian

Political Frontiers

Final Report

The essence of the project is the attempt to explain Russia's attitude toward NATO, its growing cooperation with former Soviet republics, and likely second round of enlargement, by visions of a new Russian identity held by the political elite. I assume that perceptions of Eurasian political frontiers are important components of the Russian definitions of self. How do the leading political forces in Russia map Eurasia after the breakup of the Soviet Union? How do "cognitive maps" of Eurasia make their way onto the foreign policy agenda? Why are Russian attitudes toward taking in to NATO three Central European states now and likely adding former Soviet republics in future dramatically different? I try to reconstruct the Russian historically based "cognitive maps" of Eurasia. This may give additional means for interpreting Russia's quest for a new identity and strategic thinking of NATO, Russian attitudes toward growing cooperation between the Atlantic Alliance on the one side and three Baltic states, Ukraine, and other CIS countries on the other.

The attempts to conceptualize domestic sources of Russian foreign policy have led many authors in Russia and the West to the emphasis on the differences between various schools of thought within the Russian political elite. Classifications of the Russian foreign policy community members into “Atlanticists” and “Eurasianists,” “democrats ” and “communists” has become one of the main topics in the literature on Russian foreign policy making. Indeed, different political actors in Russia have divergent analytical lenses focusing on the same world. They conceptualize the state, nation, and security in different kind of discourse. While the government develops concrete programs and official “concepts,” the opposition uses party documents and books written by their political and intellectual leaders for presenting their views. They have different visions of what Russia is, as well as its major security threats, aims and instruments of security policies. However, there are some fundamental foreign policy issues most of the political forces in Russia agree on. Extremely negative attitude toward NATO’s enlargement is one of the issues that unite Russian political elite. Why are liberals and dye-hard communists, doves and hawks do not have many differences on this issue? It is logical to hypothesize that there is a consensus within the Russian elite on some fundamental issues concerning geopolitical position of the country and that this agreement is not at odds with the general perceptions of common people.

This paper is an attempt to look at historic factors of Russian geopolitical perceptions and theoretical discourse of the issue. Different worldviews held by various groups of the contemporary Russian elite will be also analyzed in order to answer the question why all the differences do not affect a common attitude toward NATO's enlargement. A new theoretical framework for addressing the questions of Eurasian political frontiers and regional integration will be suggested.

NATO's Policy

Warren Christopher, Secretary of State in 1993-1997, and William Perry, Secretary of Defense in 1994-1997, argued for a new NATO's mission in October 1997, soon after their resignation: "It is time to move beyond the enlargement debate. Adding the new members is not the only, or even the most important, debate over the alliance's future. A much larger issue looms: What is the alliance's purpose?" Their answer was that the alliance should be defending common interests, not territory. "Shifting the alliance's emphasis from defense of members' territory to defense of common interests is the strategic imperative."¹ Among the major threats to common interests, proliferation of WMD, disruption of the flow of oil, terrorism, genocidal violence and wars of aggression in other regions that threaten to create great disruption were cited. It is interesting that a threat of emergence of an anti-Western nuclear power deeply suspicious about NATO intentions on the borders of the Alliance was not mentioned and evidently ruled out. "Defense of members' territory would remain a solemn commitment of

the Allies, of course. But such territory is not now threatened, nor it is likely to be in the foreseeable future.”² In spite of the fact that the talk about defending interests, not territory, is becoming popular, enlargement remains to be the key element of present and future NATO existence. There may be some tension between the goals of defending interests worldwide and territorial enlargement of the alliance itself. So far, NATO has been trying to combine the two goals and having it both: change in the mission and territorial expansion. 1999 was a symbolic year in this sense. The Kosovo operation and formal admission of three new members signified it.

For Russia, enlargement is the central issue, which forms the background for all other problems related to NATO. Russian reaction to the operation against Yugoslavia in 1999 may be explained only in the context of NATO enlargement. Analytically, it is important to separate two connected, but still very different issues: the already happened first and the possible second rounds of NATO enlargement: Expansion One and Expansion Two. The first issue is reality. The second is the issue for tomorrow. However, The Alliance’s Strategic Concept approved by the heads of state and government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Washington D. C. on April 23 and 24, 1999 said it explicitly: NATO “expects to extend further invitations in coming years to nations willing and able to assume the responsibilities and obligations of membership, and as NATO determines that the inclusion of these nations would serve the overall political and strategic interests of the Alliance, strengthen its effectiveness and cohesion, and *enhance overall European security and stability*... No European

democratic country whose admission would fulfill the objectives of the Treaty will be excluded from consideration.”³

From Russian perspective, the critical is not the second round per se, but whether it will include any of the former Soviet republics, namely Baltic states or Ukraine. Expansion Two may take a relatively benign path for Russia: say, it may be limited to the inclusion of Romania and Slovenia. In this case, it will be a relatively easy second wave of expansion that would not upset Moscow too much. That would kick down the road once again the thornier question of NATO membership for former Soviet republics.⁴ The official NATO’s documents and statements avoid making a distinction between potential candidates on the basis of their former belonging to the Soviet Union.

American foreign policymakers emphasize that historic and geographic factors, such as former membership in the Soviet Union, cannot exclude certain countries from NATO. Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott said: “The process of enlargement is ongoing. No one’s going to be excluded on the basis of geography and history. And there’s no reason why the second round should be any more difficult or controversial than the first. In fact, it should be easier.”⁵ Defense Secretary William Cohen, when asked about Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Yevgeny Gusev’s advice for NATO not to cross Russia’s “red line” on the lands of the former Soviet Union at the Munich Conference on Security Policy in February 1999, argued similarly: “The door remains open. It’s not geographically confined. Whichever countries wish to become part of NATO, if they satisfy the requirements, they’ll be considered for membership. There will be

no determination made by anyone” outside the alliance.⁶ Secretary of State Madeline Albright in her remarks at the Brookings Institution on April 6, 1999, when talking about further enlargement of NATO, said: “In today’s Europe, destiny is no longer determined by geography.”⁷ The Washington declaration signed and issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Washington D. C. on 23rd and 24th April 1999 said in article 8: “Our Alliance remains open to all European democracies, regardless of geography, willing and able to meet the responsibilities of membership, and whose inclusion would enhance overall security and stability in Europe.”⁸

Assumptions about irrelevance of geography in official statements and documents are diplomatic code words. They mean that Russian attempts to define certain areas in Europe as zones where Russian opinion is more important than other countries’ views will be blocked. In more concrete discussions about admittance of the former Soviet republics into NATO, geographic factor, namely the proximity of Russia, plays the central role. Trent Lott, a Republican senator from Mississippi, the Senate majority leader, made concrete statements on the Baltic states in 1997: “Those countries not invited to join NATO this summer should be assured that NATO enlargement will not be a one-time event. Otherwise, the security of Europe could be undermined as, for example, the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania succumb to the fear that they will be abandoned to the whims of a powerful neighbor for the second time this century.”⁹ William Safire, a conservative New York Times columnist, advocates

“taking in [to NATO] Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and the Baltic states – the most Westernized nations of Eastern Europe – and ultimately Ukraine as it privatizes. The time to push the protective line eastward is now, while Russia is weak and preoccupied with its own revival, and not later, when such a move would be an insufferable provocation to a superpower.” Why it was needed? Because “Russia is authoritarian at heart and expansionist by habit.”¹⁰ Later on, William Safire reiterated his argument: “The expansion of the NATO alliance while we have the chance – now, with Russia preoccupied. If we wait until the bear regains both strength and appetite, the most vulnerable nations will never be protected.”¹¹

Paradoxically, the realist discourse, even if it portrays Russia as an authoritarian and expansionist bear and its neighbors as potential victims that must be protected by the West, matches the prevailing Russian perception of the situation much better than neoliberal talk about openness of the Alliance to new democracies.

It will be argued below that geography and history do matter for better understanding of the Russian position. Russians are well equipped to discuss the issue of NATO’s expansion in realist terms and present their own counter arguments. Russian interpretation of geographic and historic factors differs dramatically from those ones held in the West, but acknowledgement of their importance provides Russians and Western realists at least a common ground for discussion.

There are very serious reasons to believe that the second round, if it includes any former Soviet republic, will be much more controversial than the first round. It may involve significant risks, which may outweigh potential benefits. How will further enlargement affect one of the primary challenges currently facing NATO, namely, supporting Russia's democratic transition and securing large-scale institutionalized reconciliation with and engagement of Russia?

Russian opposition to the Expansion One can be primarily explained by the fear of that it was only the beginning. The real threat, according to many Russians, is further expansion to the territory of the former Soviet Union. That is why the Russian parliament called NATO enlargement the most serious military threat to Russia after the end of World War II.¹² The second round of NATO expansion, if or when it happens, will have far greater domestic consequences than Expansion One. Central European states and the Balkans occupy different place in Russian geo-strategic thinking than Baltic states, not speaking of Ukraine.

Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov said in February 1999 that if NATO continues to expand and especially if this process includes the Baltic countries or CIS states, "Russia will take any steps it finds necessary to guarantee [Russian] national security."¹³ According to Russian officials, no former republic of the Soviet Union – including Ukraine and the Baltic states – can ever be considered for NATO membership. There are "red-line" limits for NATO expansion. Of course, these limits are drawn by Russian diplomats, and Russia cannot have any

veto power in the alliance it does not belong to. Pronouncement of “red lines” may irritate the NATO members. However, it is worth to look at the problem from the Russian perspective. First, a threat to Russian security, as to security of any country, is assessed not from the perspective of NATO current intentions, but from the perspective of potential military capabilities. The strength of NATO during the Cold War rested on a similar approach: assess not Soviet intentions, but military capabilities. Many people cite “historic grievances” of the Baltic peoples as an additional argument for admittance of, say the Baltic states to NATO. Indeed, there are more than enough reasons to distrust Russia. However, there is no shortage of “historic grievances” in Russia in respect to invasions from the West, from the Crusaders and Napoleon to Hitler. Russia lost about 28 million people in World War II. It started for Russia with the invasion of its Western borders by the power Russia had a non-aggression pact with. That is why Russians are deeply apprehensive about strengthening of any military capabilities on its Western borders. Addition of new members to NATO is viewed as enhancing these capabilities.

Second, psychological factor is important. Many Russians still perceive the collapse of the Soviet Union as a negative event, which is not probably that final. An international group of scholars led by Timothy Colton, Jerry Hough, Susan Leman, and Mikhail Guboglo registered that an overwhelming majority (about 70 percent) of respondents in Russia in 1993 saw the breakup of the Soviet Union as "negative" or "more negative than positive".¹⁴ According to a poll conducted by VTsIOM in 1994, 76 percent of Russians agreed that the collapse of

the Soviet Union yielded more damage than good, while only 7 percent thought the opposite.¹⁵ Four years later, in 1998, VTsIOM registered that only 15 percent of Russians welcomed rather than opposed the Soviet Union's breakup.¹⁶ However, the number of respondents under age 25 who regretted the breakup is half that of those over 55.¹⁷ The polls conducted by the Public Opinion Fund have yielded somewhat different results that indicated less nostalgia for the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, they registered a sharp fall, from 32 percent in 1992 to 13 percent in 1997, of those who have no regrets about the break-up.¹⁸ One should not interpret this data as an indication that a majority of all Russians are ready to fight for the restoration of the USSR or sacrifice some of their well being for that goal. The populist general Alexander Lebed formulated the widespread Russian attitude to the deceased Soviet Union better than anybody else: "And the Soviet Union was no more. Those who do not regret its collapse lack a heart, but those who think that it will be possible to recreate it in its old form, lack a brain."¹⁹ These attitudes reflect the fact that the Soviet Union, not the RSFSR, was the alleged homeland for most Russians.

European stability and security are unimaginable without stable, predictable, democratic Russia that is cooperative with international institutions. Russia remains a nuclear power with huge, though disorganized, military. It would be probably wise to be attentive to some current Russian sensibilities. Some of Russian perceptions, perspectives, and policies may be disliked in the West. But many of them rest not on the whims of political leaders, but on deeply ingrained perceptions of the general public. In the long run, the changing

character of NATO and good relationship between NATO and Russia are much more important for Russia than adding or not adding some new members to the alliance. But we have not reached that point when trust prevails in this relationship. Kosovo changed the situation for worse. That is why further enlargement of NATO may be counterproductive for the interests of overall European security at this point, though it might strengthen security of individual small countries in Central and Eastern Europe. Russia may be seriously antagonized and alienated by further NATO's enlargement not for the reason that the country's leaders choose to see it in a negative way, but because the Alliance's expansion touches very sensitive issues of Russian identity. This argument may be backed by the analysis of historic factors that formed Russian geopolitical perceptions and examination of theoretical discourse on Russian identity, which played an important role in this process.

Historic Factors of Russian Geopolitical Perceptions and Peculiarities of Theoretical Discourse

First, the Russian Empire and its successor, the Soviet Union, were continuous land-based empires, like those of the Hapsburgs or the Ottomans,²⁰ with no natural boundaries between the center and the periphery. In the Russian and Soviet cases, the center was represented by the capital city – St. Petersburg and, later, Moscow – not by some well-defined, core territory. It was geography that played an important role in the formation of Russian national consciousness, a fundamental characteristic of which was the partial combination of ethnic and

imperial components. Richard Pipes, Roman Szporluk, and Richard Sakwa contend that the Russian Empire was formed before the modern national identity of Russians emerged.²¹ Further, Geoffrey Hosking demonstrated that the Russian elite was more interested in expanding the boundaries of the empire than promoting the belief in nationhood. Unlike Pipes, Hosking attributes the non-emergence of the Russian nation, not to the backwardness of the country, but to specific geographical, historical, and political circumstances.²²

The second factor, which played an important role in formation of Russian geopolitical perceptions, was the overlap of cultural, linguistic, and historical distinctions between Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine, leading to a confused boundary between Russians and other Eastern Slavs.²³ For centuries, it made the Russian elite “soft-pedal” their nationalism, much like the existence of the “home empire” of Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland in the United Kingdom allegedly suppressed English nationalism.

The third factor is the concept of the “Soviet people” and the reality that supported it. People from mixed marriages, those living outside their “homelands,” and Russians from large urban (and more cosmopolitan) centers were the most responsive to this concept. Russians accepted it more readily than other ethnic groups, because to be “Soviet” implicitly meant being a Russian-speaker and acknowledging the “civilizing” mission of the Russian culture and its extraterritorial nature throughout the entire Soviet Union. In theory, there was much in common between the “melting pot” paradigm in the U.S. and the “Soviet people” concept in the USSR. (The notions of multiculturalism and diversity in

the American experience also had an ideological cousin in the USSR: the “free union of flourishing nations”). The first attempts to develop a theory of the “Soviet people” can be traced back to Nikolai Bukharin.²⁴ Nikita Khrushchev revisited this theory, emphasizing the fusion of nations under communism, and promising its attainment in the near future. In the 1970s, this idea was revived, when it was solemnly pronounced that the “Soviet people” were a “new historical entity,” not just a concept. The concept adequately reflected some trends (intermingling of peoples into a new entity), while ignoring others (national awakening).

There are two major perspectives on the construction of the “Soviet people” in Western literature. One emphasizes the efforts of the Communist party to build a new supraethnic entity and points to the failures in this undertaking.²⁵ The other perceives “ethnocultural indigenazation” and the formation of nations on republican levels as a result of little effort on the part of the Soviet authorities to create a “Soviet nation.”²⁶ Robert Kaiser’s argument for a contradictory process of interaction between state policy and “nationalization” from below seems to capture the complex relationship between stated goals, policy implementation, and actual social developments in the Soviet republics.²⁷

Theoretical discourse on national identity is not a simple reflection of the “objective” factors, but an active independent force that forms a nation’s consciousness. For a century and a half, the debate over Russian identity, nation formation, and Russia’s future has focused primarily on Russia’s relation to and interaction with the West.²⁸ However, the Russians’ interaction with the

neighboring peoples of Eurasia and definition of the boundaries of the Russian people are of equal importance. At the end of the twentieth century this latter aspect is becoming even more important in the search for a new Russian identity. Nevertheless, this “Eurasian question,” while having its own history of intellectual reflection in Russia, has often played a secondary role in the discourse or has been absent within it.

It is possible to identify two traditions in Russian intellectual history in the nineteenth century, universalist and statist. “Universalists” emphasized the limitlessness of Russia as an ethical and moral entity, while “statists” drew concrete boundaries for Russia, whether they be pan-Slavist or imperial. “Universalists” were represented by Slavophiles, Feodor Dostoevsky, and Vladimir Solovyov. The second tradition included such different, and often politically opposite thinkers as Nikolai Danilevsky, Petr Struve, and Pavel Milyukov.²⁹

In 1869, Nicholas Danilevsky in his *Russia and Europe*, tried to fuse Slavophilism, pan-Slavism, and a policy of imperialism.³⁰ Danilevsky essentially recast the liberal pan-Slavic idea into conservative imperialist thought. Slavic culture, in Danilevsky’s view, could serve as a basis for Russian leadership of a newly created federation of Slavic peoples with Constantinople as its capital.

There was one more significant intellectual development in the nineteenth century that left an important imprint on later discussions: the idea of the “universal” character of the Russian identity. Started by Slavophiles, this idea was developed by Dostoevsky, who wrote in his famous 1880 sketch on Pushkin: “For

what else is the strength of the Russian national spirit than the aspiration, in its ultimate goal, for universality and all-embracing humanitarianism?”³¹ In his deliberations, Dostoevsky, like both Slavophiles and Westerners, referred only to Europe: “Yes, the Russian’s destiny is incontestably all-European and universal. To become a genuine and all-around Russian means, perhaps (and this you should remember), to become brother of all men, *a universal man*, if you please.”³² Universality for Dostoevsky was limited to the Christian world:³³

Oh, the peoples of Europe have no idea how dear they are to us! And later.. we... will comprehend that to become a genuine Russian means to seek finally to reconcile all European controversies, to show the solution of European anguish in our brethren, and finally, perhaps, to utter the ultimate word of great, universal harmony, of the brotherly accord of all nations abiding by the law of Christ’s Gospel!

It could be argued that Dostoevsky expressed with remarkable passion some very important features of Russian national consciousness: its openness, inclusiveness, and messianism. While Danilevsky drew boundaries, though very broad ones, Dostoevsky went beyond them; Dostoevsky admired Pushkin for his ability to understand and include the entirety of European culture into the Russian soul.

Universalism of Dostoevsky was further developed by Vladimir Solovyov. While harshly criticizing Danilevsky for his particularism,³⁴ Solovyov himself paradoxically endorsed Russian imperial policy. Writing about the addition of

formerly Polish lands to Russia by Catherine the Great, he argued that “Russia acted here not as a nation, which conquered and suppressed the others, but as a superior force of peace and truth, which gave every nation what it was entitled to.”³⁵ For Solovyov, justification of imperial policy was its Christian, or universalistic, character. He argued that the behest of Peter the Great and Catherine the Great to Russia was: “*Be faithful to yourself and your national peculiarity, so be universal.*”³⁶ Nikolai Berdyaev wrote that Solovyov believed that Russians were the people of the future, because they would resolve all the problems that the West was incapable of addressing.³⁷ Solovyov strongly believed that Russia’s mission was universal and unifying, not particularistic and exclusive. The boundaries of the people in this context are practically limitless.

However, Russian policy in the nineteenth century was driven not so much by these ideas, but by the doctrine of “official nationalism,” formulated by Count Sergei Uvarov. Orthodoxy, autocracy, and “nationality” were proclaimed the pillars of the empire.³⁸ The third principle, “nationality,” (*narodnost'*) was the most ambiguous, especially after the Polish revolt of 1830 and the nationalization of ethnic groups in the second half of the nineteenth century. In mid-nineteenth century Russia, *narodnost'* in most cases meant belonging to a people or a community.³⁹ However, this was a subject for very different theoretical and political interpretations. Throughout the centuries, the Russian Empire co-opted those who accepted its rule into a system of government which was rather diverse in the non-Russian regions, while granting a lot of freedom on local cultural

issues. At the same time, however, tolerance could end abruptly if political defiance was shown.

The key factor in theoretical discourse in Russia was the fact that nationalization processes among Russians and many non-Russians were evolving simultaneously, but with different speed. The Russian intellectual elite, while responsive to the nationalization process, usually lagged behind the developments among the non-Russians, who, by the second half of the nineteenth century had already constructed collective mental boundaries between themselves and Russians. Slavophiles and Westerners, as well as Danilevsky, Dostoevsky, Uvarov, and others, were concerned with the issues of Slavic unity, the Russians' connection with Europe, or their place and mission in the universe and not with relations between Russians and other peoples within the empire. In their minds, the “Little Russians” (Ukrainians), the “White Russians” (Byelorussians), and the “Great Russians” (ethnic Russians) comprised one Russian people, while all others (*inorodtsy*) were practically excluded from theoretical discourse. This occurred because ethnic or national consciousness (among both the elite and the masses) was still relatively weak in this pre-modern empire. Evidently, it was a mistake to ignore the developments in the empire's Western part, especially Poland, where national consciousness was becoming stronger.

The interest of the Russian elite in its cultural roots was not backed by the process of “national awakening” of Russian peasants who remained very local in their outlook. The abolition of serfdom in 1861 initiated the process of nationalization of the masses, but there was a long way to go before the peasants

started to identify themselves primarily as Russians. This was also true for many peoples in the East and the South of the empire. Although nations as mass-based communities had hardly evolved in most regions of the Empire,⁴⁰ by World War I the more developed Western parts of Russia were paving the way.

When the nationalization process gained momentum in the second half of the nineteenth century, the policy of Russification started to take shape in the Russian Empire, especially under Alexander III. There was an evident shift from the de-ethnicized mindset of the imperial court, which was mostly concerned with loyalty of the subjects to the czar, to more ethnically articulated attempts to either turn the non-Russians into Russians or to secure Russian dominance over the “awakening” peoples. This shift established a background for defining Russians as a separate nation.

However, by 1917, when loyalty to the czar among the Russians had thoroughly eroded, they did not yet constitute a modern cohesive nation. There is no consistent evidence in the history of Russian society, intellectual thought, or social history to support the assumption of Jeff Chinn and Robert Kaiser that “nation and homeland – rather than czar and religion – became the focus of Russians’ loyalty.”⁴¹ In fact, most Russian thinkers stressed the opposite. Petr Struve wrote: “The collapse of the monarchy, after a brief period of general shock, showed *the extreme weakness of national consciousness in the very core of the Russian state, among masses of the Russian people.*”⁴² Struve argued that in pre-revolutionary Russia the nation was opposed to and in disagreement with the state; hence he favored a reunion between the state and nation. Amazingly, like

the Slavophiles of seventy years earlier, he addressed neither the problem of multiethnicity in the Russian “nation,” nor the place of ethnic Russians in the state as something of crucial significance. In that regard he was very much in line with other liberal thinkers and politicians. For example, Pavel Milyukov, the leader of the Constitutional Democratic Party of Russia, wrote about the formation of Russia's new supra-ethnic nation, which had begun to develop well before 1917. He argued that there was a moment in history (in late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries), when “nationalities took the path of establishing a common Russia’s (*rossiiskaya*) state ‘nation.’” He attributed the failure of this attempt to the defeat of Russian democracy and freedom.⁴³

An important contribution to the debate on Russian identity was made by the Eurasians, a group of young intellectual émigrés (Pyotr Savitsky, Nikolai Trubetskoy, Georgi Frolovsky, Pyotr Suvchinsky, and others) in the 1920s. Unlike the Slavophiles, they went beyond their Slavic roots in search of the basis for the Russian nation. Arguing that Turkic and Finn-Ugric elements played a key role in the formation of the “Russian superethnos” as well, they were the first to incorporate the non-Slavic peoples into the discourse on the identity of Russians. According to them, Eurasia was cemented by a common geographic space and self-consciousness; it was neither European nor Asian, it was Eurasian. Though the Eurasians differed significantly from other thinkers in many respects, they continued the tradition of a non-ethnic definition of “Russianness.”

The Bolsheviks seemed to be the party that devoted the greatest attention to the “nationality question.”⁴⁴ The most important features of their view were

the denunciation of the Russian empire as a “prison of the peoples,” the accusation of “Great Russian chauvinism,” and the proclamation of the right for self-determination for all the peoples of the country. Contrary to these principles, the Bolsheviks gradually re-created a highly-centralized state within borders similar to those of the empire. The price they paid was the suppression of Russian ethnic nationalism and the creation of ethno-territorial units with different levels of autonomy for the non-Russians.

The Soviet leaders’ theories of the “nationality question,” as well as policies pursued in this realm were far from consistent for more than seven decades. Up to the early 1920s, the internationalist perspective was dominant. Relying on Karl Marx, Russian revolutionaries Pyotr Lavrov, Pyotr Tkachev, Georgi Plekhanov, and Vladimir Lenin believed that the nationalities question was subordinate to broader social issues and that nations would disappear, or “merge,” in a future communist paradise. The Russian nation envisioned by Milyukov was transformed into the global communist one by Lenin. While neither liberals nor Marxists saw a future for the nationalities question, there was an important difference between them. In order to gain allies in the struggle against the czarist empire, Bolsheviks were ready to make significant concessions to the non-Russians by giving them ethno-territorial homelands and the right to self-determination. The regime was sure that Russians, as a more “advanced” nation, did not require such enticements as a homeland, since they would be satisfied with the Bolshevik social ideal. For Lenin, the national interests of Russians did not exist separately from the interests of world proletariat. In this

respect, Dostoevsky's "universality" of Russians took a new, Marxist form, while remaining practically the same in its essence: Russians were supposed to dilute their ethnic identity in broader humanitarian and social missions.⁴⁵ This "universality" stood in sharp contrast to the implicit notion that Russians represented the vanguard of a new brave world. The difference between the interests of Russia and the interests of humanity were often blurred.

When the goal of a world socialist revolution was indefinitely postponed, temporary concessions to nationalities within the Soviet Union became long-term. Centralized party rule was a critical counterbalance to this ethnonational federal system. When the party dissolved and then collapsed under Gorbachev, the state itself fell apart.

Five Worldviews

The analysis of the modern governmental documents and political parties' positions might yield important insights useful for understanding the existing perspectives on nation-building and security issues as well as political options for the Russian government. The governmental documents and parties' programs adequately reflect the approaches that have crystallized within the Russian intellectual and political elites throughout the 1992-2000 period. Although the 1993 crisis and the subsequent adoption of the new constitution, as well as the 1993, 1995, 1996, 1999, and 2000 elections changed the relative strength of each perspective, these events hardly led to the emergence of radically new ideas in the area of nation-building and security policies.

The establishment in December 1993 of a republic in which tremendous power was granted to the President has not been beneficial for the development of a full-fledged party system. A weak parliament meant weak parties. To a certain extent, however, this was counter-balanced by electoral law stipulating that half of the Duma seats were filled by party electoral lists. Party politics has been evolving primarily in the State Duma, while grass-roots party organizations have been practically non-existent, with the important exception of the communists. Many regions are dominated by local leaders – "the strongmen" – who might have loose party liaisons, but in many cases act independently.

The analysis of governmental documents and ideologies and the programs of various political parties, groups, and prominent politicians leads to the conclusion that there are five major perspectives, or projects, on building the state and nation as well as corresponding visions of international security in contemporary Russia.⁴⁶ They are: new state-building, ethnonationalism, restorationism, hegemony/dominance, and integrationalism. The major elements of these different visions of security are presented in the table below.

Actors	Reference object (View of Russia)	Aims of security policy	Major threats	Instruments	Outcome
<i>State-builders (Yeltsin/Putin Government; Unity, Union of Right-Wing Forces, Yabloko)</i>	Russian Federation (nation-state)	Preservation of state sovereignty, stability	Economic crisis	Economic, political, military	Stability
<i>Restorationists (KPRF, LDPR -)</i>	Successor of the USSR (empire)	Strengthening and enlarging the state	Weakness and disintegration	Political, military	Instability
<i>Ethnonationalists (intellectuals; non-parliamentary parties)</i>	People (nation)	Survival as “we”	Disappearance of identity	Moral (building of self-consciousness)	Instability
<i>Dominators (Luzhkov’s part of Fatherland)</i>	Eurasian power (derzhava)	Hegemony and domination in the region	Hostile neighbors	Political, military, economic	Instability
<i>Integrationalists (part of Yeltsin/Putin Government; rhetorically - most of mainstream political parties)</i>	CIS member (one of Soviet successor states)	Eurasian integration	“Yugoslav scenario”	Economic, political, cultural	Stability

•Abbreviations: KPRF – Communist Party of the Russian Federation; LDPR – Liberal Democratic Party of Russia

The concept of *new state-building* dominated the official policy of the Russian Government in 1991-1992. It was advocated by President Yeltsin and the Democratic Russia movement. The theoretical foundations of new state-building have been laid out by Valery Tishkov, Russian Minister for Nationalities in 1992, and Director of the Institute of Ethnology.⁴⁷

The essence of this project was state-building through the creation and stabilization of new state institutions within the former borders of the RSFSR, inviolability of the borders between the former Soviet republics, and the development of relations with neighboring states as fully independent entities. The problems of Russian ethnic identity were practically ignored as politically insignificant. The project stressed civic patriotism and de-emphasized the allegedly artificial character of the Bolshevik-drawn borders of the RSFSR, which were much narrower than the domain of Russian culture, language, religion, and traditions.

Russia is viewed as a modern nation-state by new state-builders, and the major aims of security policy are seen to be the preservation of state integrity and stability. The threats are considered to be economic crisis, organized crime, and disintegration. On the international arena, NATO expansion and failures of arms control are portrayed as threatening developments.

After the breakup of the Soviet Union, several versions of *restorationism* were shaped in Russia. In the Russian context this view is hardly distinguishable from imperialism or supra-ethnic nationalism. The most

influential party that effectively backs restorationism is the Communist Party of the Russian Federation. A less "Soviet" version of imperialism was formulated by the former vice-president Alexander Rutskoy, who drifted to a more ethnonationalist stand after 1993. The most extremist interpretation of this way of thinking in today's Russia can be found in the writings and statements of the Liberal Democratic Party leader Vladimir Zhirinovskiy.

The essence of this project is to restore a state within the borders of the USSR (and in Zhirinovskiy's dreams even to expand it). Before it is achieved, decisive assistance to the Russians in the "near abroad," including economic sanctions and threats of military intervention is advocated.

Unlike most ethnonationalists, "imperialists" are modernizers. They favor a strong army, big cities, and industrial development. Vladimir Zhirinovskiy dismissed the image of a Russia of "small villages, forests, fields, accordion player Petr and milkmaid Marfa" as a writers-assisted communist plot aimed to partly compensate for the suppression of Russian nationalism.⁴⁸ His Russia is the Russia of historic might, world influence, and impressive richness. Zhirinovskiy sided with painter Ilya Glazunov, who created images, not of a country of drunken peasants, but an "empire with shining palaces of Petersburg, great historical traditions and achievements, thinkers of genius, and the leading culture."⁴⁹

Restorationists see Russia as an empire. The major threats are found in the weakness and disintegration of the state. The breakup of the Soviet Union is

seen as the first step toward the possible disintegration of Russia. On the international arena, the West is portrayed as adversary.

In 1991-1993, the moderate versions of *ethnonationalism* were politically represented by the Christian Democratic Party, led by Viktor Aksiuchits, and the Constitutional-Democratic Party, headed by Mikhail Astafiev. Later on, in 1995-1998, Derzhava, headed by Aleksandr Rutskoy, and the extremist National Republican Party of Russia, headed by Nikolay Lysenko, became more visible on this side of the political arena. Theoretically, this perspective relies on the ideas of Alexander Solzhenitsyn, prominent writers Valentin Rasputin and Vasili Belov, and mathematician and essayist Igor Shafarevich. There have also been many small extremist groups; Pamyat being the most notorious among them. These groups are known as the Russian right, or the Black Hundred, and are similar to the moderate ethnonationalists in at least one respect: they emphasize the importance of Russian ethnicity for state- and nation-building. The basic difference between extremists and moderate ethnonationalists is that the former completely rejects "Western values" of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. The influence of the Black Hundred is thus far limited; however in a time of social unrest they might become focal as well as dangerous. Extremist and moderate ethnonationalist parties and groups were significantly weakened after 1993 when some of them were outlawed and their newspapers banned. This move was due to the fact many small militant ethnonationalist groups played an important role in organizing the defense of the Moscow White House in September- October 1993, and led attacks on the buildings of the Moscow

mayorate and Ostankino TV station. Yeltsin's repression targeted them as the most well-organized force of resistance.

The essence of the ethnonationalist political program is to unite Russia with the Russian communities in the "near abroad" and to build a Russian state within the area of settlement of the Russian people and, eventually, other Eastern Slavs.

The mental map of Russia held by Viktor Aksyuchits is characteristic for all ethnonationalists. According to him, the Great Russians, the Little Russians (Ukrainians), and Byelorussians form a united Russian people. The future Russian state envisioned by Aksyuchits includes the territories of Russia, Belarus, Ukraine (without its Western part), and Northern Kazakhstan. This state must be in confederated relations with other areas of compact Russian settlement. The rest of the territory of the former Soviet Union remains a zone of Russia's vital interests.⁵⁰ Russia must assist the relocation of ethnic Russians from the "near abroad" back to Russia and simultaneously defend their interests by all means, including the military.⁵¹

Ethnonationalists view Russia as the Russian people. Russia is sited to be where the Russians live. This perspective, in both its extremist and moderate versions, assumes the need for a redrawing of state borders along ethnic lines. The major threat is narrated as the disappearance of Russian identity, which will inevitably accompany the current moral degradation of the people. The West is usually portrayed as a hostile force. Ethnonationalists do not conceive of an important global role other than as a stronghold of spirituality for Russia. As a

rule, they argue that the country must concentrate on its internal problems. Attitudes toward the events in former Yugoslavia have been partial exception. Rhetoric of “Slavic brotherhood” and calls for assistance to Serbia intensified during the NATO strikes in Spring 1999. Most other political forces were primarily concerned not with “Slavic brotherhood,” but with the establishment of the US-led “new world order” and NATO “assuming a role of a pan-European policeman.”

Hegemony and dominance perspective might be viewed as similar to imperialist approach. It is difficult to draw a clear-cut division between the two schools of thought, though the former has some distinct features.

Antonio Gramsci was one of the first political scientists who wrote on hegemony in international relations. This tradition was also developed by Robert Keohane and others.⁵² According to Gramsci, a country usually becomes hegemonic because other actors willingly or subconsciously defer to it, even if they wish to do otherwise. The followers comply because they see both the leader's policy position and his putative power as legitimate.⁵³

Political scientists and international studies experts are divided on whether hegemony and dominance are a description of the same phenomenon. Those who believe that it is plausible to make a distinction claim that a country might involuntarily defer to an external power without accepting the legitimacy of its policy.⁵⁴ The dominant power does not necessarily seek to create an empire by absorbing dependent political units; it can be quite satisfied with subjugation.

Unlike a hegemonic leader, it might use more or less direct coercion to achieve compliance.

Principles for a Russian policy of hegemony and dominance over the "near abroad" were first developed theoretically by Presidential Council member Andranik Migranyan.⁵⁵ In more moderate and policy-oriented terms, this project was advocated by the former chairman of the Committee for International Affairs and Foreign Economic Relations of the Russian Supreme Soviet, Yevgeniy Ambartsumov. Elements of hegemony/dominance rhetoric were also present in some statements, articles, and reports of Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev.⁵⁶

The essence of the project is state-building within the borders of present-day Russia accompanied by the subjugation of other successor states and the creation of a buffer zone of protectorates and dependent countries around Russia. Russian diasporas are viewed as a convenient instrument of influence and manipulation within the neighboring states.

In 1996-1999, the most vocal advocate of the policy of hegemony and domination was Yuriy Luzhkov, the Mayor of Moscow, who relied heavily on the political expertise of Konstantin Zatulin, his advisor and the Director of the Institute of Diaspora and Integration. Political alliance between Otechestvo movement headed by Yuriy Luzhkov and Yevgeniy Primakov formed in 1999 led to softening of Luzhkov's position. Yevgeniy Primakov shared the views of state-builders and integrationists and attributed especially high value to the principle of maintaining stability. Answering the question on what political

forces he considered to be most responsible, Primakov contended: “I will support any forces which advocate stability, the strengthening of Russia, the strengthening of statehood while developing market relations, a socially oriented economy, and democracy.”⁵⁷ It is noteworthy that stability was placed ahead of all other principles.

In 1997, an explicit attempt was made to incorporate ideas of hegemony and domination into actual Russian policy in the CIS. On the eve of the May 1997 CIS summit, the institute headed by Konstantin Zatulin prepared a special report for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.⁵⁸ The Ministry rejected it, and Evgeniy Primakov immediately disclaimed any responsibility for the report, since it did not reflect Russia’s official stand. According to Konstantin Zatulin, however, the report made its way from the Institute directly to the president, and some of its ideas were incorporated into Yeltsin's speech behind closed doors during the summit.⁵⁹ The major message of the report’s explicitly hegemonic approach was to demonstrate that Russia’s moderate policies towards near abroad could be substituted with more assertive ones. In order to prevent the Soviet successor states’ anti-Russian policies, Russia could stir political instability and inter-ethnic tensions in the region. In November 1998, Zatulin was elected as the new chairman of the Derzhava Social Patriotic Movement, founded by Aleksandr Rutskoy in 1994. This event demonstrated that dominators had acquired a party base by overtaking a formerly restorationist movement.

For those who subscribe to hegemony/dominance, Russia is viewed as a strong Eurasian power, which dominates the region. The major threats are seen in

hostile anti-Russian neighbors. Their regional groupings backed by the Western powers or Turkey are portrayed as a dangerous encircling of Russia. The alliance between Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, and Moldova (the so-called GUUAM) is viewed as extremely dangerous for Russia.

Integrationalism is being developed by those who call themselves Russia's political centrists. In some respects they are intellectually close to Gorbachev's team. These forces included the amorphous Civic Union and its spin-offs. Later, All-Russia's Union "Renewal," Sergey Shakhray's Party for Russian Unity and Accord, the Democratic Party of Russia, and the Congress of Russian Communities developed similar ideas. It is important to note that the project has wide support in other successor states of the former Soviet Union. Its most active supporter is Kazakhstan's President Nursultan Nazarbayev.

The essence of the project is the promotion of economic reintegration, which might lead to a defense and political union. Some versions of integrationalism envisioned a sort of confederation of former Soviet republics. The project is very pragmatic, emphasizing economy and security and downplaying more abstract components, such as identity, ethnicity, and nationhood. Supporters of this school of thought maintain that diaspora issues will become obsolete if the post-Soviet space is integrated in terms of economics and security.

There have been several major visions of the future Union. They were developed in Nazarbayev's Eurasian Union program, in Shakhray's plan for a Confederation of three to four countries within the Commonwealth of

Independent States program, and in Yavlinsky's Economic Union program. The key common characteristic of all these versions is the claim that there is a need for some supranational institutions, controlled economic reintegration, and the maintenance of major symbols of political sovereignty accompanied by a high level of cooperation. Unlike the imperialist project, integrationalism claims to be a democratic program granting equal rights to all participating states.

Egoistic interests of the Russian political and economic elite, the fear of Russian domination disguised under an integrationalist veil, which is strong among the post-Soviet elites, and the US policy of supporting Eurasian “geopolitical pluralism” are important barriers for implementation of integrationalist projects.

Integrationalists view Russia as a CIS member and one of the Soviet successor states. The major threat is the “Yugoslav scenario,” which may evolve if Eurasian countries do not cooperate on a wide range of economic, security and humanitarian issues. The general outlook of integrationalists is usually quite benign and peaceful.

New state-builders and imperialists were well represented in the State Duma in 1995-2000. It is only natural that those who represented a “new” Russia and an “old” Soviet Union were major political players. Their agendas were easily identifiable and comprehensible in election campaigns. However, it would be quite an oversimplification to reduce the nuances of political struggle to these two schools of thought. Ethnonationalists, integrationalists, and dominators were poorly represented in the Duma in their “pure” form, but their influence on the

politics of the major parties is significant and was only getting stronger. The last three perspectives' strength was not so much in their direct representation in the Duma, but in their intellectual influence across the political board.

The difficulties ethnonationalists have faced in gaining much direct electoral support derive from their radicalism and exclusiveness. They could not reach out to non-Russians, mixed families, many intellectuals, and all whose identity may be defined as "Soviet." The weakness of Russian ethnonationalism was well demonstrated by the failures of this project on the political arena. Dominators and integrationalists also did not appeal to the general public, since their ideas could hardly be wrapped up into catchy electoral slogans and put into the center of any campaign. I contend that ethnonationalism, integrationalism, and domination have been gaining much more influence by intellectually taking over the mainstream parties.

Several important changes occurred on the Russian political arena during and after December 1999 State Duma elections. First, the election campaign was dominated by loose and diverse electoral alliances, which united political forces and individuals whose perspectives on nation-building were fundamentally different from each other or were not concerned with these issues at all. Unity block had no program or people who would be able or willing to develop one. Fatherland-All Russia included integrationalist/new state-builder Primakov, dominator Luzhkov, and regional leaders who were interested in their parochial issues only. Second, those parties that had relatively consistent views of nation-building (KPRF, Yabloko, the Union of Right Forces as a heir of DVR, Common

Course, and Forward, Russia!) managed to preserve their representation in the parliament, though their real influence and visibility were diminished. Third, pure ethnonationalist, integrationalist, and domination forces were further weakened.

It may be argued that the issues of nation-building did not draw the party lines during December 1999 elections. It stood in sharp contrast with the fact that these problems did play an important role in intellectual debates and some party programs. This phenomenon was a reflection of personified non-ideological power struggle within the Russian political class. It contributed to interruption of the trend, which developed in 1995 elections in comparison with the poll of 1993, namely transition from loose Moscow-based election alliances toward more established parties with identifiable programs addressing important issues. Under this condition, the parliament will not be necessarily the major arena for the dialogue and competition between the different visions of nation-building. It will also lead to the formation of ad hoc alliances and chaotic struggles between different factions within the parliament. The issues of nation-building may unexpectedly come to the fore in these struggles and reconfigure, at least temporarily, political landscape of the legislature.

The five projects of state and nation-building summarized above are more or less “ideal” versions. Some party programs might include the features of several perspectives. There is a natural affinity between some projects. On the one hand, these affinities might serve as the basis for coalition-building. On the other hand, the parties that share similar views on the problems of nation-building and international security might be at odds with each other on other issues, such as

economic policy. In addition, differences on tactical matters might part the political forces with similar strategic goals.

Rethinking the Theoretical Framework

Mainstream Western Sovietology has concentrated almost entirely on the Soviet Union as a whole, paying little attention to particular nationalities. It prompted Alexander Motyl to accuse Sovietology of “traditional Russocentrism.”⁶⁰ Motyl’s assertion is especially illustrative for reconceptualization of the most basic premises in Soviet studies, which occurred in the late 80s – early 90s. In this period, in retrospect many scholars equated “Soviet” with “Russian.” Policies of the communist regime, especially in non-Russian regions, were uncompromisingly declared “Russian.” However, the relationship between “Soviet” and “Russian,” though of course intimately related, especially in the view of many non-Russians, is very complex. Many Russians, for example, believe that the Soviet regime was first anti-Russian. As focus of analysis for political scientists, studying the Soviet Union as a whole was not Russocentrism, but rather neglect of all ethnic groups, including Russians.

In the late years of perestroika, the problems of nationalities within the Soviet Union dominated the agenda of scholars and policymakers alike.⁶¹ Many volumes on newly emerging or reemerging non-Russian nations have been published since then. The constructs of collapse of empire, self-determination, newly acquired independence of freedom-loving peoples, nation-building, resistance to imperial Russia has dominated neoliberal academic and strategic thinking about Eurasian states. Many of these constructs represent the eighty-year

old Wilsonian worldview and historically look back, not forward. First, this approach ignores new trends in economic and political development of the world. These trends are usually conceptualized as “globalization.” Second, traditional framework of analysis ignores deeply ingrained perceptions about Eurasia, the Soviet Union, and post-Soviet developments held by many people living in that region. These perceptions may be conceptualized as “civilizational identity.”

The future belongs to economic, political and security interdependence, regional integration, transnational populations and multicultural states, open borders and multiple identities. Nation-building in the newly independent states of Eurasia occurs in an entirely new context than was the case in Central Europe in the wake of World War One. A new global condition brings along new challenges to peace and security and does not promise a problem-free world and prosperity to all. The issues of a new Russian identity and attitudes toward NATO’s enlargement should be addressed in the context of the most recent trends in international development, namely formation of an interdependent world.

Thus far, there has not been an explicit conceptual link between globalization and political processes in Eurasia in American policymaking in the region. From the perspective, which pays appropriate attention to globalization, Russian diasporas, for example, may be probably seen not as simply an unfortunate leftover from the imperial past, but as an important ingredient of a transnational future. Economic and political integration of the former Soviet republics may be viewed not only as manifestation of Russian imperial ambitions, but also as a natural modern development. Nation-building on an ethnic basis in

the newly independent states and rupture of traditional ties with the neighbors may be perceived as a counterproductive trend not to be encouraged by the West. President Clinton questioned the usefulness of the nationalist projects in the era of globalization in his speech at Mont Tremblant, north of Montreal, Quebec, Canada, on October 9, 1999. National independence, he warned, is often “ a questionable assertion in a global economy where cooperation pays greater benefits in every area than destructive competition.”⁶² This approach provides a good prism for assessing developments not only in North America.

It is important for the West to be attentive to the perceptions of the Russian elite and the public regarding Russian identity and Eurasian political map. A newly emerging Russian nation is too easily associated with a new Russian state by American foreign policymakers. The difference between the two is too often ignored. Just as most scholars, U.S. foreign policymakers have concentrated on the Russian *state*, not the *nation* or *civilization*. On the one hand, this focus on the state is quite normal, since "international" relations are primarily concerned with inter-state relations. On the other hand, ignoring the non-state dimensions of world politics might result in serious misjudgments and leave policy makers unprepared for new challenges. It is important to understand that, as yet, there is no congruence between states and nations in the former Soviet Union. Compared to their studies of other former Soviet nationalities, political scientists have lagged behind in studies of Russians as a “people,” or as a “nation,” in the post-Soviet context.⁶³ The civilizational approach also has not been adequately applied to post-

Soviet realities. The concept of civilization may be particularly helpful for the inclusion of mental maps into analysis and policy recommendations.

Throughout several centuries, Russian identity has been formed by the interplay of ethnic and non-ethnic factors. The latter may be defined in many different ways. Politically, these factors are imperial. In Dostoevsky's tradition of universalistic humanitarianism, they are panhuman. From the comparative cultural studies perspective, they may be called civilizational, if the ideas of Arnold Toynbee and Samuel Huntington on civilization as the highest cultural grouping of people are engaged. It may be argued that Russian civilization was long diluted in the Soviet one, though the latter represented much more than simply continuation of Russian imperialism.⁶⁴

Many Russians felt that they belonged to some entity, which was bigger and more important than just an ethnic group. Russian intellectual tended to define their national distinctiveness not in terms of peculiar songs, dances, or food, but in terms of a special set of values and attitudes which manifested themselves in the so-called "Russian idea." For a century and a half, the elite has tended to define Russia in opposition to Europe as a whole, not to particular European peoples, for example Germans or French.

Of course, not all non-Russians in the empire and the Soviet Union considered themselves members of this civilization, but there were many who did. If we look not at the cores of ethnic groups, or their ideal types, but at their margins, boundaries, and mixed entities, we will find, particularly in the Soviet period, tens of millions of individuals who were "Russian-speakers," and/or

ethnically mixed, and/or living outside their alleged homelands. Often having relatively weak ethnic identity they were more receptive to deethnicized Soviet, in this context – civilizational, trends. For some non-Russians, that meant linguistic and to some extent broader cultural Russification and thus expansion of the Russian civilization. For Russians, it was fulfillment of their peculiar self-imposed manifest destiny to “civilize” entire Eurasia and to assert themselves as prime bearers of a distinct civilization.

Russian perception of their culture as a civilization historically has presented itself in two different ways. On the one hand, there is the tradition of Danilevsky and Leontyev, with the emphasis on the separateness from and hostility to the West. On the other hand, there is the influential tradition of Dostoevsky and Solovyov, with their attempts to present “the Russian idea” as a set of moral values of openness and universality. “Russianness” in this case had primarily a civilizational connotation and could be perceived as an umbrella category for many nationalities. Later on, this approach was further developed by Eurasianists, who wrote about multinational civilization.

Imperial Russia and then the Soviet state collapsed. Disintegration of the respective civilization is still underway. On the individual level, a crisis of identity is particularly strong for those who have found themselves outside their alleged homelands or who simply have difficulty in defining one. Post-Soviet diasporas are fragments of a shattered civilization.

It may seem that the civilizational approach, as is suggested here, emphasizes the past. However, it also may be illuminative for the future, because

it goes beyond the current scholarly and political preoccupation with ethnicity, self-determination, and nation-building. Intellectual and political discourse often shapes social reality. It is especially true for the formation and redefinition of identities in the post-Soviet context. It may be argued that, on the one hand, there are many factors that may strengthen ethnonationalist sentiments in modern Russia and among Russian-speaking diasporas. On the other hand, Russians and Russian-speakers in the newly independent states may be viewed not only as leftovers of an imperial past, but also as ferments of a transnational future.⁶⁵ Russian heritage, like that of any nation, has many different faces, including imperialistic and humanistic ones. If the latter is properly engaged in a new context, Russia can play the role of a legitimate leader in Eurasia, as a center of cultural, economic, and political gravitation. However, the current international environment has not been favorable for such a result. Nation-state building on an ethnic basis seems to be the only game in the arena of Eurasia thus far.

Forging a New American and European Approach to Eurasia

The Clinton administration and the European governments have been trying to implement a policy of engagement of a new Russia. All NATO members encourage Russian integration into the world economy and its democratic transition. They support Russia's effort to transform its political, economic, and social institutions. At the same time, an important task of American and European policy in Eurasia has been to assure that the collapse of the Soviet Union is irreversible.⁶⁶ The U. S. has also shown determination to block any Russian

attempt to develop as a regional hegemonic power. The goal of American international leadership is incompatible with giving regionally dominant powers a free hand in their zones of influence. This is the area where the question of NATO's enlargement became one of the central issues in Russian-American relations.

Much of American and European geopolitical and strategic thinking about Eurasia has been informed by historic (and well-grounded) fear of Russian imperialism and an attempt to prevent its revival. Zbigniew Brzezinski, whose views, of course, do not represent the entirety of American perceptions but remain influential in the Clinton administration's national security team and Washington's academic community, has contributed significantly to this approach. He warned American policymakers about Russia's designs to revitalize "a regionally hegemonic Russia...to become again the strongest power in Eurasia. Unlike the old centralized Soviet Union and its neighboring bloc of satellite states, the new arrangements would embrace Russia and its satellite states (within the former Soviet Union) in some kind of confederation."⁶⁷ Instead, Brzezinski suggested another, much smaller, confederation, when he wrote about the desirability of "a loosely confederated Russia – composed of a European Russia, a Siberian Republic, and a Far Eastern Republic."⁶⁸ In other words, Russia, even in its present borders, is too big for Brzezinski's taste. Only a marginal confederated Russian state on the periphery of Europe, in future, may be included into the Euro-Atlantic system envisioned by Brzezinski. Russia in its present form is seen as a force that can obstruct American geopolitical goals of dominating Eurasia.⁶⁹

“Democratic, national, truly modern and European Russia” fits the goal of America’s primacy in the Euro-Atlantic community much better than Russia with imperial ambitions, according to Brzezinski.⁷⁰ Two positive components of this formula, namely *national* and *European*, paradoxically, may be destabilizing and counterproductive if interpreted as broad goals of the Western policy toward Russia. What has not been noticed is the important fact that national Russia, in the view of many common people and the elite of this country, includes all the Russian diasporas in the “near abroad” and thus spreads well beyond the borders of the Russian Federation. Abstract notions of nation-state are mechanically applied to the region, which has not had any relevant historic experience and where “national” primarily means ethnic. Building “national” Russia may also alienate non-ethnic Russians within the Russian Federation. This fact makes calls for a national Russia extremely dangerous for regional and global security.

Paradoxically, thinking of Russia as a potentially European state may slow her integration into international institutions and security arrangements. The size of the country, its diversity, nuclear arsenal, instability on its Southern borders, economic problems, the existence of multimillion-member diasporas, peculiarities of national identity make Western countries very cautious when discussing admitting of Russia into European or transatlantic institutions membership. Recognition of Russia as a significant and important other, on the contrary, may ease building a constructive partnership with her.⁷¹

James Baker III, former U. S. Secretary of State, thoughtfully suggested an approach, which recognizes the fact that Russia is different and that there are

limitations to outsiders' attempts to transform it into an entity that is well known to European or American experience. Still, this does not mean disengagement on the international arena. Baker argues: "A peaceful, democratic and prosperous Russia is strongly in our national interest...We must recognize that Russia will develop on her own terms and in her own way... Our efforts to help Russia meet her challenges can only have a modest impact on a country that vast and complex. But that impact in itself is well worth our time and resources."⁷² If Western policy does not have ambitions to change the historical identity of Russians, but limits it to efforts to help Russians solve their problems peacefully, within international law, and in cooperation with international institutions, it is worth this time and resources.

Recognition of Russia as a country, which deserves a much more sophisticated policy than simply the suggestion that an instant European nation-state be created on the ruins of an empire and that the U. S. must stimulate this process, has led some analysts to rethink a standard moralistic vision of imperialism. Anatol Lieven even suggests that some kind of restrained Russian imperialism must not be feared by the West and that such imperialism may block development of a "real threat." He has been one of very few Western observers who make a clear distinction between imperialism and ethnonationalism and who point to the greater danger the latter is to international security. When analyzing options for Western policy in the triangle Ukraine – Russia – the West, he argues: "The great threat is not that Russia will retain certain 'imperialist' attitudes and seek a sort of sphere of influence among its neighbors, for this is inevitable. The

West's task must be to see that it does so in a restrained and civilized manner, without either force or subversion.

The real threat, on the contrary, is that perceiving itself isolated from the West and threatened by its neighbors, Russia will develop a form of narrow, bitter, ethnic nationalism resembling that of the Ukrainian radical nationalists. In my view, for Russia to swing from its present mild and highly constricted 'imperialism' to such a form of nationalism would be no gain for Russia, for its neighbors, for Europe, or indeed for humanity – and it is precisely this outcome that would be risked by a misguided strategy of using Ukraine as a weapon against Russia.”⁷³ This conclusion is probably applicable not only to the Western policy toward Ukraine, but also toward Azerbaijan, Georgia, Uzbekistan, or the Baltic states. Lieven's framework of analysis is an important step forward in shaping a new policy toward Eurasia. It brings the threat of Russian ethnonationalism into the equation. However, limiting alternatives to imperialism, even restrained one, is ignoring another option, namely that of integration.

In sum, it is important for the Western foreign policymakers to go beyond the dichotomy “imperialistic Russia or Russia as a nation-state.” Thinking exclusively within this framework is to reason employing eighty-year old concepts. It would be helpful to pay attention to a different pair of options, namely “ethnonationalist Russia or Russia as a leader of regional integration.” Encouragement of nation-building may lead to endorsement of destructive ethnonationalism. Paralyzing fear of imperialism may lead unintentionally to a situation where modern positive trends of integration are mistakenly perceived as

signs of imperial ambition. Ethnonationalism and globalization, including regional integration, characterize the modern world. The issue of NATO's enlargement must be addressed in the context of these trends. Policy recommendations cannot ignore the threats accompanying ethnonationalism and the inevitability of growing cooperation among the nations, which usually starts with building bridges among neighbors.

While the theme of Russian neoimperialist ambitions in the "near abroad" dominates the Western discourse on security and foreign policy issues in Eurasia, the topic of economic and political integration in the region is mainly ignored. Many analysts have failed to see that there are not only neoimperial or nation-state options for Russia, but also an alternative policy to both of these scenarios, namely integration. The latter may prevent the rise of a militant, revanchist Russian ethnonationalism.

Within the internationalist option, however, there are several alternatives. In a path breaking study of integration and disintegration processes in the former Soviet Union, Terrence Hopmann, Stephen Shenfield, and Dominique Arel make an important conceptual distinction between four likely scenarios in the realm of integration: coercive integration under Russian domination, voluntary cooperative integration, chaotic unregulated disintegration, and cooperative independence. The authors came to the conclusion that

"the West must be cautious about interpreting Russian efforts to promote integration within the CIS as an inherently neoimperialist effort by Russian leaders to exert hegemony over former Soviet territory. In particular, the West

*must distinguish clearly between coercive attempts by Russia's leaders to use integration as a guise to dominate other countries, which the West should oppose, and other more cooperative efforts to integrate, toward which the West should adopt a more sanguine attitude. In fact, many experts [in Russia and some other newly independent states] argue that the West should aid integration within the CIS region, as the United States did in Western Europe through the Marshall Plan after World War II. Integration based on common historical and cultural ties, comparative economic advantage, existing infrastructure, and other common interests is not only natural, but in fact serves the long-term security interests of Western Europe, North America, and indeed the entire world."*⁷⁴

Whether U. S. foreign policymakers want it or not, a significant and influential part of the Russian elite strongly believes that the Western attitude toward economic, defense, and political integration among the former Soviet republics is negative. It was the main theme of the 1994 Russian External Intelligence Service special report "Russia – the CIS: Does the Western Position Need to Be Corrected?" It was very unusual for Russian intelligence to make a public statement on an international politics issue. This step reflected a strong conviction that the issue was extremely important and probably indicated divergence between the intelligence community and the Foreign Ministry then headed by Andrey Kozyrev. The report directly linked the fate of the Russian diasporas to the prospects of economic integration between the former Soviet republics. It said: "Creation of common economic space in the CIS is the only way

to reduce tension in the relations between the Soviet successor states arising from the fact that millions of ethnic Russians and Russian-speakers remain in the “near abroad.”⁷⁵ The report was prepared under the supervision of Yevgeny Primakov, then Director of the External Intelligence Service. In 1999, Primakov, the most popular Russian politician at that time, asserted in his memoirs that the Russian intelligence had obtained documentary affirmation from a very reliable source that the CIA was interested in preventing grouping of the sovereign CIS countries around Moscow. Analysis of the obtained materials led him to the conclusion that the leaders of some Western countries acted to undermine rapprochement between Russia and other CIS countries.⁷⁶

Of course, Russian foreign policymakers well understand that the Western position may play an important, but a secondary role in the failures of the CIS integration. The prime reasons for failure are lack of consensus among the political and economic elites on this issue within Russia, coupled with the extreme weakness of state institutions and the difficulties of implementing any foreign policy or domestic decisions. However, Russians may point to concrete Western policies aimed at preventing integration among former Soviet republics and at limiting Russian influence. They include a negative attitude toward a pro-Russian regime in Belarus (though human rights violations have not been any worse there than in many other post-Soviet states) and Belarus-Russia Union; vigorous attempts to keep a distance between Russia and Ukraine; readiness to spent almost a billion of American taxpayers’ dollars and considerable political capital to help build alternative pipelines for the Caspian oil which would bypass Russia; joint

military exercises of forces from the United States and the Central Asian nations; discussions of eventual inclusion of the Baltic states into NATO. American financial assistance to Ukraine and Georgia to demarcate and install technical equipment on their new state borders has been particularly symbolic for the policy of building walls, not bridges in Eurasia.

These policies may be perceived as anti-Russian by the Russian elite not only because they may weaken the country's preponderance in Eurasia, but also because they block solving the "Russian question" on the ways of integration. It stirs up anti-Western sentiments even among otherwise quite liberal parts of the Russian elite. Many Russians fail to realize that American policies are often not part of an anti-Russian conspiracy, but simply reflect other domestic and international concerns of the United States and its European allies. Many U.S. policies can be attributed to a desire to have a pro-Western regime in the country (Belarus) that now borders NATO, support of Turkey as the key ally in the Middle East (pipeline routes), domestic pressures of émigrés from the borderlands of Russian Empire and their descendants. The problem is that these concerns are often not balanced by due consideration of other factors, including those related to specific features of Russian identity and the existence of multimillion Russian diasporas.

The problem of Russian diasporas to some extent structures the whole of Eurasia and ties many former Soviet republics together. In the "near abroad," there remain about 23 million ethnic Russians, an additional 11 million Russophones, and many more of those non-Russians who live outside their alleged homelands

and prefer to speak Russian. Combined, they total about 30 per cent of the entire population of non-Russian Soviet successor states. Joined with the geopolitical preponderance of the Russian Federation in Eurasia, it makes Russia not simply a marginal *national* European state, but a potential center of a revived distinct *civilization*.

It has been correctly pointed out that the popular Russian view of integration or reintegration as an inevitable outcome is “more faith than strategy.”⁷⁷ Indeed, Russia lacked a well-developed strategy and consistent policy in the “near abroad.” However, the faith in integration is based on long historic tradition and objective (or perceived as objective) facts. In this context, musings about the current weakness of Russia as being an obstacle to its playing a special role in the region seem unconvincing if long-term factors are taken into account. It would be unwise for the Western foreign policymakers to try to restructure Eurasia according to geopolitical schemas that ignore the existence of Russian diasporas and civilizational aspects of Russian culture. Recognizing Russia as a central element of complex ties between Eurasian countries does not contradict the aim of strengthening the statehood of newly independent states. Moreover, it may contribute to peaceful resolution of difficult problems in building new civic nations in countries with the significant Russian populations, such as Ukraine or Kazakhstan.

Hierarchies of national interests are different in Russia on the one hand and in the United States and Europe on the other. Any issues related to the territory of the former Soviet Union stand very high in Russian priorities because

they are linked to the fundamentals of Russian self-perception. NATO should appreciate the concern of Russia for its immediate surrounding, the territory of the former Soviet Union. It is impossible for Russia to be indifferent to the policies of its neighbors. To assure that Russia's policies in the region are peaceful, the United States, Europe, and NATO would be wise to give active support to positive aspects of regional integration in Eurasia. American and European understanding and constructive cooperation with Russia in this area could have a tremendous positive effect on bilateral relations and may secure concert in other areas, including those vital for the national security of the United States and its European allies.

¹ Warren Christopher and William Perry, "NATO's True Mission," *New York Times*, October 21, 1997.

² *Ibid.*

³ *The Alliance's Strategic Concept. Approved by the heads of State and Government participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Washington D. C. on 23 and 24 April 1999* (Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press, 1999), pp. 11-12. For Russia, there is an important and soothing provision in the Membership Action Plan released on April 24, 1999. It

says that aspirants, in addition to assuming the obligations and commitments under the Washington Treaty and the relevant provisions of the Study on NATO Enlargement, will be expected to provide their views on, and substantiate their willingness and ability to comply with some other NATO documents, including the NATO-Russia Founding Act. (NATO Press Release NAC-S(99)66).

⁴ *Washington Post*, April 20, 1997.

⁵ *New York Times*, May 4, 1998.

⁶ Robert Burns, "Russian Opposes More NATO Expansion," *Associated Press*, February 7, 1999.

⁷ Internet.

⁸ "The Washington Declaration. Signed and Issued by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Washington D. C., 23 and 24 April 1999," *The Readers Guide to the NATO Summit in Washington, 23-25 April 1999* (Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press, 1999), p. 12.

⁹ Trent Lott, "The Senate's Role in NATO Enlargement," *New York Times*, March 21, 1997.

¹⁰ *New York Times*, December 1, 1994.

¹¹ *New York Times*, January 16, 1995.

¹² *RFE/RL Newslines*, Vol. 2, No 16, Part II, 26 January 1998.

¹³ *RFE/RL Newslines*, February 18, 1999.

¹⁴ See results of the survey in Valery Tishkov, *Ethnicity, Nationalism and Conflict in and after the Soviet Union* (London: PRIO, UNRISD, SAGE Publications, 1997), p. 252.

¹⁵ *Economicheskije i sotsial'nye peremeny: monitoring obshchestvennogo mneniya* 1 (1995), p. 72.

¹⁶ *Interfax*, March 12, 1998.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁸ *Interfax*, December 25, 1997.

¹⁹ Aleksandr Lebed, *Za derzhavu obidno...*(Moscow: Redaktsiya gazety "Moskovskaya Pravda," 1995), pp. 409-410.

²⁰ For comparative analysis of the Soviet Union and the Russian, Ottoman, and Habsburg empires, see Karen Barkey and Mark von Hagen, eds., *After Empire: Multiethnic Societies and Nation-Building* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1997).

²¹ Richard Pipes "Introduction: The Nationality Problem," in *Handbook of Major Soviet Nationalities*, ed., Zev Katz (New York: Free Press, 1975) p. 1; Roman Szporluk, *Communism and Nationalism. Karl Marx versus Friedrich List* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1988), p. 206; Richard Sakwa, *Russian Politics and Society* (New York: Routledge, 1993), p. 101; Richard Pipes, "Is Russia Still an Enemy?", *Foreign Affairs* 5, volume 76 (September/October 1997), p. 68.

²² See Hosking, *Russia: People and Empire* (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1997).

²³ For the analysis of different trends in historiography on this issue, see Hugh Seton-Watson, "Russian Nationalism in Historical Perspective," in *The Last Empire: Nationality and the Soviet Future*, ed. Robert Conquest (Stanford, C.A.: Hoover Institution Press, 1986), pp. 15–17. Also, see also Roman Szporluk, "The Fall of the Tsarist Empire and the USSR," Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrott, eds., *"The End of Empire? The Transformation of the USSR in Comparative Perspective"* (Armonk, New York and London, England: m. E. Sharpe, 1997), pp. 70–71. In this article, Roman Szporluk, while struggling with historical myths, effectively creates a new "negative" one concerning the non-existence of links between the Muskovy and medieval Kiev.

²⁴ See Aleksandr Vdovin, *"Rossiiskaya natsiya"* (Moscow: Libris, 1995), p. 105.

²⁵ See Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, "Chickens Coming Home to Roost: A Perspective on Soviet Ethnic Relations," *Journal of International Affairs* 42 no. 2 (1992), pp. 519-548; Roman Szporluk, "The Fall of the Tsarist Empire and the USSR," pp. 82-83.

²⁶ See Ronald Suny, "Ambiguous Categories," *Post-Soviet Affairs* 2, volume 11 (April-June 1995), p. 190; Rogers Brubaker, *Nationalism Reframed. Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 28.

²⁷ See Robert Kaiser, *The Geography of Nationalism in Russia and the USSR* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1994), pp. 252-253. However, the author's dismissal of any reality that stood behind the concept of the "Soviet people" does not seem convincing.

²⁸ See, for example, Liah Greenfeld, *Nationalism. Five Roads to Modernity* (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1992), pp. 261–274.

²⁹ Pavel Milyukov harshly criticized Nikolai Danilevsky for his “reactionary” and “retrograde” views. See Pavel Milyukov, *Natsional’nyi vopros* (Prague: Svobodnaja Rossija, 1925), p. 140.

³⁰ Nikolai Danilevskii, *Rossija i Evropa* (St. Petersburg: Glagol, 1995).

³¹ Feodor Dostoevsky, “Pushkin: A Sketch,” in *Russian Intellectual History*, ed. M. Raeff (New York, N.Y.: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1966), p. 299.

³² *Ibid.*, p. 32.

³³ *Ibid.*, p. 300

³⁴ Vladimir Solovyov, “Natsional’nyi vopros v Rossii. Vypusk Pervyi (National question in Russia. Volume one),” *Sochineniya v dvukh tomakh* (Works in two volumes). Volume 1 (Moscow: Pravda Press, 1989), pp. 333-349.

³⁵ Vladimir Solovyov, “Mir Vostoka i Zapada (World of East and West),” *Sochineniya v dvukh tomakh*. Volume 2, p. 604.

³⁶ *Ibid.*

³⁷ See Nikolay Berdyaev, *Russkaya ideya* (Moscow: ZAO Svarog i K, 1997), p. 62.

³⁸ Gennady Zyuganov, leader of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF), effectively endorsed the formula of orthodoxy, autocracy, and “nationality.” He argued that these principles, while being a conservative alternative to any attempts at reforms in Russia in the 30-40-s of the last century, nevertheless adequately reflected the historical and cultural pillars of the Russian

state. Moreover, he perceived the CPSU slogans of a “Soviet people as a new historical entity,” “moral and political unity of the Soviet society,” and even a “union multinational state” with a “single leading and guiding force” as a continuation of Uvarov’s formula. See Gennady Zyuganov, “*Rossiya – Rodina moya. Ideologiya gosydarstvennogo patriotizma* (Russia is my Motherland. Ideology of state patriotism) (Moscow: Informpechat’, 1996), pp. 224-225.

³⁹ See E. G. Aleksandrov, “‘Etnicheskoe samosoznaniye’ ili ‘etnicheskaya identichnost’? (‘Ethnic self-consciousness’ or ‘ethnic identity’?)” *Etnographicheskoe obozrenie* 3 (1996), pp. 15.

⁴⁰ For theoretical foundations of the outlined approach, see Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983); Miroslav Hroch, *The Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Cambridge University Press, 1985); Eugene Weber, *Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France* (Stanford, C.A.: Stanford University Press, 1976). For an application of this perspective to Russia, see Jeff Chinn and Robert Kaiser, *Russians as the New Minority* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1996).

⁴¹ Chinn and Kaiser, *Russians as the New Minority*, p. 61.

⁴² Petr Struve, “Patrioticheskaya trevoga ‘renegata,’ (Patriotic concern of a ‘renegade’)” *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, February 7, 1995.

⁴³ Pavel Milyukov, *Natsional’ny vopros*, p. 173.

⁴⁴ For the analysis of the Bolsheviks’ approach to the “nationalities question,” see Alexander Vdovin, “Natsional’naya Politika Bol’shevikov i Eyo Al’ternativy,” in

Russkii narod: istoricheskaya sud'ba v XX veke, ed. Yurii Kukushkin (Moscow: ANKO, 1993), pp. 119–78; Robert Kaiser, *The Geography of Nationalism in Russia and the USSR*, pp. 96-150.

⁴⁵ One of the first Russian thinkers who pointed to this continuity was Nikolai Ustrialov.

⁴⁶ For the texts of political parties' programs, see V. A. Oleshchuk, V. V. Pribylovsky, M. N. Reitblat, *Parlamentikie Partii, dvizheniya, ob'edineniya. Istoriya, ideologiya, sostav rukovodyashchikh organov, depytaty parlamenta, programmnye dokumenty* (Parliamentary parties, movement, associations. History, ideology, members of governing bodies, parliamentary deputies, program documents) (Moscow: OOO Panorama, 1996); Vladimir Pribylovsky, *Russkie natsionalisticheskie i pravo-radikal'nye organizatsii. 1989-1995. Dokumenty i teksty* (Russian nationalist and right-radical organizations. 1989-1995. Documents and texts). Vol. 1. (Moscow: Panorama, 1995).

⁴⁷ Valery Tishkov did not push disintegration of the Soviet Union as did Gennady Burbulis. Rather, Tishkov tried to cope with the realities of post-Soviet Russia.

⁴⁸ *Trud*, January 1, 1995.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

⁵⁰ Interview with Viktor Aksyuchits, the leader of the Russian Christian Democratic Movement, *Etnograficheskoe obozrenie* 4, 1996, pp. 125-126.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p. 129.

⁵² See Robert Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984).

⁵³ David Forsythe, *The Internationalization of Human Rights* (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1991), p. 90.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 91.

⁵⁵ *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, January 12 and 15, 1994.

⁵⁶ *Izvestiya*, January 2, 1992 ; *Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn*, March-April 1992.

⁵⁷ *Komsomol'skaya pravda*, May 5, 1999.

⁵⁸ *SNG: Nachalo ili konets istorii* (The beginning or the end of history) (Moscow: Institut Diaspory i Integratsii, 1997).

⁵⁹ Author's interview with Konstantin Zatulin, Summer 1997.

⁶⁰ Alexander Motyl, *Sovietology, Rationality, Nationality. Coming to Grips with Nationalism in the USSR* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), p. X.

⁶¹ Ian Bremmer and Ray Taras, eds., *Nations and Politics in the Soviet Successor States*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. XIX.

⁶² *New York Times*, October 10, 1999.

⁶³ I would like to mention the important writings of George Breslauer, who has analyzed Yeltsin's attempts to build a new Russian nation-state. See George Breslauer and Catherine Dale, "Boris Yeltsin and the Invention of a Russian Nation-State," *Post-Soviet Affairs* 4, volume 13 (October-December 1997): 303-332. See also the works of John Dunlop, one of the few authors who have attempted to address the problems confronted by Russians as a "people" after collapse of the Soviet Union. See John Dunlop, "Russia: In Search of Identity?" in Ian Bremmer and Ray Taras, *New States, New Politics: Building the Post-Soviet Nations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 29-95. Wayne

Allensworth has analyzed the issue of Russian post-Soviet identity as an attempt to grapple with modernity. See Wayne Allensworth, *The Russian Question. Nationalism, Modernization, and Post-Communist Russia* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1998).

⁶⁴ The term “Soviet civilization” was used by Andrei Sinyavsky, a prominent writer and Soviet-era dissident, to describe the cultural context of the Soviet Union. See Andrei Sinyavsky, *Soviet Civilization: A Cultural History* (New York: Arcade Publishing, 1990).

⁶⁵ Hilary Pilkington, *Migration, Displacement and Identity in Post-Soviet Russia* (London and New York: Routledge, 1998), p. 206.

⁶⁶ Zbigniew Brzezinski called this policy a strategy of supporting "geopolitical pluralism" in the region. See Zbigniew Brzezinski, "The Premature Partnership," *Foreign Affairs. Agenda 1995. Critical Issues in Foreign Policy* (New York: Foreign Affairs, 1995), p. 98.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 77.

⁶⁸ Zbigniew Brzezinski, "A Geostrategy for Eurasia," *Foreign Policy* 76, no. 5 (September/October 1997), p. 56.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 87, 197.

⁷⁰ Zbigniew Brzezinski, *The Grand Chessboard. American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives* (New York: Basic Books, 1997), p. 120; emphasis added. Brzezinski also wrote that "Russia... will have no choice other than eventually to emulate the course chosen by post-Ottoman Turkey, when it decided

to shed its imperial ambitions and embarked very deliberately on the road of modernization, Europeanization, and democratization" (ibid., p. 119).

⁷¹ See discussion of Russia's place in a new world order in Alexey Salmin, "Rossiya, Evropa i novyi mirovoy poryadok (Russia, Europe, and new world order)," *Polis* 2, 1999, pp. 10-31.

⁷² Remarks by James A. Baker III Given at the Kennan Institute 25th Anniversary Dinner. October 4, 1999, Washington, DC. USIA, 4 October 1999.

⁷³ Anatol Lieven, "Restraining NATO: Ukraine, Russia, and the West," *The Washington Quarterly* (Autumn 1997), pp. 74-75.

⁷⁴ P. Terrence Hopmann, Stephen D. Shenfield, and Dominique Arel, *Integration and Disintegration in the Former Soviet Union: Implications for Regional and Global Security*. Occasional Paper # 30 (Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute for International Studies, Brown University, 1997), p. 52.

⁷⁵ *Izvestiya*, October 28, 1994.

⁷⁶ Yevgeny Primakov, "Fragmenty iz glavy 'Poshel v razvedku' (Fragments from the chapter 'Went to Intelligence') *Sovershenno sekretno* 9 (1999), pp. 9-10.

Louis Sell, a well-informed retired U. S. foreign officer, who served as Minister Counselor for Political Affairs at the U. S. Embassy in Moscow in 1991-1994 and as Director of the Office of Russian and Eurasian Analysis in the State Department in 1996-1998, contends: "The U. S. approach toward the CIS has been a key element in convincing most Russians that the real aim of U. S. policy has been to keep their country weak...The U. S. has almost always taken the side of the former Soviet republics in their abundant quarrels with Moscow." His

advice is to conduct a very different policy: “We should encourage integration among the independent states of the former Soviet Union...This does not mean recreating the Soviet Empire but rather encouraging the states of the former Soviet Union to reestablish the economic, cultural and human links that are essential to rebuilding prosperity in the region.” (Louis Sell, “Who Lost Russia?” Remarks to the Camden, Maine Foreign Policy Forum on October 21, 1999, as posted at the Johnson Russia List on October 21, 1999).

⁷⁷ Sherman Garnett, “Russia’s Illusory Ambitions,” *Foreign Affairs* 2, volume 76 (March/April 1997), p. 67.

Russia fears further NATO enlargement, and has used the energy card in order to test the limits of its geopolitical influence in Europe.¹⁴ So what will happen next? Are Russia and the West headed for a new Cold War-style confrontation? Or will Moscow focus on overcoming its economic, social and political backwardness? What are the strategic factors that will define Moscow's behavior in the coming years?⁹ Igor Zevelev, "NATO's Enlargement and Russian Perceptions of Eurasian Political Frontiers," George Marshall European Centre for Security Studies, www.nato.int/acad/fellow/98-00/zevelev.pdf (accessed October 13, 2009).¹⁰ Michael Rywkin, "Russia: In Quest of Superpower Status," *American Foreign Policy Interests*, 30:1 (2008): 18. NATO's "Russian relations, relations between the NATO military alliance and the Russian Federation were established in 1991 within the framework of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council. In 1994, Russia joined the Partnership for Peace program, and since that time, NATO and Russia have signed several important agreements on cooperation. According to Vladimir Putin, he proposed the idea of Russia joining NATO to President Bill Clinton in 2000 during a visit to Moscow, to which Clinton responded that he Materials from mass media on NATO enlargement. Declassified documents today by the US National Security Archive at George Washington University. Published at: <https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/russia-programs/2017-12-12/nato-expansion-what-gorbachev-heard-western-leaders-early>.¹¹ When Russian Supreme Soviet deputies came to Brussels to see NATO and meet with NATO secretary-general Manfred Woerner in July 1991, Woerner told the Russians that "We should not allow [the] isolation of the USSR from the European community." According to the Russian memorandum of conversation, "Woerner stressed that the NATO Council and he are against the expansion of NATO (13 of 16 NATO members support this point of view)."

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